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This dissertation presents an urban history of Bombay/Mumbai from the perspective of a politics 
of plurality, arguing that while the city has emerged from governmental control and planning, its 
development has also been shaped by myriad popular productive forces of urban society. The 
dissertation traces the uneven development of the city through significant planning policies, 
popular movements, and lived experiences of various struggles against regimes of 
developmentalism—the governing ideologies of development, techniques, policies, and rules of 
law through which the city has been planned and governed. These ideologies and practices have 
shifted over time, but since the earliest days of Bombay’s urban development, they have marked 
the space of the city. Colonial and imperial projects were based on planned abandonment and the 
governance of differentiated vulnerability that was inherently anti-democratic and depoliticizing 
(even as it used the rhetoric and machinery of democracy). Myriad popular cultures of the city 
have nonetheless marked the space of city with a variety of political responses to 
developmentalist projects. This selected history, indeed the often-antagonistic interplay between 
two histories of the city, allows us to understand that planning has long been a terrain of struggle 
over not only the city’s development but also the city’s functional democracy. It shows that 
planning and development are the domains of both state and popular practice, however uneven 
and divergent those practices are.  
v 
Through in-depth ethnography, this dissertation connects the historical investigation of 
Mumbai’s development to the contemporary politics animating a range of urban movements in 
recent years that have mobilized working-class and populist visions of the city, its past, and 
present and possible futures. This dissertation chronicles a five-year popular cycle of struggle to 
establish a more hopeful vision of the future for the city by responding to, and seeking to 
reshape, the municipal government’s official twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034. In the 
process, a spirited municipalist politics has emerged in Mumbai undergirded by a rupture of 
those experiences and knowledges that define the dominant regime of urbanization. These 
politics demonstrate that the prospect for dismantling the anti-democratic forms of 
developmentalism that plan and govern the city emerges from attempts to forge collectivist and 
popular urban consciousness.  
By tracing this history, the dissertation argues that Mumbai’s contested cultures of 
planning offer important insights into the heterogeneity and plurality of the city’s futures. In so 
doing, the dissertation places Mumbai as a significant site for the investigation of the diverse 
trajectories in which the developmental futures of capital emerge. Finally, the dissertation calls 
for renewed theorization of the Indian city from the perspective of urban movements—the places 
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“When we labourers demand our share of this world, not just an orchard, not merely a 
field, we will demand the entire world.” —Sahir Ludhianavi  
 
This dissertation chronicles the rise of a five-year citywide campaign in Mumbai seeking to 
transform municipal and national urban governance programs, housing schemes, and land use 
policies—and in doing so, challenges the “juggernaut” of developmentalism and the pervasive 
production of urban informality in one of the world’s most populous, diverse and unequal 
metropoles. I interrogate the development of the city through significant policies and popular 
moments of its urban development, through various “regimes of developmentalism”—the 
governing ideology of development, techniques, policies, and rules of law through which the city 
has been planned and governed. I show how these regimes evolved in order to trace a genealogy 
of the present question confronting the city of Mumbai, namely: how did a city shaped by a 
deep history of popular and working-class movements come to be governed by such an anti-
democratic form of urban development? Lastly, I chronicle how the five-year mobilization of the 
citywide network of people’s campaigns called Hamara Shehar Mumbai (Our City Mumbai) 
sought to collectively imagine an alternative vision of development. 
Mumbai is India’s financial capital and is one of the top ten centers of commerce in the 
world. It is also the subcontinent’s most unequal city according to income and wealth 
distribution, in the second most unequal country in the world. Human development figures paint 
a bleak story: 60 percent of the city’s households live on only 8 percent of the land in informal 
settlements and slums; many of its residents are pavement dwellers or live in extremely 
congested and deteriorating tenements (chawls) while nearly 500,000 (4.79 lakh) houses are 
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lying vacant.1 It is estimated that every monsoon season, between one hundred and two hundred 
homeless people die for want of shelters and healthcare.  
Municipal water and waste services are not guaranteed to the majority of the population 
but accessed conditionally through complicated negotiations with municipal councilors and local 
area bosses; and some informal residents begin queuing for water at the community tap as early 
as 3:30 in the morning. As many as 277 people share a single toilet, and women especially are 
hard pressed to find time and privacy. Mumbai has less than half the required number of schools; 
60 percent of the city’s children are not even in school. (In the ward with the highest dropout rate 
in Mumbai, there is one school per 11,065 children).2 There is one health center per 92,000 
people. Trains operate at triple their capacity causing unbearable overcrowding and routine 
death. Mumbai has the greatest population densities in the world and the least open space.3   
All of these realities have been planned. That is to say that Mumbai’s informality did not 
arise due to a lack of planning; but rather as a result of the economic, political, and spatial 
planning regimes carried out by the city’s colonial and postcolonial governments over the last 
three centuries. As Ananya Roy (2005) has described, informality is a key mode of the 
production of space. This informality and fragmentation has intensified dramatically since 1991, 
when the city’s development plan was revised as Mumbai was undergoing a process of economic 
liberalization.  
                                                        
1 Figures according to 2011 census utilized in Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA) report, “An 
Exhibition on People’s Participation in the Mumbai Development Plan, 2014–2034,” April 2014, Mumbai.  
2 These figures are reported for Govandi by Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) in a multi-year survey project 
called the Transforming M Ward. See Mustafa Shaikh and Vikrant Dadawala, “Hell, Revisited.” Mumbai Mirror, 
Apr 6, 2015, https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/mumbai/other/hell-revisited/articleshow/46819842.cms 
3 According to 2011 census, Mumbai District Population is 33,38,031 persons and the Mumbai suburban population 
is 86,40,419. Population densities on average are 30,000 / km2 and in some slums 200,000 / km2. These figures are 
averages that become starker when broken out to account for the unequal access that women and other marginalized 
groups have to the city’s resources; meanwhile there are endless other indices one can look at. 
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H.L.T. Quan (2012) describes “savage developmentalism” as the “undevelopment” of life 
through neglect, repression, violence, and improvement schemes, which are all part of the “telos” 
of development. I expand the concept to investigate a dynamic ideology of space and a planning 
paradigm in Mumbai as it has evolved with the development of the city and changing relations of 
governance and the politics of the governed. The ideologies and practices that enable 
development’s “tendentious propensity to secure order and capitalist expansion” have shifted 
over time. I trace the origins of savage developmentalism in eighteenth century colonial 
Bombay,4 when it marked the space of the city for colonial and imperial projects. Beginning in 
the mid-nineteenth century, developmentalism then facilitated the conditions for industrial 
expansion. It once again transformed in the liberalization period, beginning in the 1990s, to drive 
the city’s neoliberal urbanization through finance and real estate speculation. Attempts to direct 
urban development according to the needs of growth and accumulation continually changed the 
relationship of planning to the development of social life in Bombay.5 In all, the machinery of 
savage development has been a dynamic tool for elite orderings of space as well as a decisive 
terrain of struggle by popular classes against it. 
Crucially, I demonstrate how urban development in Mumbai operates as a juggernaut that 
churns up a number of contradictory forms of urbanism while delimiting and foreclosing 
alternative futures. The concept of juggernaut has Indian origins. The Hindu deity Jagannath (in 
Sanskrit jagannaatha, or “world-lord”) is believed by many to be endowed with world-making 
powers. For centuries, thousands of devotees have together pulled towering and intricately 
                                                        
4 The city’s name was officially changed from Bombay to Mumbai in 1995. Like other scholarly accounts of the 
city’s history, I use Bombay when referring to the city prior to 1995 and Mumbai after. When referring to broad 
historical arc of the city’s development that encompasses both eras, I employ the term Bombay/Mumbai. This name 
change and the “vernacular struggles” of identity that propelled it are discussed in Chapter Three (cf Hansen 2004).  
5 See Swapna Banerjee-Guha “Urban Development Process in Bombay: Planning for Whom?” from Sujata Patel, 
and Alice Thorner. Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India. Oxford University Press, USA. 1995. 
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carved wooden chariots displaying the deity with ropes in street processions (yatra) of hundreds 
of thousands of worshippers. Occasionally, it is said, the devout offer themselves to be crushed 
under the chariot’s enormous spoked wheels. Juggernaut developmentalism’s expressive, world-
making capacities require routine and cruel sacrifice. Yet the connotations of an unstoppable and 
merciless sovereign territorializing of the earth it crushes underneath also suggests an 
inescapable dialectic of creativity and hope trapped inside the destructive forces of its 
development. Like the notion of progress that Walter Benjamin describes in “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” developmentalism “irresistibly propels” us into a future and leaves 
catastrophe in its wake. 
 
Figure 1: Jagannath Puri Rath Yatra, the procession of Jagannath. Image credit: The Festival of the Chariots by 
Jagajivana Dasa, Jun 1, 1978. Jagajivana Dasa, Volume-13 Number 06 (accessible at 
http://www.backtogodhead.in/the-festival-of-the-chariots-by-jagajivana-dasa/)  
 
Developmentalism is so often directed by elite imaginings and enacted by ordinary 
bureaucracies. It offers the promise of a future but moors the aspirations of most in an endlessly 
expanding present, imposing the depoliticized sense of a certain promised future for the city that 
cannot be attained except through development. In the contemporary period, this 
5 
developmentalism has centered on the processes and relations in urban society that constitute 
informality, extremely differentiated relationships to labor and polity, and eligibility for 
“recognized” urban life. It is here we find a situation of democratic institution-based planned 
development and selective abandonment.  
I investigate the categories and practices of political life in Mumbai that pertain to this 
form of savage developmentalism and within them, locate the visions of alternative futures 
emerging from various parts of the city. In the process, I offer a definition of informality as a 
terrain of conflict and antagonism that arises from, and further shapes, an already-historically 
constituted uneven landscape of social inequality, masked and manifested violence, and struggles 
over life’s possibilities. In this regard, I demonstrate how urban identity and violence have been 
central to the growing informalization of Bombay/Mumbai. How these contradictions can and 
will be “developed” is the fundamental question of the city and its future.  
The juggernaut of developmentalism is made unstable by the complex and contradictory 
forms of life that exceed its interventions and attempts to reorder society. The city’s myriad 
contestations around spatial and social claims on planning’s disbursements in one way or another 
reflect the instability of the very forms and politics of its development as well as the categories 
of political thought necessary to mobilize desired forms of urbanism. I argue that the traditional 
categories of planning—of labor and the city itself—have been rendered inoperable by its very 
historical, economic, political, and spatial uneven development of the city. What kinds of 
developmental politics and imaginaries have arisen in its place? The dissertation argues that our 
understanding of planning in Indian cities has to be rethought and that an anthropology of 
planning can help us reframe planning as a terrain of antagonism over what is possible and 
desirable—and most importantly, what kind of shared future people can promise each other.   
6 
 
Development and Democracy 
This dissertation calls for renewed theorization of the Indian city from the perspective of urban 
movements—the places of social mobilization, spatial politics, and articulations of social 
subjectivity and heterogeneity. I present a history of the evolving forms of developmentalism 
that have governed the sociospatial conditions of life in Bombay. I write a selective urban history 
of Bombay/Mumbai from the perspective of a politics of collectivism and plurality, arguing that 
while the city’s development has been shaped by governmental control and planning, the space, 
politics, and culture of the city also emerges from myriad popular productive forces of urban 
society. The interplay between these two histories allows us to understand that planning has 
always been a terrain of struggle over not only the city’s development but also the city’s 
functional democracy. 
I also argue that Mumbai’s contested cultures of planning offer important insights into 
the heterogeneity and plurality of the city’s futures. As I discuss in detail, beginning in 2011, 
tens of thousands of the city’s residents mobilized their visions of the city, its past, and present 
and possible futures. In the process, their movements demanded an alternative form of 
democratic development and city planning in Mumbai.  
At a time when savage developmentalism is the ruling and, it appears, unbreakable 
ideology of much of the world’s urban spaces, recognizing the conditions of possibility of a 
popular, democratic, and plural vision of development is an urgent task that extends far beyond 
Mumbai. Neither people nor governments make cities under conditions wholly of their choosing: 
ripping through those contested and possible futures are the immanent demands of capital. As the 
bulk of future urban growth is projected to occur in Asia and Africa, Mumbai and many other 
7 
Global South cities are dynamic settings for the diverse trajectories in which the developmental 
futures of capital emerge. The grand promise of planning is that it coordinates time and space 
and brings into actuality the possibilities embedded in each. Development is thereby called to 
answer capital’s most anxious questions: when and where? The recent mobilizations in Mumbai 
demonstrate that there is no prospect for true development without the dismantling of this 
capitalist development machine, and that such a task is both necessary and possible. 
 
Planning as Terrain of Urban Struggle 
Throughout the history of Bombay’s land use and planning, restructuring schemes have been 
proposed as a response to a crisis or perceived crisis in which the city and its economy were 
understood to be assailed by internal threats. In each case, new and drastic institutional thinking 
and planning was the order of the day. The first major institution of planning, the Bombay 
Improvement Trust (BIT), was introduced in 1898 after the city’s devastating plague epidemic 
led to a citywide crisis of governability and the first general strike. Throughout the next decades 
of “social governance,” from 1906–1925, authorities used police repression and land acquisition 
to confront growing labor struggles and consolidate class power and land holdings. The 
evolution of these struggles from the 1930s and 1960s, during the “age of labor,” however, 
produced a “distinctive urban character and civic tradition” in Bombay that paralleled the rise of 
peasant radicalism in the countryside (Chandavarkar 2009: 24). Both were regarded by colonial 
administrators as a significant political threat given the rising nationalist Independence 
movement, and therefore were made the targets of state policies and the subjects of 
underdevelopment. In the 1960s, proposals for an entire new city, Navi Mumbai, to the east of 
old Bombay, emerged amid anti-poor and anti-worker fears of congestion and overuse of scarce 
8 
public amenities. In the 1990s, after the historic defeat of Bombay’s mill workers strikes and a 
turn toward economic liberalization, increasing fervor for foreign investment and vitriol against 
the growing informal population inaugurated an era of evictions, slum demolitions, and an 
overall restructuring of the spatial economy.  
 In the face of these schemes, Bombay’s working classes have made compact and 
enduring claims on urban space and resources, countering capital and state development in urban 
uprisings, revolts, dramatic strike waves, and the building of everyday cultures of solidarity. 
Workers occupied space for themselves, shaped daily life in neighborhoods, and imprinted 
Bombay with its popular cultures. Since industrialization began in the 1850s, the daily 
experiences and political aspirations of Bombay’s working classes—the industrial workers and 
other strata of the city’s economy—comprised an important force in the rise of the city, including 
in town planning, sanitation, housing provisions, its popular cultures and political organizations. 
For the city’s colonial elite, an increasingly crucial component of planning and labor relations 
had to do with to concerns about growing militancy in the factories. Regulatory mechanisms that 
determined housing provision and municipal services as well as transportation were established 
in the field of town and regional planning and served as an extension of labor relations in the 
workplace to the neighborhood and home.6 In the post-Independence period, a state-centered, 
corporativist labor regime which emphasized legal rights, partially implemented and selectively 
granted, to small sectors of the working population coalesced with an urban planning regime that 
selectively distributed reservations of housing and other basic amenities in the form of working 
                                                        
6 The city, insofar as it was home to the working class, was regarded a key domain for planning the “social factory.” 
Cf Tronti (1966) for a theoretical discussion of capitalist planning in the realm of social life as central to the 
mediation of class struggle. Though informed by the historic development of class struggle in industrial capitalist 
societies of Europe and the United States, the concept of the “social factory” is also relevant to describe planning in 
the Indian case, as evidenced by the coterminous evolution of industrial and urban struggles in spite of uneven world 
development of capital and its region and global differences.  
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class tenements (chawls). Throughout, the astounding growth of working class militancy in 
Bombay in this long century was a clear indication that the planning strategies implicit in the 
state corporatist labor regime were not effectively containing popular political demands on the 
city.  
Workers’ politics, practices, and proposals left a lasting legacy on the culture and 
memory of the city, during times of rising class action and through historic defeat. These 
legacies endure even past the historic decline of the industrial workers movement of the 1980s. 
The city has since been home to strong neighborhood-based movements and organizations, 
though many have not been able to recast their specific struggles into citywide coordination. This 
dissertation investigates how that historic sense of working class transformation has shifted to a 
terrain of planning and development locked in place by a developmentalist juggernaut, and how 
contemporary urban movements navigate with their own possible future of the city. What 
inheritances of the antagonistic past—the narratives of struggle, collective emotional valences, 
and memories of possibilities, all conditional but material artifacts—are available to those who 
struggle in the city today? How do Mumbai’s residents draw on the city’s past experiences of 
popular cultures and collectivist mobilizations as they face an increasingly privatized urban 
future? Understanding these legacies and how they related to the planning cultures of 
contemporary Mumbai is one of the tasks of the dissertation.  
 
Planning Informality 
It is a popular conception in India that its cities are far too overcome by informality and everyday 
insurgences to be effectively planned (Roy 2009a), and that consequently, beyond enclaves and 
slums, there can be no shared future. In Mumbai, planning is most often perceived as absent. It is 
10 
often assumed that either the wholesale lack or ineffectiveness of planning is what leads to the 
city’s chaos and disorder. Consequently, the optimistic approach suggests that more planning can 
serve as an injunction against informality and will be a solution to the city’s underdevelopment.  
Despite appearances to the contrary, planning in Mumbai is central to governing the 
present order of things, “the formal inequality of capitalism” as a social reality (Gilmore 2007: 
78).7 Planning’s influence on the management of the present and the future is at the heart of 
questions that the recent citywide popular campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai sought to address 
in its elaboration of a number of modes of engagement and mobilization with the city and its 
citizens. Planning is most easily identified with land use and the spatial distribution of a desired 
built environment. But so too is it the active concrescence of the imagined city, the commingling 
of bodies, and the fixity of built materials that give shape to the commotion of daily life. 
Planning, by directing resources toward certain kinds of futures, reveals the existing imagination 
of the urban order of things.  
This dissertation critically analyzes the development histories of Mumbai and 
demonstrates how planning mediates and differentiates the city’s populations. It details how 
planning is a relation of power between urban populations and the developmental state (Roy and 
AlSayyad 2004). Rather than suggesting the incapacity of the state in maintaining formal and 
governable relations, informality actually enhances the reach of formal state arrangements (Li 
2007). The operations of the state at all levels of its vertical structures decide the conditions of 
“recognized” life and determine who will remain vulnerable to “premature and untimely death” 
(Gupta 2012: 4). Informality remains a persistent feature of the urban condition in Mumbai due, 
                                                        
7 “Insofar as the capitalist state must both help capital be profitable, and keep the formal inequality of capitalism 
acceptable to the polity, it develops fiscal, institutional, and ideological means to carry out these tasks.” (Gilmore 
2007: 78)  
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in part, because of the “arbitrary outcomes” (Gupta 2012:8–14) that emerge from the encounters 
between people and the lowest levels of the bureaucratic state. These registers of state 
domination produce informality as the vernacular form of Mumbai’s planning and development 
regimes. It is the production of urban difference, of subjectivities comprising the multiplicity of 
urban lives inhered in a system of competing hegemonies that both give and take away from 
capital and state its appearance of stability. These two aspects—the production of space and the 
production of difference—were of central importance to colonial and commodity rule in the 
early development of the city, and remain central to the present day. 
While Bombay’s contemporary informality has long historical roots, I argue that the 
nature of this informality has fundamentally changed since the historic defeat of the mill workers 
strike in 1982. Under conditions of expanding informality, the very historical, economic, 
political, and spatial development of the city has rendered inoperable the twin categories of 
planning—planning labor and planning the city itself. The effects of these changes on modes of 
production of space, on urban governance, on the daily experience of life in the city and the 
possibilities of recognized life and protected citizenship are reflected in the city’s myriad 
contestations. These struggles reflect the instability of the very forms and politics of its 
development as well as the categories of political thought necessary to mobilize desired forms of 
urbanism. This kind of urban development, which produces such extensive informality, is 
inherently depoliticizing. Planning in this regard has historically institutionalizing abandonment 
while depoliticizing the resulting popular discontent and demands for redress.  
Mumbai’s neoliberal economy has meanwhile failed to deliver on its promises of 
becoming a “global city”: globalism has led to new forms of provincialism, regional nativism, 
and class revanchism, aided in part by a right-wing culturalist agenda. Informality extends across 
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the urban landscape, from housing and water provisions, labor and land use, to the very illicit 
modes and practices of governance and widespread corruption and graft. Decades of 
development that exclude and marginalize differently the majority of the city’s populations have 
led to what activists describe as “critical levels of social alienation and apathy” that has dispersed 
rather than aggregated people’s energies and worldview.8  
Yet, we can find within planning’s dominant concerns, a hidden history of the social 
mobilities and movements that precede the planning. If we look at planning from the perspective 
of urban social mobilizations and the nature of these mobilizations from the perspective of 
planning movements, as this dissertation does, we begin to grasp the questions that planning 
opens up about how people attend to each other; how they govern and are governed; and what 
people do to shape their environment so they may dream intimately, imagine collectively, and 
ultimately recoup rather than abandon more just and human ways to live together. The visions 
and imaginations of these mobilizations, the viscera of urban social movements, point to a 
wholly different conception of planning, as this dissertation shows.   
 
Municipalism  
What kinds of new social movements are emerging in contemporary Indian cities around 
planning and urban life? Do they have the potential to bring together groups of the dispossessed, 
those abandoned in place and informalized on the one hand, and those who are more fully market 
subjects and liberal democratic citizens fortified through forms of entitled municipal inclusion—
in short, those regarded as populations who are to be governed as exception and those citizens 
who retain rights? If so, what do these types of social movements promise for the future of 
India—and postcolonial cities around the world? 
                                                        
8 See architect-activist PK Das, 2015: 92. 
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This research advances understanding of claims-making on the state in the Indian and 
postcolonial urban context in both form and content. In its form, populist organizations such as 
Hamara Shehar Mumbai suggest a challenge to the production of state-space by attempting to 
appropriate major functions of urban planning normally reserved for state agencies. This would 
counter recent claims that participation in state and urban governance programs in Indian cities is 
increasingly “gentrified” by elite classes and interests (Ghertner 2010, Zérah 2009, Harriss 
2007).  
In its content, Hamara Shehar Mumbai dispels assumptions that urban mobilizations 
among the subaltern remain fragmented, limited and sectoral in terms of caste, occupation or 
interest (Chatterjee 2004, Appadurai 2001). It is true that the long arc of development in Mumbai 
has been shaped by an instituted abandonment that has prompted a multiplicity of political 
expressions in slum community resistance, frustration and resentment among the poor aimed 
against one another on religious, regional, and caste lines, as well as political capture by low-
level bosses who assert control over neighborhood associations that have not been able to recast 
their specific struggles into citywide coordination.9 Popular expressions are increasingly 
associated with narrowly defined communal forms of politics, whereas progressive social justice 
campaigns are canalized by a non-confrontational infrastructure of non-profit organizations that 
depoliticize the discourses and practices of social movements attempting to organize against 
long-term abandonment of infrastructure and other public goods. Yet, Hamara Shehar shows us 
that a subaltern-led multi-class movement is capable of mobilizing its differences, overcoming 
fragmentation, and challenging Mumbai’s planning regime. The campaign claims its popular 
legitimacy because the content of its demands is informed not by a single sector or demographic 
                                                        
9 There are however ruptures of experiences and knowledges not wholly contained, disciplined, counted, or even 
planned for by dominant regimes of development’s abandonment and depoliticization.  
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group seeking exception and accommodation for its “narrow economic-corporate interests,” but 
through the forging of a new, ostensibly democratic, bloc in the Gramscian sense of cross-class 
and sector alliance (Gramsci 1971, Green 2011).  
This bloc is populist in name and municipalist in substance. I argue that as campaign 
participants’ experiences in the city attain a political perspective of the city, they begin to address 
planning issues that are otherwise routinely limited to the compromised realm of urban 
citizenship as increasingly expressed through market mechanisms for the distribution of public 
goods and services, security and law and order, environmental sustainability, public 
infrastructure, and cultural recognition. 
Savage developmentalism is most often the way postcolonial cities are enlisted into the 
global project of capital accumulation. Given the deep historical production of difference in state 
and urban space through evolving forms of savage developmentalism, what makes the 
emergence of this citywide participatory effort in Mumbai so extraordinary is the nature of its 
organizing directly on this terrain. That is why the forms of commonalities—shared urban 
imaginaries and spatial consciousness that serve to connect individuals and communities through 
their differences—are so significant. 
Mumbai is one of the world’s most populous cities and among the most diverse in terms 
of ethnicity, class, caste and language. It is also one of the most unevenly developed urban 
spaces in the world. Its trajectory is largely determined by the central government’s far-right 
Hindu supremacist political coalition, which is currently mobilizing the state machinery to enact 
a particularly brutal juggernaut of developmentalism across the country. It is all the more 
significant that this democratic, popular, and plural citywide mobilization emerged across 
religious, caste, class, and linguistic differences in an xenophobic urban culture long-dominated 
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by institutionalized forms of nativism and ethnic chauvinism. This dissertation reveals both the 
dramatic challenges that a renewal of working class, popular, and pluralist mobilizations had to 
overcome—and suggests that this mobilization emerged precisely because the stakes are so high. 
This research aims to intervene in a watershed moment in urban planning and governance 
in Indian cities. The government of India has made the building of one hundred new smart cities 
the cornerstone of its grand vision for unrivaled economic growth. Streamlined technocratic 
governance by experts is the administration’s strategy to enact India’s “urban revolution.” The 
capitalist urbanization of cities as well as popular consciousness of its discontents are 
increasingly connected and common conditions. The dissertation presents an analysis of the 
specific ethnographic and historical circumstances of a unique case study of Mumbai, yet it 
contributes significant findings to ongoing debates about the social forces arrayed in many 
Indian and other postcolonial cities.  
In an era of rising nationalism and xenophobic rightwing populism, a number of cities 
around the world are demonstrating the transformative power of municipalism through popular 
efforts to fundamentally rethink and reshape residents’ relationships with their cities. This 
movement connects an array of cities—from Barcelona, Spain to Jackson, Mississippi; from 
Jemna, Tunisia, to Mumbai, India—where residents across social, religious, class, and ethnic 
lines have united in their shared recognition that those who control city planning control the 
future of the city itself. Their municipalism, moreover, revolves around a renewed politics of the 
dispossessed, the informalized, and retrenched working classes, for whom the city is both 
workshop and neighborhood, marginal and popular, precarious and surplus, production and 





The passage toward understanding the present planning regime and its social, spatial, and 
cultural ramifications for city life in Mumbai begins with the earliest attempts at planning and 
social control in the city at the outset of colonial urban development. Combined, Chapters One, 
Two, and Three tell the story of Mumbai’s urban development from two perspectives: (a) the 
colonial and post-colonial state’s spatial administration and plan for its populations, and (b) the 
everyday lived realities of various communities and classes in the bourgeoning city. What this 
frame of interpretation reveals is a different history of Mumbai, one that views the city not as 
layers of personal and public cultures but rather as an archeology of social struggles in which 
people articulated and agitated for different but common-sense notions about the city and their 
world. It is from both vantages that a sense of the political cultures that emerged at various 
moments and sites of resistance in the city’s history may be recovered. The histories of these 
social struggles and the contingencies of the possibilities that emerged from them, moreover, do 
not stay put in a simple “past.” They remain scattered, yet potentially activated across layers of 
the city’s structures of meaning. This urban history assembles key moments in the long arc of 
urban colonial and postcolonial relations as they shaped the city and various social relations of 
subordination and resistance. This arc importantly coincides with a process of political and 
capitalist development that drove class and social (ethnic, religious, caste-based) differentiation 
and determined a unique spatial “pattern of patterns” written into the planned and unplanned 
landscape of the city.   
In Chapter One, I trace the history of Mumbai from an undeveloped Portuguese colonial 
outpost to the British Empire’s most prized port city, and the industrialization and immigration 
that accompanied this transformation. In Chapter Two, I detail the eclipse of an earlier colonial 
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economy by a rising industrial mill economy and its colonial and native bourgeoisies: from the 
first wave of enclosures that drove proletarianization; to the newer forms of enclosures that 
further entrenched sections of the working classes of the city and brought great numbers into 
pauperization; and throughout, the punctuated histories of worker and popular resistances that 
characterized much of everyday life in the city. In Chapter Three, I examine the post-
Independence period for the continued tensions between the Indian bourgeoisie and worker 
movements, which culminated in a wave of historic strikes in the 1980s, the collapse of the 
workers’ movements, and an increasing rush by elites toward new forms of capitalist 
accumulation and financialization of the city. 
 Chapter Two and Three detail how the development of working-class urbanism became a 
political matter of governance and planning. They also trace the development of various streams 
of collective consciousness during moments of rising urban dissatisfaction and ensuing crises of 
government in the making of Bombay as India’s premiere metropolis. This perspective offers a 
way of both investigating the urban histories of city life and a way of understanding the 
fragmented and unpredictable nature of contemporary city politics, in which a developmentalist 
regime has created the conditions of splintered urbanism (Graham and Marvin 2001) as well as 
the conditions of political recomposition through new municipalist imaginations.   
Taken together, the first three chapters argue that from the beginning of the city’s history, 
colonial elites, both English and Indian, developed Mumbai as a city dedicated to the success of 
various capitalist projects, from mercantilism to industrialism and financial extraction. Yet, 
urban development depended not only on colonial and elite interests, but also on the interplay 
between various social classes as well as economic development arising from the array of 
mercantilism, land speculation, and informal laboring practices unique to the contours of the 
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development of colonial rule and capitalist accumulation in the city. I argue that this dynamic has 
endured into the present, historically linking an internal economy to rural hinterlands as well as 
far-flung coordinates of an imperial world-economy, and thereby is an important feature in the 
telling of Mumbai’s history. These chapters explore this relationship with special attention to the 
nature of the articulations and mobilizations of various working classes on a changing urban 
landscape.  
In Chapter Four, I investigate the contemporary form of developmentalism at work in 
Mumbai, which has facilitated a rise in informality. I argue that the relationship between state 
developmentalism and Mumbai’s informal economy has extended to its official planning 
cultures. I trace the origins of this developmentalism through the colonial and postcolonial 
urbanization projects that required drastic transformations of land and labor unfolded through the 
logic of differentiation. These transformations can be understood as the historical production of a 
series of “group differentiated vulnerabilities” that exaggerate regional, subcultural and linguistic 
differences into outcomes and probabilities for class, caste, gendered, ethnic and spatial 
subdivision and reconstruction (Gilmore 2007, Robinson 2000). Bombay’s developmental 
histories have repeatedly involved processes of differentiation that continue to shape the 
contemporary experience of development. Understanding how planning in the context of 
widespread informality became a terrain of political mobilization in Mumbai is also the task of 
this chapter. Mumbai’s Development Plan has been revised only once in the last fifty years. That 
occurred in 1991, as the city was undergoing a process of economic liberalization. It was a 
momentous year for the foundations of Mumbai’s urban economy and has had tremendous 
consequences for how the city was planned for years to come. The effects of these changes on 
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modes of production of space, on urban governance, on the daily experience of life in the city 
and the possibilities of citizenship, are all crucial aspects of the urban question.  
How the urban question may be answered is the central focus of Chapter Five, which 
focuses on the emergence of the citywide campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai as it responds to the 
municipal government’s twenty-year Development Plan and attempts to challenge the 
established planning regimes with a popular imagination for the lived city and the city to come. 
In the process of this struggle, the city’s histories of development come to life. So too do its 
possible futures. From this vantage, we can better determine the conditions of emergence and 
suppression of certain forms of what might be referred to as “collective spatial consciousness” in 
the city today around the key questions framing the city’s future. (Cf Soja 2010.) I show how 
urban imaginations and senses of possibility are significant, embodied, and material features of 
practical popular politics and urban life. Given the heterogeneous nature of urban life, spatial 
consciousness does not assume a unitary character, and as the ethnographic study of the Hamara 
Shehar Mumbai campaign demonstrates, consciousness is created by the composition of myriad 
spatial experiences and imaginations of the city—what sections, aspects, dimensions of the city 
is, for whom, and for what. Nevertheless, the chapter also details how spatial consciousness can 
be fragmented by the very forces that produce it. This does not negate its existence and the 
political possibilities that emerge from it. Indeed, however infrequent and ephemeral it may 
seem, when collective spatial consciousness does take political form, its conditions of emergence 
must be understood in the contradictory nature of urban life. The chapter finds that while popular 
planning imaginations do mobilize material forces in urban society, they do so within and against 
a long tradition of state developmentalism that captures, deflects, and depoliticizes its 
resistances.  
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Chapter Six brings further attention to the urban commons in Mumbai as a significant 
lens for understanding urbanism in its cultural, political, as well as economic aspects. These 
urban commons illuminate the contemporary context of what I refer to as manifold planning 
“crises” and “impasses” that emerge in questions of infrastructure, governance, access and use, 
organization as well as how the city serves is the space for livelihoods, subsistence, labor, 
reproduction, surplus production. The commons also offer a perspective on Mumbai’s urbanism 
in its everyday dimensions and as the lived relations in the city. The chapter discusses how the 
commons is situated at the center of a number of recent urban developments, mobilizations, and 
imaginaries in Mumbai that challenge the prevalence of neoliberal ideology and practice in the 
government and lived experience of cities. New political imaginations and organizations 
constitute vocabularies of the commons as specifically urban questions. The chapter draws its 
analysis on the nature of the commons in Mumbai in order to raise questions of livelihood, land 
use, sociospatial difference, and organization. Both point to the significance of the urban 
commons for a possible post-neoliberal urban agenda in Mumbai and elsewhere. By identifying 
and investigating a range of urban commons in Mumbai, the chapter then investigates the 
emergence of a commons perspective in a range of popular articulations and mobilizations 
around “people’s planning” stemming from Hamara Shehar’s campaign.  
Chapters Four, Five, and Six together engage with the question of the reconfiguration of 
class in the contemporary condition of urban life. These investigate the class nature of commons 
as found in experiences of subsistence and reproduction as well as collective consumption 
(housing, health and education amenities, transportation, water and social infrastructure, open 
space), governance, and questions of exclusion. 
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In Chapter Seven, I investigate the question of what constitutes spatial justice in cities of 
the Global South. My central aim is to rethink the potential of dominant “subaltern urbanist” 
theories for the critical project of understanding urban society today and to pose significant 
questions about the resonance of subaltern studies as a descriptive tool, an explanatory 
framework, and as a radical analysis in understanding urban politics.  
Is subaltern urbanism a theory of urbanism or a theory of subalterns in urban contexts? 
This chapter tries to show that it can and should be both, requiring careful ethnography of urban 
life, but also endeavoring to produce urban theory of power relations as useful interventions that 
accompany many social struggles on the ground. At the same time, its theory of power remains 
largely skewed and limited. New tools of analysis that situate power differently and are up to the 
task of critique and action are not only possible steps forward in subaltern urbanist research— 
but necessary ones.  
This chapter asks many questions about the subaltern urbanist project and in doing so, 
tries to suggest new approaches wherein subaltern urbanism may contribute more effectively to 
the critical task of understanding politics from below in contemporary urbanizing India while 
also making important contributions to radical urban methodology that may help facilitate 
connections of critique, solidarity, and collective intervention alongside a range of urban social 
movements where they arise in diverse urban contexts. As such, the chapter develops a basis for 
comparison of how subaltern urbanist literature relates to recent critical “urban social 
movements” literature.  
What are the prospects of social justice in the Indian city? The dominant planning 
paradigms in Mumbai and elsewhere show little interest in an answer. Other approaches to the 
planning and development of cities must emerge, however much they appear unwritten and 
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unknown in the present. This dissertation demonstrates the contingent and conflictual nature of 
urban development. It lays the ground for an urban analysis of collective spatial consciousness. 
Both, I argue, are aspects of a heterogeneous class and social project of claiming the city’s 
future.  
 
Historical and Ethnographic Methods 
I combine urban historical and ethnographic approaches in the research and writing of this 
dissertation. What does writing Mumbai’s spatial history from these perspectives entail? 10  
Combining the insights and approaches of Marxist geography, postcolonial anthropology, and 
anthrohistory, my analysis of planning, popular politics, and the uses of imagination mobilizes a 
politics of space to grapple with colonial difference as well as urbanization as a process of 
capitalist development on a world scale. My writing of urban history relies a modality of 
relationships, and a reconstruction of the thoughts and events that give structure to history as a 
material force, and furthermore, that can grapple with “the ambiguities of the symbolic world, 
the plurality of possible interpretations of it and the struggle which takes place over symbolic as 
much as over material resources.” (Stieber 1999:383, White 1978, 1986) 
Temporalization is also an aspect of spatial struggle. Mumbai’s urban fabric is found in 
multiple dimensions of time, unfolding through the integuments of space and social power as 
                                                        
10. There are many levels of representation in which the city is involved: spatial, building, and architectural 
practices; material, physical and spatial forms, human action, behavior, protests, celebration, and contestations; the 
landscape is a cultural image—in all, space is a site through which social relations are manifest; this implies a urban 
historical approach that attends to, e.g. the means which architectural and urbanist form and political, economic, and 
social forces produce the city; and the ways they interact with other systems of meaning and social discourse (e.g. 
land ownership patterns, bureaucratic interests, and governmental policy as well as institutional contexts that give 
rise to the meaning embedded in the built environment). This also requires an attentiveness to the city as a place of 
meaning making, through but also beyond the artifacts of the city (streets, squares, buildings, all visible signs of 
social, economic and political processes) in the way they mediated popular engagement in the city; the city as a 
composite of “representational acts.” 
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well as in symbolic processes of temporalization through which changes in city life are produced 
in everyday spatial and cultural practices. Time, like space, exists through forms of state 
spatialization found in its planning regimes, in both the verticality (where the state acts “above” 
society) and horizontality (where the state encompasses its localities) of state practices (Ferguson 
and Gupta 2002). The collective character of time is also embodied in experiences of time in the 
city and consequently form a composite of the city’s temporal ontology, both ephemeral and 
durable. As we see in the following chapters, changing notions of time and spatial practices also 
serve to interrogate how state functions of verticality and encompassment that have led to a crisis 
of political imagination in which the “states’ authority over ‘the local’” appears natural (ibid.).  
The historical components of the dissertation were shaped by a “history from below” 
approach that I situated dialectically with the dominant forces structuring urban and capitalist 
development in Bombay. So too was my ethnography guided by a reading of developmentalism 
from the experience of struggles and the antagonisms that arise in the fields of development. My 
ethnography of the city relied on the extensive observations and participation I conducted during 
fifteen months of fieldwork among participants in three urban people’s campaigns located in 
Mumbai and other Indian cities: the first was Hamara Shehar Mumbai, a diverse class, caste, and 
religious consortium of slum dwellers, informal workers, planners, architects, and activists from 
across Mumbai who sought to appropriate authorship of the twenty-year Development Plan 
2014–2034 from the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai; the second was the recently 
inaugurated national Right to the City Campaign, comprised of sixteen “people’s organizations” 
across India who aim to collectively challenge and transform municipal and national urban 
governance programs, housing schemes, and land use policies. I also worked with Ghar Bachao 
Ghar Banao (Defend Homes, Build Homes), a member of the National Alliance of People’s 
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Movements (NAPM), which coordinated direct action and legal struggles for housing among 
slum dwellers, redevelopment-affected people, and informal workers in Mumbai. 
As an activist-researcher involved in the everyday life of these campaigns, I realized that 
the most critical and compelling view of the city, state actors, and important processes of 
development emerged not from elite visionaries and media accounts but crucially from 
grassroots meetings, interviews, and collective inquiries. As I learned from their experiences and 
activities and attempted to make sense of them, I learned to adopt the tools of participant 
observation central to ethnographies in the city for use in my goal of conducting an ethnography 
of the city—its collective urban politics, urban processes, and contested forms of urban 
development.  
My research combines ethnographic methods established in both qualitative social 
movement as well as urban ethnographic research (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, della 
Porta 2014) with analysis of documentary evidence on the campaign’s history, objectives, and 
actions. I employed a combination of participant observation of the everyday life of the 
campaign, collection of organizational survey data and semi-structured interviews, oral histories 
as well as content analysis of the group’s communication and media. This allowed me to (a) 
collect data based on a wide variety of experiences, and (b) enable comparison based on the 
unique histories as well as personal and shared accounts of daily life of participants in the 
campaign.  
I also employ a method of urban investigation based on co-research and collective 
inquiry to root my analysis in the ethnographic participation and collective experience of the 
citywide campaign (Roggero 2011).11 It is here that new forms of experience and knowledge of 
                                                        
11 According to Woodcock, “This idea of co-research builds on the traditions of workers’ inquiry, starting with 
Marx’s (1880) call for a survey of working conditions. This inspired a critical Marxist approach that sought to 
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the city emerged. As such, I have focused largely on collective representations of the city that 
have arisen from the campaign. This, I hope will be of greatest use to the many I met and 
observed who participated in the campaign. 
 Urban anthropology has long offered detailed and extensive understandings of social life 
in the city and also contributed enormously to our theorization of cities (Cf Hannerz 1980, Susser 
1982, Mulling 1987, Lynch 1994, Low 1996). It was a challenge to utilize such rich theorization 
and field methods to understand the city itself without obscuring direct experience and narrative, 
social meaning of action, and interpretative frames. I have also attempted to read my own 
ethnographic notes against the macro and mesoanalytic approaches of urban theory such as 
political economy, cultural studies, or discourse and media analysis. By centering the 
development of the campaign as the lens from which to analyze the city and its development 
prospects, this dissertation responds to the need to expand the resources with which we can 
organize our collective imaginations of what the urban world can and should look like (Robinson 
2004). It also stems from the desire to elaborate a political reorientation toward the project of 
developing what Lefebvre referred to as “a comprehensive theory of the production of space,” by 
taking spatial and social struggles as an important key for unlocking the enigma of contemporary 
urbanization. 
My research investigates the contested nature of planning imaginaries as a means of 
thinking about what it means to live together in the city and as a central determination of the 
conditions of possibility and impossibility of city life. I interrogate the political nature of 
developmentalism in South Asia and the ways it conceptualizes and orders urban life as a method 
                                                        
combine the construction of knowledge about workplaces with new experiments in organizing.” Woodcock, Jamie 
(2018) Digital labour in the university: understanding the transformations of academic work in the UK. TripleC, 16 
(1). pp. 129–142.  
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of uncovering layers of meaning, conflict, and action presently suffusing and interrupting urban 
modes of development and governance.  
Informed by a historical approach to the contemporary form and meaning of city life, my 
research on urbanism addresses the temporality of city life; value and difference in urban 
lifeworlds; popular imaginaries and movements; territorial contestations and state spatialities; 
and uneven urban histories of informality. I view these as vital issues for urban anthropologists 
and those in related disciplines who contribute to ethnographically driven theories of spatial 
politics, whether working in a global, postcolonial, subaltern, or comparative urbanism 
framework. The task of understanding and connecting the plurality of urban political expressions 





The Colonial Disorder of Things:  
Early Urban Development in Bombay 
  
 
“Autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and with what makes up the continuous flow of life. Here, I am 
talking of a space, of moments and discontinuities.” —Walter Benjamin, One Way Street (1932) 
 
Introduction 
The urban history of Mumbai detailed in this chapter situates the complex story of colonial and 
capitalist development on the Indian subcontinent and in a world context, and the vortex-like 
nature of its urbanization that has connected and reshaped the lives and histories of countless 
millions of people. This chapter identifies the historical origins of contemporary planning 
paradoxes and politics, exploring the vicissitudes of urban politics and policies since the colonial 
era that have produced the space and politics of the city. It reveals the structures, processes, and 
class politics that undergirded Bombay’s uneven development. The chapter highlights the 
various outcomes of uneven urbanization enabled by selective and class-driven planning and 
governance policies and what impact those have had on the people of Bombay over the past 
three-hundred-and-fifty years of its history since the 1660s. This uneven development has also 
shaped the strange and paradoxical urban world from which many city dwellers to this day 
attempt to fashion individual and collective life “after their own desire.”12 In short, the history 
presented here sketches out complex contestations over space and sovereignty that have shaped 
the city.  
                                                        
12 Harvey, David. “The Right to the City.” New Left Review. 53, September-October 2008. Quoted from Robert 
Park, On Social Control and Collective Behavior, Chicago 1967, p. 3. 
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“The Cinderella of English Settlements in India” 
The seven islands that were to eventually become present-day Mumbai were little more than an 
“inhospitable fishing hamlet” surrounded by mud flats when it came into British possession in 
February 1665 as a royal gift on the marriage of Charles II.13 Indeed, the Crown quickly 
transferred its “worthless possession” to the East India Company for an annual rent of £10 in 
1668, who in turn considered abandoning it on several occasions. In all likelihood, that should 
have been the end of an unremarkable beginning, and indeed, it was so for a century and a half as 
“Bombay remained ‘the Cinderella of the English settlements in India: the poorest, unhealthiest 
and most despised’” (Chandavarkar 2009:31).  
Yet this perception of Bombay was almost certainly at odds with those earliest colonial 
administrators and collaborators whose self-ascribed task was to develop the city ‘by God’s 
assistance.” Parsi barrister Phiroze Malabari zealously referred in his legal accounts of the city 
from 1661–1726 to the earliest days of Bombay as “one of the best governed and certainly the 
healthiest city in the East (1910: 11).14 Such was the assessment at a time when it was said that 
                                                        
13. The island’s earliest moments of “development” began with noble Portuguese subjects who first leased the 
Island of the Good Life (“Ilha da Boa Vida”) in 1554 from the King of Portugal under agreement that they 
“improve” it. Development existed mainly to facilitate trading along Portugal’s trade routes across the subcontinent. 
Trading of silk, muslin, chintz, onyx, rice, cotton and tobacco occurred between the Portuguese and indigenous 
inhabitants. Thus Portuguese development was limited to a warehouse, a monastery, a fort, and a shipbuilding yard 
on the main island. There were scattered mansions for the wealthy as well. In 1661, the seven islands were granted 
to the British as part of Portuguese crown’s dowry to Charles II, which at the time of his marriage to Catherine of 
Braganza, also included Tangiers as well as trading privileges in Brazil and the East Indies. The Portuguese retained 
possession of Salsette, Mazagaon, Parel, Worli, Sion, Dharavi, and Wadala for some years, making the transition to 
British rule difficult.  
14. According to The Spectator September 24 1910, No. 4291: “Sir George Clarke wrote, ‘of the early days with 
which Mr. Malabari deals, and man has laid a heavy hand upon the natural beauties which many visitors have 
recorded. A thick pall of smoke, the wasteful outpouring of numberless chimneys, overhangs the island and obscures 
the splendid background of the Western Ghats. Yet when the sunset paints the waters of the harbour and tinges the 
sails of the old world craft that still ply their trade unchanged since the time of the Angrias, or when at night the 
necklace of lights embraces the noble sweep of Back Bay under the stars, none can deny the fascinations of the great 
Eastern Gate of India, of the city which, in Gerald Aungier’s words, was to be built ‘by God’s assistance’. . . . While 
the wealth of Bombay tends more and more to flow to Indians of many classes, British administration has left an 
indelible impress upon the great city, although the guiding hand is now lightly felt.” 
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/24th-september-1910/24/the-beginnings-of-bombay 
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“three years was the average duration of European life”; “two mussouns (monsoons) are the age 
of a man”; and of children born there “not one in twenty live beyond their infant days.”15 Praise, 
in ready circulation by those who benefited from the city’s economic and political development, 
was heaped particularly on the “Father of Bombay” Gerald Aungier, Governor of the Island in 
1669. The Governor presided over East India Company’s schemes for Bombay. He was handed 
London’s city plans following the Plague Year and Great Fire in 1666, and with that, established 
Bombay’s first commercial and political credentials, founding a mint and court system, 
recruiting traders and artisans from Surat to settle on the islands, and also forming Bombay’s 
first police force, the Bhandari Militia, in 1672.16  
  
Figure 2: Demonstração da Fortaleza de Mombaim (Demonstration of the Fortress of Mumbai), 1635, a Portuguese 
map of Bombay indicates the early urban infrastructure (warehouses, fort, ship building year, houses and mansions). 
[Harvard University holdings]. Source: “Bombay: History of a City” in Trading Places , British Library 
Archives,http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/bombay/history.html. 
                                                        
15 Source: “Bombay: History of a City” in Trading Places, British Library Archives, 
http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/bombay/history.html 
16 According to commentary in the British weeklies, “Aungier strove to supplement the British laws in force in his 
factory by the employment of indigenous panchayats for the settlement of disputes, and thus anticipated an 
administrative device which has been revived in our own time” (“The Beginnings of Bombay.” The Spectator 
September 24, 1910, no. 4291). 
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As an early colonial city, Bombay was imagined as little more than an imperial base for 
securing maritime trade and as a major node in an expanding export-oriented network for 
communications and military operations in India. As such, the development of political 
organization and the economic systems in Bombay would remain subordinate to commercial 
trading and remained largely so in 1687 when it was made headquarters of the British East India 
Company on India’s west coast.17  
This commercial objective is reflected in the earliest planning of the city. Spatially, the 
town originated as a fortified harbor area on the southeastern tip of the island within and largely 
against a more dispersed eastern coastal region arrayed with the imposing and antagonistic 
Mughal, Maratha, Sidhi populations as well as Portuguese and Dutch trading communities that 
posed a threat to the Company’s holdings and tradings.18 A fortified area for European settlement 
in the southeast corner of the main island, with walls and sea-facing defenses from earlier 
Portuguese manors, gardens, and “factories” (trading posts), was the nucleus of early colonial 
development driven by commercial trade. Yet this was not a city built on a blank slate. There 
was agricultural cultivation on oarts (farms) “of coconut, date and brab (palmyra or tadgola)” as 
well as rice paddies and saltpans on the central and northern parts of the island. These were 
                                                        
17 As the imperial lines of urban development were being drawn at the dawn of the Victorian era, Bombay 
developed in relation to a larger territorial ambition to bring various urban centers in India into a coordinated 
network of capitalist relations of wealth and resource extraction and colonial administration. Indian towns and cities 
were central to the British Empire, and as such, colonization was central to the process of Indian urbanization. The 
British drove a wave of urbanization through the establishment of new towns and cities that both diverged from 
indigenous towns and created new towns whole cloth—varying in type and scale from small hill stations and canal 
colony, to the Presidency towns where territorial administration was concentrated, and eventually metropolitan port 
centers of Calcutta (Kolkata), Madras (Chennai), and Bombay (Mumbai). The control and use of “urban” and 
“rural” land undergirded these twin processes of imperial expansion and indigenous urbanization, and served as the 
foundational linkage between the city, the village, wealth and revenue extraction and apparatuses of administrative 
control. 
18 The Dutch attacked Bombay in 1673; piracy was barely resisted by fortification; between 1678 and 1690, Moghul 
armies repeatedly attacked Bombay, torching Mahim and razing the Mazagon Fort in June 1690 before British 
payments to the Moghul Empire concluded the affair. In 1737, Salsette was captured by the Maratha Empire and 
most of the Portuguese provinces in Bombay was ceded to the Marathas in 1739.  
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inhabited by koliwadas and sonkolis (fisherfolk), agris (cultivators), and bhandaris (toddy 
tappers), kunbis (tillers), all among the earliest settlers of Bombay. Precolonial settlements 
beyond the fortified area presented few barriers for land appropriation and reclamation, and 
existing developments largely yielded to the wholesale reorganization of space for colonial rule. 
Inscribed within Portuguese-built walls was “Fort town,” the British-occupied quarter divided 
since the beginning of the colonial era by an informal residential segregation. Europeans 
dominated the south of town; to the north were native elites—traders, merchants, and artisans.  
 The town itself was the scene of both residential and commercial affairs. This mixed 
town settlement belies the class logic of segregation that otherwise divided Europeans, native 
elite, and native workers. Thus, the European colonial quarter was home to natives as well, but 
was separated from the Indian quarter of lower strata by an open square (maidan). This was the 
site of growing tension and mutual mistrust in the coming years. The old and new “Native 
Town” was populated by a heterogeneous mix of class, caste, and religious communities: 
merchants and financiers from Gujarat, artisans, petty commodity producers and informal 
laborers from Deccan, Konkan and Gujarat.  
Bombay, as other port cities of the Indian Ocean, was a plural society (Ho 2006). As such 
there were many actors in the vast drama of land and wealth accumulation that accompanied 
early urban development. There were Parsis who settled in the nascent city during the Portuguese 
era mainly acting as brokers for labor and construction materials. It was the subsequent arrival of 
many Indian and British merchants of cotton cloth that led to the development of Bombay’s trade 
by the end of the seventeenth century. Between 1661 and 1675, there was a sixfold increase in 
the city population from ten thousand to sixty thousand. By 1676, the British policy of getting 
Parsi weavers to settle in the city was well established. “Cloth investment” on the island city 
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“was one of Company’s principal concerns” (Dobbin 1996: 82). Recruitment to the city of 
various classes and masses was selective, based on the requirements of early British commerce 
and industry. Yet want and opportunity drew people into the city from all over the South Asian 
subcontinent. The city quickly became a home to a number of different lived experiences of 
labor and subsistence in the city. This more than anything else created the conditions for a 
heterogeneous population that gave Bombay its early cosmopolitan character.  
The British at this time counted less than one percent of the population. By the late 
eighteenth century, native overcrowding on the prized lands of Fort, with its wall security and 
proximity to the harbor, pushed the town to settlements beyond the fortifications. As the city 
grew more congested with residents, laborers, and merchants, native elites inched into other 
predominantly European areas, from Malabar and Cumballa Hills, to Breach Candy and 
Mahalaxmi. The poorer parts of the Native town, however, grew disordered as it became 
increasingly congested. “Offensive” and “polluting” industries were relocated to areas just north 
of Town, where in the coming decades a bourgeoning laboring class would increasingly find 
their survival in both home and industry (this was where, in the 1850s, the first mills cropped 
up).  
 
Commercial and Spatial Development  
The East India Company largely confined its control and use of the narrow peninsula to the 
concentrated area of the fort and eventually “port town” in the south, sequestered from insecure 
lands to the north by a wall built between 1716 to 1723. It eventually expanded from Fort to 
Salselle; from the sea to the coast; and then from the coast inwardly. This was the first in a 
number of spatial paradoxes in the city’s development: fortifications and wall constructions, the 
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development of a fort within of a port town, and the inward concentration of colonial settlements 
here necessarily imposed isolation and self-protection.  
 The character of urban development in this period arose through a tenuous balance of 
defense and confrontation as well as integration and dependency. While the British Company 
eventually came to rule large areas of India with its own private armies, exercising military 
power and assuming administrative functions, it was not particularly keen on disrupting the 
balance of powers with the Marathas, who in large part regained control of the mainland to the 
east (from Mughal rule in 1533) and Salsette (from the Portuguese in 1737–1739), when they 
became neighbors to the Company. It was only the annexed Peshwa lands in the Deccan 
following the third Anglo-Maratha war in 1819 that propelled Bombay to the seat of British 
power in western India. Historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) argues that the emergent economy 
stoked by the British in the eighteenth century was a form of “plunder” (depleting the food and 
money stocks and of imposing high taxes that in part caused a series of great famines) and was 
no doubt a catastrophe for the traditional economies during the preceding Mughal Empire. 
Tellingly, the colloquial Hindustani word for plunder, “loot,” entered the English lexicon in the 
late eighteenth century and came into common usage in Britain and its empires abroad. 
 As economic opportunities gradually emerged against an otherwise insecure climate of 
trading and defense, the Company set about the task of opening up the islands for the further 
development of Bombay for trade and commerce by constructing a quay, customs houses, 
warehouses, ramparts (forts) and a port (where the Gateway of India now stands), market places, 
and housing, and a harbor that could berth up to twenty ships. The introduction of civil lines for 
colonial officials and cantonment for military quarters to the planning of the built environment 
radically changed the use and conception of the traditional city. With administrative and defense 
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infrastructure more secure, South Bombay soon became a commercial hub as new warehouses 
were established.  
 The colonial administration undertook land reclamations as early as 1698, with major 
works beginning in 1710 when breaches in the north closed tidal waters of Mahim bay and creek, 
to be followed by the closing of the breaches between Worli and Mahim, and still later the 
Hornby Vellard. By 1710, the construction of Bombay Castle was complete, which fortified the 
islands from sea attacks by European pirates and the Marathas. In 1728, a Mayor’s court was 
established in Bombay and a Judge-Advocate was appointed for the purpose of civil 
administration, which extended to city limits. The first reclamation was a temporary work in 
Mahalaxmi on the creek separating Bombay from Worli.  
 Between 1716 and 1725, the crescent-shaped enclosed area of the fort was home to 
British colonials and natives alike. Reliance on imported Surati traders (Buniyas) for trade 
ensured the extension of property rights to Indian elite merchant communities.  The Gujarati 
mercantile class was poised to be partners in the commercial development of the city. Their 
asking price was a list of demands centered on free land, ethnic autonomy, and respectability. 
B.R. Ambedkar details such demands in his 1948 Maharashtra As a Linguistic Province: “that 
no Englishman, Portuguese, or other Christian nor Muhammadan shall be permitted to live 
within their compound or offer to kill any living creature there; the right to carry an umbrella 
(presumably to glorify the aura of their status).” Most importantly was their demand for “land in 
South Bombay free of rent to build a house or warehouse.” 
 The fortified harbor town’s utility in the 1730s as a natural harbor was assessed for 
shipbuilding and deployment for the security of trade routes across the Indian Ocean less 
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dominated by Mughul trade in Surat, but still otherwise threatened by piracy.19 The shipbuilding 
industry started in Bombay in 1735. The Naval Dockyard was established in the same year, with 
the Bombay Dock built in 1750, the first dry-dock to be commissioned in Asia. Under new 
building rules set up in 1748, many houses were demolished and the population was 
redistributed, partially on newly reclaimed land. Between 1784 and 1845, four raised causeways 
were constructed that welded together the disconnected islands. 
Linebaugh (2014) suggests that the city and the commons appear as contrasting historical 
formations, the first antagonism appearing between the city and the productive hinterlands from 
which it draws surplus. He speaks of the logic of enclosure manifest in the function and built 
landscape of the town as an “urban theater of power” whose operations centered around 
principles of law (the court, the prison), money (the bank), and the commodity (the port and the 
factory), what he calls the “threefold essence of the city” (Linebaugh 2014: 28). In its forts, 
courts, and ports, as well as its factories, prisons, and other institutions of administrative power, 
from a burgeoning colonial station to a teeming metropolis, Bombay’s development “has 
embodied in all of these functions the principle of enclosure. . . .The great age of confinement 
begins—the hospital, the factory, the barracoon, the prison, the ship, insane asylum, old age 
home, the crèche, the school, barracks—become sealed capsules where the commanding 
principle (as Bentham termed it) prevailed.” (2014: 24, 26) The urban spatial production of 
empire in the form of walls and enclosures built to protect commerce and trade from an outside, 
to transfer wealth from the Indian interior to the city on the bay, and from the port and fort to the 
British metropole oceans away, have evolved into the formal and informal sites of contemporary 
                                                        
19 See Ho 2006, “Ecumenical Islam in an Oceanic World,” for context on Indian Ocean trade routes. 
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power from which, as Linebaugh states, were “interiorized to enclose urban wealth from the 
creation of commons in the city by workers who had lost their commons in the country.” (26)  
As an outpost and port, Bombay played a key role in the history of colonial rule that 
facilitated primitive accumulation in India. The commons of the swamp, the sea, and the 
countryside were not only “outside” the early colonial city, but its original location. We find 
commoners who were not merely rural transplants, but also original inhabitants who fished and 
foraged in Mumbai’s island villages. While many have been separated from their commons over 
this long period, it is significant to note how centuries of primitive accumulation, after which 
followed more than a half century of managerial and entrepreneurial urban governance regimes, 
have not managed to completely destroy communal and subsistence laboring practices, nor 
displace them from the city itself.20 Indeed, they remain crucial sites of development struggles in 
Mumbai to this day.  
Dispossession and displacement have a long history as tools of economic and urban 
development that facilitated the transformation of “nature” into urban space, from commons to 
capitalist formation. This history is written through the “invisibility of the commons” arising 
from “bourgeois vision. . . transmuted into the superiority of western economic ‘development’” 
(Linebaugh 2014: 249, 251). We can also trace this history through competing sensibilities 
around land use, namely the trajectory of divergences between Koliwadas (fisherfolks) and 
Adivasis (tribal) self-administration of settlements, their spatial and social relations with regard 
to life, livelihood, and planning; and the military and town planners of the British Empire. 
Indeed, the contemporary urban commons of Mumbai are layered with these clashing histories. 
                                                        
20 Nor are their livelihood practices constitutive of isolated rural economies transposed to the city but in some cases 
link to commodity and value chains that supply the entire city, region, and national economy (often through 
“contracts with supermarket chains, restaurants and wholesalers whose super profits are based on workers’ self-
exploitation.” Parthasarathy 2011: 57). 
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A Cosmopolitan Collaboration 
By 1780, Bombay had over thirty thousand inhabitants, of whom nearly 10 percent were Parsis, 
while the European population was not more than one thousand (Dobbin 1996: 82). Failing to 
realize adequate profits in its commercial trade of woven textiles to British markets and finding 
few prospects for selling British goods in India, the British East India Company had considerable 
debts owed worldwide. Exports of raw cotton from the Gujarati hinterland to China fomented a 
“commercial revolution” that changed this bleak scenario and ushered in a stage of urbanization 
into the hinterland that would revolutionize the urban-rural landscape.  
The ethnic and communal composition of competitive Indian entrepreneurs who had a 
hand in the development of Bombay explains the dynamism found in the business community 
and its sway over municipal affairs. Ismaili muslims, Baghdadi and Bombay Jews, and Parsis 
have had an important role in economic life of the city since its inception and indeed commanded 
substantial amounts of land and capital. In addition to Parsis, there were Vanis and Bhatia caste 
Hindus, Muslim Bohras, Khojas and Memons, as well as Sindh and Marwar businessmen. Even 
Swiss and Japanese traders called Bombay home (Markovitz 1996: 42). In the context of weak 
colonial administration and economic power, where isolation was not possible, it could not be 
otherwise. The shetias [merchant princes] of Bombay were important to the British Raj in 
Western India for both economic and political power. It was in collaboration in matters of wealth 
that loyalty could be counted. Governer Sir Bartle Frere in 1862 noted of the Baghdadi Jews, 
“They are like the Parsees [sic], a most valuable link between us and the natives—oriental in 
origin and appreciation—but English in their objects and associations, and almost of necessity, 
loyal” (quoted in Dobbin 1996: 94). British reliance on Indian merchants and financiers for 
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commercial partnership and political collaboration compelled colonialist to cede space for a 
dynamic and diverse class, ethnic, and religious composition of elite ruling class to emerge that 
would command spatial and economic resources over the bourgeoning town and region the mid-
eighteenth century onward. Early on, Bombay’s various elite classes enjoyed relative autonomy 
in governance, planning, and business affairs in this manner. As such, economic and 
administrative contact between British and variously composed Indian classes was key to 
Bombay’s development.  
  Indian elites claimed their share of the city’s institution, allowing them from the 1830s 
onward to be firmly entrenched in the public and political culture of the city as well as local 
government, the Governor’s Court, and by 1880, wider representation in the Municipal 
Corporation. Municipal affairs were governed by mostly autonomous—and sporadically 
unmanageable—town councils, all composed of merchants. These councils had barely enough 
powers for the effective management of their local affairs, and the ensuing lack of oversight of 
the overall Company operations in India led to some grave abuses by Company officers or their 
allies (physical assault, looting, theft, and other crimes associated with an occupying settler 
protected by a rapidly growing security force). Nevertheless, these alliances between various 
Indian groups and the British that formed the basis of an elite bloc in the city staved off crisis 
and conflict by aligning along class and property lines rather than caste, race, and religion 
difference.21 In this way, merchants, bankers, and industrialists who amassed power in the early 
                                                        
21. British policy since the beginning was to encourage self-governing councils (panchayats) amongst groups of 
Indians (the Parsi panchayat was established between 1673 and 1728, ending in 1830). 
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colonial development of Bombay would retain their power over the ensuing decades of imperial 
rule, consolidating their sway over the direction of urban development.22  
 
“A swarming, vivid, various humanity” 
That is not to say that racism did not exist or that racial polarization did not impinge on a healthy 
business environment in the late eighteenth century. It is just that a greater quest for money and 
power united Indians and Britishers alike and as such both elite formations deployed racist and 
class polarizing attitudes and strategies to suppress Bombay’s toiling classes. The British went 
into partnership with Indian bankers and raised revenue through local tax administrators and kept 
the old Mughal rates of taxation. This was piled on top of an onerous taxation system that 
already took one-third of the produce of Indian cultivators. These same cultivators would be the 
newcomers who arrived principally from Gujarat and Maharashtra in search of new economic 
opportunities. Villagers from the Konkan coast and the Western Ghats manned the docks and 
cotton textile mills. There were few incentives to disrupt the indigenous fisher villages and the 
agrarian and communal settlements of the Koliwadas and Adivasis (who had inhabited the other 
seven islands of Bombay more or less uninterrupted from 1000–1661 during the Magadhan 
empire, Konkan Silhara family reign, and during the Gujarat Sultanate starting in 1343). 
Municipal services and infrastructure, such as the city water system, were only proposed when 
Bombay’s poorer residents protested and demanded water. The elites already had their own 
private wells and opposed municipal public works that would service the lower strata of the city. 
Philanthropy was their substitute for entitlements through the redistribution of wealth via taxes. 
                                                        
22. These same Indian capitalists traversed the Indian Ocean in search of greater profits, seeking into the 1920s to 
turn East Africa, namely Kenya and Uganda, into an Indian sub-colony. Indeed, British colonialism was not British 
alone. 
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An account by a visitor to the Native town marveled at the “white men, brown men, yellow men, 
chocolate men, and very nearly black men” and declared that ‘nowhere in London or in any other 
European city that I know, except possibly Naples, have I ever seen anything like this swarming, 
vivid, various humanity.”23 Thus did urbanization and urban governance depend upon racial and 
class alliances between Indian merchants, clerks and petty colonial officers, as well as artisans 
and migrant laborers. 
 
The First Town Plan: Trial by Fire 
A major fire in February 1803 devastated most of the city inside the old fort walls, its dense 
markets and houses, and incited fervor among Company authorities for an effective spatial 
reorganization of the town. This inaugurated the city’s first “deconcentration” efforts. Town 
planning and nascent urban governance regimes sought effective barriers against unauthorized 
settlement in the town and established a precedent of attacking the “right to reside in town.” 
British administrators embraced the occasion to correct the large deficit in effective spatial 
organization of the town by relocating parts of the native population to outside the walls.24 
Attention was paid to questions of a rational and planned spatial use of the city. Entire 
settlements in the inner city were demolished, and large cordons were created to segregate and 
constrain the flow of natives into colonial quarters.  
                                                        
23 J. A. Spencer, “Native Life,” in R.P. Arkaria (ed.) The Charm of Bombay: An Anthology of Writing in Praise of 
the First City in India, quoted in Kidambi 2007: 22. 
24 Robert Peckham describes in Empires of Panic: Epidemics and Colonial Anxieties (Columbia University Press, 
2015) how colonial authorities interpreted and utilized moments of panic and crisis to further their colonial and 
imperial ambitions. See also The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 1950–1963 
by Alan Smart (Hong Kong University Press, 2005); and Anxieties, Fear and Panic in Colonial: Empires on the 
Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, edited by Harald Fischer-Tiné (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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Figure 3: A View of Bombay from Malabar Point during the Fire of 1803 (Engraver: Barth, J.S.; Medium: Aquatint, 
coloured, Date: 1804). British Library. 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of Bombay, 17 February 1803. Image taken from ‘Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency (pp 391). 
Edited by Sir James M. Campbell. General index, by R. E. Enthoven. 
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Separation but not segregation emerged as the paradigm of urban relations.25 Although 
meaningful distinctions were long observed between Fort and town, the “English” and the 
“Black” areas of the city, collaboration in business and politics took precedence over 
segregationist tendencies practiced elsewhere in the subcontinent. This formalized the division of 
social space into a European “Fort” and a “Native Town” to the north. The shift in spatial policy 
was therefore not simply racial. As Chandavarkar states, “social segregation in Bombay was 
always more fervently imagined than it was consistently practised” (2009: 19). The planning 
concern with a thriving and productive built environment suitable to the needs of the Company 
took precedent. A new town, based upon a grid, was to be built on reclaimed lands in 
Bhuleshwar and Khara Talao, extending north toward Byculla. Rapid commercial and population 
growth would defy the spatial order of the first imagined plan of Bombay. By 1849, 40 percent 
of the entire population of Bombay island were contained within sections of Bhendi Bazaar alone 
(Kidambi 2007: 33) From then on, the Indian town spread northward to Byculla and 
Kamathipura and westwards through Khetwadi and Girguam towards Chaupati.  
                                                        
25 Over the coming decades, planning was increasingly utilized to impose separation through the use of open spaces, 
canals, and railway lines.   
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Figure 5: Map of the Native Town of Bombay, 1855. London: Vacher & Sons, Stationers (84 x 102 cm). It is almost 
certain that this map was created for reasons of governance and police operations. There are distinct sections on the 




Capitalization of Land and Industry 
Land has been decisive in Bombay’s history, the formation of a colonial state, and its 
differentiated class relations. Control over the eighteen square miles was crucial for the stability 
and expansion of British power, both in the city proper, eastward in the hinterlands and 
eventually, across the entire territory of the subcontinent, and across the Indian Ocean. Bombay’s 
most significant developments were tied to these shifts in territorial arrangements and their 
ability to facilitate the advent of an industrial era.  
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 By the early 1800s, Bombay had a recognizable capitalist face with a high degree of class 
differentiation (Farooqui 2006). The first land surveys on Bombay took place in 1811 and 1827; 
and again in 1865 and 1872. Both sets of surveys provide us with reliable indications that the 
population in this period grew considerably (Dossal 1995:90).26 More importantly, these surveys 
were essential to the reorganization of land use in the city and furthering class differentiation. 
Yet they sought to “rationalize” and constrain various land rights and obligations, customary 
rights, communal rights, and inheritances. Colonial administrators imposed greater control 
through uniform land tenure that converted previous tenure arrangements into a regime of 
freeholding property that would enable British and Indian speculative land acquisition and urban 
development. At the time, the surveys identified nine different types of land tenure and 
ownership, and demarcated areas under each type. Thus did the surveys defined the legal claim 
of “Company land” and established the category of “encroachments.” The 1872 survey 
established all land on the island as “government” land, ending definitively the long-existing 
controversy of ownership, placing the Company in a stronger position when dealing with 
inhabitants of the island. “Resistance took the form of rioting and petitioning and reflected the 
anxiety of various Indian communities as the State began to make its presence felt by replacing 
traditional rights on land by a new dispensation” (Prakash 1993: 2119). Land was both the means 
of more effective urban governance and the first sites of resistance. The whole mapping process 
was deemed “the most complete survey of the whole island in every detail” and facilitated the 
raising of land rents that would define the coming period of private ownership. (Quoted in 
Dossal 1995:99) 
                                                        
26. According to the land surveys undertaken in 1811–27 and 1865–1872, the population increased form 230,000 to 
500,000 in this first period; and from 500,000 to 816,000 in the latter. 
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 Capitalist property rights strengthened over time, enabling land rents and building 
ownership to return vast profits, but also created a more expansive accumulation strategy based 
on land revenues in the city. This gave rise to a significant “class faction” of landlords amongst 
British and native owners. (Hazareesingh 2001) In 1855, Parsis owned approximately half the 
land in Bombay predominantly because three or four Parsi families had acquired large portions 
of land in the previous decade (Dobbin 1996: 90).  
 Shipbuilding in the city’s dockyards became another lucrative industry for collaboration 
and profit amongst colonial and native elites (as in the earliest days of Bombay’s development). 
Driven in part by innovations such as the steam engine in the shipbuilding industry (though still 
repressed by British laws preventing Indian ships to sail), and in part by the Opium War in 
China, Indian mercantilism inspired an early wave of industrialism. It was nascent Parsi 
industrialists who ventured to establish cotton mills in Bombay while the British exported cotton 
from India to Britain and then returned it via industrial Lancashire in the form of cotton textiles. 
Already having amassed a fortune in earlier trade and acquired city lands through commercial 
collaboration with the British, these Parsis were primed to take advantage of the vast supply of 
raw cotton, ample demand in China, and an abundant supply of low-waged laborers who could 
be recruited to the city from the hinterlands.27 Thus, it was the Parsi-led cotton industry that 
“stimulated the formation of a modern Indian entrepreneurial class” (Dobbin 1996: 90).28 
 As such, colonial rule was not British alone. Indeed, the British were not in full control 
but instead players in what was primarily an Indian drama of coordination and consolidation of 
power; and in which the British rise to power was calibrated through their cooperation with 
                                                        
27 For more on India in a world context of imperial “war capitalism,” see Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global 
History. Knopf, 2015.  
28 “Of the thirteen cotton mills established in Bombay in the period 1854–1870, nine owed their existence to Parsi 
entrepreneurs. (Dobbin 1996: 90) 
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Indian elites.29 It is in this context that in 1855 Bombay became home to the Native Share and 
Stock Brokers Association, Asia’s first stock exchange.  
  
Bombay and its Hinterland 
Bombay, from its improbable origins as a military trading post, was to become an imperial city 
within a new world market poised to achieve dominance over both the Indian Ocean to the west 
and a vast hinterland to the east. Early on in the nineteenth century, it was trading in salt, rice, 
ivory, cloth, lead and sword blades with other Indian ports as well as with Arabian cities. The 
British trading activities rose to account for half of the world’s trade, particularly trade in basic 
commodities that included cotton, silk, indigo dye, salt, saltpeter, tea and opium. This great 
outwardly expanding economy quickly necessitated much greater and more efficient use of land 
and labor within the city. 
The rising global connections to the urban economy certainly imprinted on Bombay a 
distinct colonial urban form as a port city surrounded by native industries. Wealth in and from 
the entrepôt, and from its surrounding hinterland, was largely driven by cultivation and trade of 
two commodities: Afghani opium exports destined for China and Indian cotton primarily to 
England. Trade with China of cotton and opium facilitated the only profitable part of the 
Company’s early exploits in the region (Chandavarkar 2009). Both commodities played a large 
                                                        
29 Nevertheless, achieving colonial control over India was a catalyst for the Industrial Revolution, which began less 
than twenty years after the British conquest of India in 1757. The East India Company accelerated the British 
Industrial Revolution, developing for the preceding several decades (from the 1780s until 1850), by providing 
necessary capital in the form of collected revenues and seized raw cotton from indigenous cotton farmers. Both 
capital and raw material would steadily flow from the subcontinent while prying open a vast South Asian and world 
market for British manufactured textiles imported into India without duties or tariffs. This conjuncture gave rise to 
modern industry, the engine of Britain’s Industrial Revolution being its textile industry. It was truly after the 
American war of Independence that the British turned fuller attention to India as an imperial symbol of power as 
“the jewel in the British crown. For more on this history as it pertains specifically to cotton and textiles, see Stephen 
Yafa, Cotton: The Biography of a Revolutionary Fiber. Penguin, 2006. 
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role in a process of urbanization driven by new technologies and infrastructures, such as 
railways, ports and wharfing facilities, factories, and warehouses. In a few short years in the 
early eighteenth century, the colonial port city was transformed into an industrial metropolis.  
Even during the height of this influence, the urban character of Bombay emerged as 
much from within a rural and village setting as it did from an outside colonial influence.30 This 
hinterland would not cohere around the city until well after the successful annexation of Gujarat 
in 1803 and the Maratha Empire in 1818. In 1830, the island city was connected to the Deccan 
by roadway for the first time. Urbanization created an urban-rural continuum across a vast 
hinterland. While geographically differentiated from rural life, commercial forays into the 
countryside both preserved and transformed primarily agricultural labor economies while 
cultivating occupations in the city. Improved communication with this hinterland and rising 
opium prices were necessary for the urban expansion into the countryside that would allow 
Bombay to truly become the “gateway” to India.  
 Urbanization and the related capitalist organization of cultivation in the hinterland drove 
a wave of largely caste-based migration that altered the urban structure of labor organization and 
thus the social composition of the city. In addition to distress migration after monsoon failures, 
rapid economic growth opened the city to migrants from throughout Western Maharashtra 
(Kunbi and Maratha castes from the Konkan coast and Deccan plateau, Ratnagari, Satara, and 
south Gujarat) and beyond the Bombay Presidency (especially from the United Provinces). 
Migration was structured through caste, kin, and village connections; mutual aid networks in the 
                                                        
30. “The Indian town in many cases is an extension of the village, carrying over the same social unities and 
attitude…. The linkages are so close and so pervasive that it is myopic, misleading, to see the town apart from the 
region from which brought it into being or sustained its economic activity (in fact the total dependence of the town 
on the region which it serves; no one has expressed this more clearly than Lewis Mumford in Culture of Cities, 
London, 1938:3).” (S.C. Misra in Banga 1991:2) Banga, Indu. 1991. The City in Indian History. New Delhi: 
Manohar Publishers and Distributors. (S.C. Misra, “Urban History in India,” pp. 1–9). 
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city generally grew out of these alliances. The explosion in the city’s population remained firmly 
tied to villages and rural life, ensuring that the commercial and laboring culture of Bombay was 
never the province of any one caste, linguistic, or religious group. According to the late historian 
Rajnarayan Chandavarkar (1994), caste and kinship competition for labor in the city 
consequently activated these same distinctions in the hinterland. Migration was mainly forced 
through breakdown of the rural economy and a consequence of the city becoming a viable 
alternative to the oppression of the landed upper caste in the villages. The urban identity of 
Bombay grew out of these migratory trends, the city assuming the condescending image of 
savior in its ability to absorb the desperate, make productive the destitute, and all the while 
maintain a detached indifference to the lesser fortunes of the country.31  
 The different migrant lower caste experiences of work and opportunities (as well as 
barriers) for mobility became part of the political landscape of the city as well as the caste 
character of spatial politics of the city. Mahars, for example, enjoyed relative caste mobility and 
were able to insert themselves into the industrial economy as coolies on the docks and in the 
building trades, millworkers in the textile factories, and hired hands on the railways. They also 
found their way into the ranks of police and military, as well as in municipal occupations such as 
public works and sanitation.32 Deviating from typical processes of urbanization, these forms of 
                                                        
31 Thus it drew factory workers and mill hands from the hinterlands of India in the way Walter Benjamin spoke of 
the dark miasma of Marseilles in 1929 as a “yellow studded maw of a seal with salt water coming out between the 
teeth…. When this gullet opens to catch the black and brown proletarian bodies thrown to it by ship’s companies 
according to their timetables, it exhales a stink of oil, urine and printer’s ink …” (Benjamin [1929] 1999: 232). 
32 Lower caste experiences in the industrial urban economy would later foster a movement against unequal status 
and treatment in the 1920s. This caste identity based in a movement for dignity and rights would sustain itself for 
decades. By the 1960s, the city would be the center of the Dalit movement, hosting conferences of the Depressed 
classes and headquarters for its organizations and political parties. Though largely confined to electoral and 
constitutional realms, the movement occasionally propelled itself into new and direct expressions in the city (such as 
the burning of the Manusmitri (a Brahmanical text sanctifying caste discrimination). Where advances in the anti-
caste movement failed to push the boundaries of upper caste consciousness (for temple entry, inter-dining, sharing 
community resources such as water), lower caste workers excelled in economic and political agitations, as well as 
education and social improvements for lower castes. See chapter three and four for further discussion of the 
mobilization of urban caste politics.  
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labor however were not meaningfully separate from agrarian life. This too was a factor in the 
city’s bourgeoning and differentiated cosmopolitanism.33 Educated lower caste workers would 
relay their struggles back and forth to their poor peasant brethren in the countryside (Omvedt 
1994: 142). 
 Chambhars, on the other hand, continued their traditional occupations as leather 
craftsmen, but now performed their labor both directly to supply the factory system and for a 
more urban and anonymous clientele whose tastes were influenced by the industrial economy; in 
both, they faced conditions of wage and contractual work vastly different from the permanent 
and servile jajmani system (wherein higher landed castes extract services from lower castes in 
exchange for grain). Matangs, another part of the untouchable groups of Bombay, populated the 
ranks of the largely unskilled labor force. In all cases, however, caste continued to shape 
segregation in hiring practices, living conditions, and access to urban amenities.34  
 
Infrastructural Development of the Mercantile City  
As an expanding city, Bombay was able to absorb distress-driven rural migration and even 
represent itself as a beacon for those “worthy destitutes” of the famine of 1820 (Masselos; 
quoted in Prakash 1993:2119). Yet Bombay had not yet established a municipal corporation and 
other city institutions when it was hit by its own water famine in 1824. Bombay City Hall was 
built during the period from 1820 to 1835. New construction during this time transformed the 
                                                        
33 Cf Chandavarkar 2009: 17–18 (“Bombay’s perennial modernities”) for a corresponding description of the social 
composition of Bombay at this time.  
34 In the ensuing industrial period, they were often excluded from working class housing (chawls) by landlords and 
residents alike, and therefore were often force into improvised huts and sheds (zavlis) of corrugated iron and wood, 
without light or ventilation, taps, latrines, or water supply. Eventually, accommodations were made available, albeit 
still along caste lines, in the municipal chawls built by the BDDB and BIT in 1924. These would serve as the home 
of the Ambedkarite movement for generations to come, sustaining the Republican Party of India and the Dalit 
Panthers in the post-Independence era. 
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urban landscape, such as the Wilson College Chaupati (1832), Malabar Hill; the first access road 
to Malabar Point was built in 1828 (the Governor moved there in 1885). The construction of the 
new mint commenced in 1825, while the Bombay Chamber of Commerce was established in 





































Figure 6: Maps of the seven islands of Bombay before and after land reclamation, 1843 and 1893 (James Douglas, 
Map of the Island of Bombay, “Bombay and Western India. A series of stray papers” (1893), British Library. 
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Meanwhile, reclamation projects slowly connected the seven separate islands into one 
land mass. In 1838, the islands of Colaba and Little Colaba were connected to Bombay by the 
Colaba Causeway. Most of the reclaimed lands of what constituted the city had only a few 
decades earlier been submerged by the sea. The expansion of physical land only exacerbated 
planning pressures. Uneven economic and urban growth rapidly outpaced infrastructural 
demands on the bourgeoning commercial, industrial, and international port city. Yet owing to 
severe governmental and economic disinclination toward social development at odds with 
commercial and industrial development, coherent social policy and planning was severely 
lacking. The eschewing of social planning at the advent of industrializing Bombay represented 
both an economic and aesthetic calculus as ruling class urban ambitions consolidated perceptions 
about how the lower stratas lived, their customs and habits, and what might be considered 
minimum standards of living.  
Late eighteen-century Victorian values and imaginaries were pervasive in Bombay—from 
the introduction of western education and law, leisure and industry, the twin growth of wealth 
and the built environment from industrial colonial modernity and high architectural styles—and 
increasingly symbolized the power and prowess of colonial rule over the city. These ideological 
and aspirational effects on local elites, especially the “westernizing” Parsi propertied and 
business class, is not to be underestimated, for it did a lot to forge the cosmopolitan and eclectic 
political elite culture in Bombay. So too did it cause a radical bifurcation of the urban fabric into 
poorer indigenous forms and experiences of city life, and the haute-style of the colonial 
administration and its collaborationist strata of Indian elites.  
 The British could hardly finance municipal “improvement” through taxation of their 
“favored collaborators: the city’s sheiks, merchant princes, and millowners”—“all fat, rich, and 
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happy,” as one report to Queen Victoria phrased it (Chandavarkar 2009: 35). Nevertheless, elites 
indulged their civic pride in governance and planning affairs mainly through philanthropy and 
highly selective and self-serving legacy projects for Bombay’s “improvement,” endowing 
hospitals, schools, libraries, and university buildings. This could not in the slightest address the 
fact that the rate of economic growth spurred by cotton was quickly outpacing urban 
development. At the same time, the role of Bombay’s mill owners and the expanding industrial 
economy in influencing urban relations and political culture translated into bourgeois mistrust of 
workers as unruly and undeserving across the city’s landscape. This would have a far-reaching 
effect on elite understandings of what provisions and services were expected from local 
government and simultaneously weakened the chances that Bombay’s working classes would be 
able to successfully direct their concern for welfare to a receptive governing elite. Indeed, basic 
urban infrastructure was allocated by the state along strict class lines. Not incidentally, one of the 
first municipal funds was established in 1845 to finance the operation of the city police.  
 
Territorial Colonialism and New State Spaces  
The Indian Rebellion of 1857, what Marx once presciently referred to as the ‘First Indian War of 
independence’, raised perhaps for the first time for the British the specter of widespread 
ungovernability in colonial India.35 It led to a frantic reorganization of political power and, with 
the Government of India Act 1858, the consolidation of state power in the form of the Raj.36 
                                                        
35 During Company rule over the city, Bombay was to become an important colonial “gateway” on the western coast 
of India for wealth extraction from the hinterland and the rest of the subcontinent. Imperialist and mercantilist 
ambitions were at the center of the class-nature of city’s development, largely unrestricted by preexisting settlement; 
as such, colonial and elite interests took up desirable lands. Defense and confrontation emerged as twin strategies to 
consolidate power in Bombay and establish control over the hinterlands, both vital to the colonial project. The 
construction of territorial rule combined British countenance and hubris in matters of governance with industrial 
ambitions.  
36 “The suppression of the rebellion of 1857 marked the end of the protracted denouement of the East India 
Company as a governing apparatus and consolidated the shift from mercantile to territorial colonialism. It also 
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Following the dissolution of East India Company rule, the British government took on a different 
approach to the form and function of the town, seeking to diminish the history of military 
conquest and highlight instead the city as a lively center for imperial trade and commerce.  
With regard to Bombay, the rebellion initiated an unprecedented and cautious process of 
sanitary reform, understood as a requisite for economic and commercial prosperity. Bombay had 
increasingly preoccupied and fascinated British administrators as both “a laboratory and 
exemplar of urban planning” where accumulated urban knowledge from both metropolis and 
colony could be assessed and mastered in the form of civic norms, practices, and statistics (e.g. 
the strange fact that Bombay had a lower mortality rate than London in the 1860s and in some 
cases a better health and hygiene record) (Varma 2011: 128).  
A new “colonial state space” with both reform and sovereign repression at its center, was 
created in the post-1857 era (Goswami 2004).37 The demolition of ramparts and reclamations of 
the sea gave way to the use of additional lands for this ambition, utilizing imposing architectural 
projects such as the Bombay High Court and the Municipal Corporation, as well as the Victoria 
Terminus. As the commercial center of Bombay, the Fort district would now become the center 
of an emerging colonial industrial modernism.  
 The antinomies of colonial urban development were there after better maintained in 
institution, law, economy, and built environment, lest the specter of insurrection rise again. The 
Raj strengthened and expanded its infrastructure via the court system, legal procedures, and 
statutes which introduced new penal codes as well as new codes of civil and criminal procedure, 
                                                        
inaugurated a spectacular reworking of the institutional, political-economic, and spatial coordinates of the colonial 
state, its technologies of power, and its material and epistemological modes of reproduction” (Goswami 2004: 8).  
37 According to Goswami, “The making of colonial state space and the lived geographies it generated during the 
post-1857 era—from railway journeys to the circulation of ever-more-reified money forms to the racialization of the 
labor force to the localization of colonial pedagogical practices—framed the experience of colonial-domination- as-
lived for the vast majority of colonial subjects in colonial India” (2004:9).  
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based largely on English law. It introduced many rules, regulations, and practices that aimed to 
make Indian cities more easily manageable and legible to the British so that control over them 
would be easier via the establishment of nominated municipal authorities. The Raj also took to 
widening the roads, demolition of crowded areas, and the establishment of physical markers of 
imperial colonial authority.38  
 Consider the changes that occurred within the city during this period of regional 
connection and communication: the first-ever Indian railway line began operations between 
Bombay and neighboring Thane over a distance of 21 miles on April 16, 1853. In 1857, the 
University of Bombay was the first modern institution of higher education to be bestowed upon 
India. In 1860, a central railway was established that connected Bombay to Gujarat via the 
Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway (BB&CI) company, incorporated just five years 
prior. This same company inaugurated the first suburban train line from Colaba in the southern 
tip of the island to Virar, currently the northern most part of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region 
(MMR). Meanwhile, telegraph lines were laid from 1850s onward, with five lines operating in 
town by 1860.  India’s first train embarked on its maiden voyage by steam from the Boree 
Bunder Station in 1853. Expanding locomotive and communicative networks established deeper 
connections to the hinterland that was essential to the city’s growth and to the development of 
industrial capitalism in the region. The Bombay Port Trust was established in 1870 for the 
development and administration of the port, and reclaimed 165 acres between 1873 and 1909 for 
the improvement of the city’s docks (Chandvarkar 2009). Port facilities expanded between 1845 
and 1859 to allow for steam shipping companies to serve Bombay. By 1847, there were nine 
                                                        
38 These dramatic events mirror the changes Haussmann ushered in from 1853 and 1870 after the French Revolution 
of 1848 in which boulevards were introduced to make it easier for the army to maneuver and suppress armed 
uprisings (six such uprisings happening between 1830 and 1848, all in the narrow, crowded streets). 
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such steam ship operations, and with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, port activities 
became even more robust. Imperial architectures in the following decades underscored British 
dominion over the city: the telegraph office, the General Post Office, the Secretariat, the High 
Court, and the University Library and Convocation Hall. Its loftiest of creations, the Victoria 
Terminus, completed in 1888 and the Bombay Municipal Corporation, stamped the high style of 
British architectural conquest on the city. The Government of India’s control over the railway 
companies meant the colonial state had direct investments in urban land.  
The central government acquired a substantial area of Mutunga for railway operations in 
1904, sparking conflict amongst local government and landlords who derided the central 
government for its “land hunger” that would seek “to turn the city into a station yard with a few 
houses dotted about here and there” (Government of Bombay, ‘Medical proceedings, 1905’, 128, 
as quoted in Hazareesingh 2001: 241). Land reclamation was necessary not only for the 
commercial industrial propensity toward expansion, from which the need arose for new ports, as 
well as drains, houses, and local markets, but also to conquer the pestilent swamps of the low-
lying coastal islands.39 Over forty percent of the city of Bombay, especially its industrial and 
dock areas and the commuting rail corridors, lay on low reclaimed land.40  
 The political will of the Bombay Presidency found the financial means to exert its rule 
only when, due to the American Civil Wars’ effect on the global cotton market, a subsequent 
                                                        
39. The third phase of reclamations, launched by the Back Bay Reclamation Company, the most controversial of the 
projects, came into being in 1863. Before East India Company rule came to an abrupt end it had reclaimed a 
precious strip of land west of Queens Road (Maharishi Karve Road). Later, the Public Works Department stepped in 
and committees and schemes proliferated. 
40. The surface configuration and topography of present-day Mumbai and its suburbs is not natural but mostly 
anthropogenic. The topographic contours of Brihan Mumbai (municipal city limits) have been visibly affected not 
only by the creation of new land for urban settlement but also by the demolition and leveling of hills by quarrying to 
meet the enormous needs for urban building material. Quarrying generated its own physiocultural landscape of pits 
and depressions, overly steeped slopes liable for landslides (which occurs nearly every monsoon, mostly devastating 
the precarious jopadpattis (squatter shanties) built upon them or in their wake). 
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boom and general commercial expansion of 1861–1865 provided Bombay the capital requisite to 
regulate and advance both industry and town alike. The British Raj invested heavily in 
infrastructure such as canals and irrigation systems in addition to railways, telegraphy, roads and 
ports. Tramway communication was instituted in Bombay by 1873. India built a modern railway 
system in the late nineteenth century that was the fourth largest in the world. The railways at first 
were privately owned and operated.41 Under Lord Elphinstone (1853–1860) and then Henry 
Bartle Frere (1862–1867), administration was orderly, demand from Lancashire and Birmingham 
and other cloth mills was rising “exponentially” and money was pouring in with the continuation 
of the American war. The end of the war in 1865, however, ruined the biggest commercial 
interests in “white gold” in the city. A speculation run (dubbed the Share Mania, 1864–1865) 
fomented India’s first stock market crash, a commercial crisis and the ruin of the Bank of 
Bombay, a key source for capital during the speculation mania, in 1866. The director of the bank, 
Parsi industrialist Cowasji Jehanghir Readymoney, gifted the city a convocation hall, gave 
handsomely to the university, an ophthalmic hospital, an art gallery and forty drinking water 
fountains. Parsi and Gujarati brokers had already been trading in shares since 1850 at various 
bureaus in Bombay, but the Bombay Stock Exchange would be born some seventeen years later. 
The Back Bay Reclamation share, with face value of ₹ 5,000, traded at ₹ 50,000 in 1863 (shares 
subsequently fell to under ₹ 2,000 in 1866). The entire city’s elite, the merchant princes of 
Bombay, were—momentarily—in ruins.42  
 
                                                        
41 The railways were run by British administrators, engineers, and craftsmen. At first, only the unskilled workers 
were Indians. 
42 The city’s population dropped by 21 percent (There were estimated to be 816,000 people in Bombay in 1864; the 
census of 1872 put the population at 644,000). 
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Municipal Water 
It was in this period that the first municipal water supply system in all of British India was 
introduced (Dossal 1995, Anand 2011). In 1860, a debilitating drought forced the design and 
construction of dams on the peripheries of the island city. Supply plans to exploit the water from 
Vehar nala (canal) were in fact drawn a decade earlier, but the growth of the city’s population 
instigated by the rate of industrial migration and rural distress meant that this scheme would 
quickly be inadequate to the need. Otherwise and in earlier times of scarcity, such as 1854, water 
would be brought by rail or boat to the city. Until 1860s, army peons (pukhalie) would bring 
water to troops by bullock cart from wells in the Esplanade. British troops in Coloba were the 
first to get piped water. Subsequent schemes to service other sections of the city (via water from 
the river Tasso, Vehar and Tulsi lakes, and Bhandarwada reservoir) over the next twenty years 
were also quickly found to be deficient for the needs wrought by the industrial expansion of the 
city.  
 The development of water supplies and sanitation for the majority of the city’s 
inhabitants had mostly been an afterthought in service first and foremost of the city’s business 
interests. When water services were directed to the city’s toiling classes, it was mainly a 
response to problems in management of labor and conditions of life (which was otherwise 
largely a police issue). The majority of the city’s population could not afford the arrangements 
necessary to ensure a steady flow of water. Most relied on dipping wells of water so impure they 
were deemed according to health reports in 1875 to be “absolutely poisonous.” 
 The city was filled with the foul smells of an improper sewage system dependent on open 
creeks and canals (nalas) that poured into the sea. In 1848, the two main roads most frequented 
by Europeans in traversing the Native town (Girguam and Kalbaderee roads), were the first to 
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have their gutters covered. But the interior arteries of the town remained neglected. Drains were 
open and frequently clogged. Prior to 1860, when little of the ensuing reclamation had been done 
in Bombay, a journey by rail, as an observer in 1855 put it, from “Bori Bunder to Byculla, or to 
go into Mody Bay, was to see in the foreshore the latrine of the whole population of the native 
town” (quoted in Chandavarkar 2009: 36).43 Pipe infrastructure in 1871, according to the Report 
of the Health Officer for Bombay Town and Island, was: a “pitiable sight of men, women, and 
children awaiting…eagerly and quarreling for the miserable dribble from it” (ibid.: 37) When, by 
1925, Bombay had more sewers than any other city in the subcontinent, the poorest working 
classes were afforded none. Sanitation was a labor issue in a more immediate sense, too. 
Butchers and tanners, mainly low caste Hindu and Muslim, were perceived by town planning 
officials as an acute threat to the unrelenting crises of health and hygiene and thus were the first 
to be targets of denigration and regulation of “dangerous and offensive trades.” The 
slaughterhouses were moved out of Bombay city to Bandra in the northern suburbs, where 
special supply trains would satisfy the city’s needs.  
 In all, British attitudes (elites, police, salon humor, and journalistic accounts) derided 
natives as lacking the propriety to maintain hygienic and orderly lives. This meant elites could 
give a pass to wholesale urban improvement schemes because the people were simply not ready 
for them. The menace of open defecation, for instance, would be addressed by stationing 
“mounted policemen with hunting crops to keep a close eye on miscreants through poorer 
                                                        
43. Consider the metropolitan literature of related developments at the time: Friedrich Engels’ The Condition of the 
Working Class in England [1845] (2009), a study of the industrial working class in Victorian England, similarly 
highlights the slum housing and poor sanitation that Manchester’s industrial workings classes were made to submit 
to. One can compare accounts to Manchester working class given by Engels, his critique of industrialization in 
which the industrial workers had lower incomes than their pre-industrial peers and they lived in more unhealthy and 
unpleasant environments. (The Condition of the Working Class in England, 1845; The Housing Question, 1872) The 
Housing Question was published in 1872. A Tale of Two Cities (1859) by Charles Dickens picked up related themes 
in London and Paris before and during the French Revolution. 
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districts” (Chandavarkar 2009: 50). Even sympathetic colonial views on the laboring classes 
identified the problem as the masses who “are utterly unacquainted with even elementary ideas 
of hygiene and sanitation, and little improvement can take place until they have been educated to 
a different standard of living.”44 The problem was framed as “the adaptation of peasant to city 
life” wherein “municipal improvements can only provide the means of cleanliness to those who 
are willing to avail themselves of them” (Ibid.). Thus was the city framed as pure, elevated, and 
isolated from the lowly countryside, an icon of industry on a trajectory quite apart for the rest of 
the subcontinent. Until such time, “sanitary cordons,” the restriction of travel (rural migrants, 
devout pilgrims, industrial workers), became part of a hygienic apartheid regime in Bombay’s 
early city planning days. And here in the hygienic character of the India lay the foundations the 
urbanization agenda of India, as remarked upon by Sir Stanley Reed, early editor of The Times of 
India: “The whole future of India, based as it must be on the efficient and contented labour force, 
is bound up with an improvement in the hygienic conditions of the great industrial centers.” 
(ibid.)  
 In this light, the determinations of social policy followed the development needs of 
business interests (such as roads, etc.), the aesthetic judgments of various upper classes, as well 
as the adjudication and discipline of labor through wages and provision of essential subsistence. 
Questions of human development and urban improvement would be mediated through these 
concerns. Housing, water and sanitation, as well as other social services not yet formally 
submerged in the commodity sphere (such as spaces for worship, cremation, and burial) were 
nonetheless pressing needs. Disease and epidemics emerging from the poorer quarters was not 
only perceived as a matter of governance or municipal administration but seemed to threaten 
                                                        
44 From Alexander Robert Burnett-Hurst, Labour and housing in Bombay: a study in the economic conditions of the 
wage-earning classes in Bombay in 1925, quoted in Chandavarkar 2009: 50. 
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merchants (shetias) and bankers (shorffs), millowners and civil servants, of Indians and 
Europeans alike, and therefore the very commercial character of the city.45  
Yet attention to these large structural problems remained episodic, piecemeal, and 
insincere. The rate of migration was quickening, the streets and neighborhoods were becoming 
increasingly congested, and the frenzy of commerce only added to the cacophony.46 Avoidance or 
neglect of the social conflicts prevailed amongst the city’s various upper strata, yet also placed 
unwelcome pressure upon the expanding business sector and local authorities alike. Moreover, 
the lack of social provisions distributed adequately to the growing laboring populations risked 
the commercial viability of the city as a whole. Victorian economic sensibilities subsumed 
improved governance, urban relations, population health and well-being to political and 
economic factors of production and social order. Premature death was a calculated variable in 
economic and urban equations. Henry Conybeare, a civil engineer and architect who would 
become Superintendent of Repairs for Bombay in 1855, for instance, argued that “sanitary 
reform is in itself a police improvement.” (Chandabarkar 2009: 42) As such, health and policing 
were regarded as twin problems. In 1858, this calculus was laid bare: municipal investments 
would be justified in the field of population health if they could reduce the death rate by 20 
percent. This was a focal issue for the management of troops stationed in Colaba, who it was 
reported in 1863, cost the Raj £97 per soldier annually while their infirmary cost £388,000 
(ibid.). Sanitation certainly became a concern with regards to the growing mill industries in the 
1870s and 80s, but it was the plagues that besieged the city from 1896–1900, which so radically 
                                                        
45 “It exercised the imagination, it threatened the very existence of shetias [merchants] and shorffs [bankers], of 
millowners and civil servants, of Indians and Europeans alike.” (Chandavarkar 2009: 41) 
46 According to historian Gordon Johnson, “The population of the city increased nearly nine times in as many 
decades: between the early nineteenth century and the census of 1911 the number of people living in the city had 
risen from 160,000 to over 900,000. Moreover, most of this increase was from immigration: in 1901 less than a 
quarter of Bombay's citizens had been born there. Bombay was thus not only a new but a very cosmopolitan city.” 
(1973: 112) 
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threatened the health and wealth of the city’s magnates. Only mounting urban crisis would force 
the reorganization of urban policy.  
 The needs for massive infrastructural outlays for the popular classes in the growing city 
would not be met. The business classes and town officials of Bombay had much to gain from 
their commercial excitement, administrative acumen, and conservative aesthetic desire to 
prioritize the expansion of social provisions to the city’s laboring communities. For the most 
part, governmental authorities were steadfast in their approach to business-oriented social 
planning. A perceived lack of resources for development that was not commercially viable or did 
not serve the accumulation needs of the city’s business sectors meant that the implementation of 
these schemes would remain selective, “favoring those concerns which were the most relevant to 
the late economic interests and the more immediate material needs of the dominant classes” 
(Chandavarkar 2009: 46). Until that point, how the popular classes would provision much-
needed urban amenities and infrastructure, such as water or housing, were treated as problems of 
public order, and therefore persisted as police problems. Meanwhile, transport of goods and 
people in the service of the urban economy were the primary concerns from which much 
development followed: roads from “dock to warehouse, from cotton fields to cotton greens,” and 
drains for the army cantonments of Colaba and the elite residential areas of Parel and Malabar 
Hill (Chandavarkar 2009: 35). Negotiations over the distribution of urban wealth, the resources 
for infrastructural development, would only shift as workers increasingly took center stage in the 




Struggles for Space:  
The Fabric of Worker’s Urban Culture and Power 
 
“Everywhere barbarous indifference, hard egotism on one hand, and nameless misery on the other, 
everywhere social warfare, every. . .  house in a state of siege, everywhere reciprocal plundering under the 
protection of the law, and all so shameless, so openly avowed that one shrinks before the consequences of 
our social state as they manifest themselves here undisguised, and one can only wonder that the whole 
crazy fabric still hangs together.” —Frederick Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England 
 
Bombay’s Mill Modernity 
The role of mills in shaping Bombay’s modernity and its influence on urban cultures cannot be 
overstated. With the help of fifty leading businessmen in the city, Parsi entrepreneur and former 
dealer of raw cotton and opium, Cowasji Davar, founded the first cotton-textile mill in the city in 
1854 in Tardeo, on the northern outskirts of the densely populated Native town. The advent of 
limited liability corporation as well as the lifting of bans on the importation of British machines 
to India were crucial factors in the rise of Indian industrial capitalism, but the cost of shipping 
these machines, as well as the coal from Bengal needed to power them, would have been fateful 
impediments to enterprise without Davar and the Indian business community’s confidence to 
command labor and exploit the land for raw materials. So too did they envision an enormous 
regional market barely perceptible to the British that would arise in the city’s vicinity. Thus did 
Indian capitalism take root by the efforts of “creative middlemen” who would mediate between 
the colonial state and Indian laboring society. 
The 1850s and 1860s were a boom for Bombay. The development of an indigenous 
cotton textile industry portended an illustrious and unprecedented rise of industrial capitalism 
and an industrial working class in Bombay.47 In 1857, the first industrial weavers of Bombay 
                                                        
47 Cotton prices skyrocketed–between 1860 and 1863–1864 prices rose by a factor of four on average, and at times 
by a factor of ten. As cotton exports from the United States fell, exports from Persia, Egypt and especially India 
boomed. 
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were housed under one roof. By 1865, ten mills employed nearly 6,600 laborers across the 
Native town. By 1875, there were fifteen mills powered by 5,000 workers. Fifteen years later, in 
1890, sixty-seven mills were home to 70,000 workers from sunup to sundown.48  
The Bombay Baroda and Central Indian Railway and the Great Indian Peninsular 
Railway companies employed a substantial portion of the working population in metal and 
mechanical fabrication, maintenance, and repair. Additionally, they had workshops in Parel as 
well as new lines and roads built through the marshy lands known as the Flats in 1860s, all of 
which came to be know as the “mill district”—in addition to Parel—of Byculla, Tarwadi, 
Mazagon, Sewri, Sion, Mahim, and Worli. Major civic institutions, such as the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation and the Port Trust, as well as companies concerned with infrastructure, 
such as the Bombay Electric Supply and Tramways Company (BEST) and Bombay Gas Works, 
all had workshops employing workers. BEST brought select electricity to Bombay’s tramways in 
1903, and soon also operated buses and trams on the widest road network of internal roads for 
city travel in India; while Bombay Gas provided street lighting and household gas (following the 
appointment in 1865 of Arthur Crawford as the city’s first municipal commissioner) and 
eventually elsewhere via four hundred kilometers of pipes for coal gas (street lighting existed 
earlier, in 1843, in the form of kerosene lamps).  
The gas plant in Parel brought light and wonder to the city, but also a fine black dust and 
intolerable fumes for workers in the vicinity. Marathi poet Dilip Chitre’s “The View from 
Chinchpokli” describes the early industrial urban sensorium, “I breathe in the sulphur dioxide 
emitted by the Bombay Gas Company, blended with specks of cotton / And carbon particles 
                                                        
48 Estimates put early figures at nearly 7.5 percent of the city’s population in 1890. The proportion of industrializing 
workforce viz. workers in other established small-scale industries would grow to ten percent by the turn of the 
century and even more dramatically in the first few decades of the twentieth century. 
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discharged by the mills / That clothe millions of loins.” The first streets to receive light were 
Esplanade Road (now Mahatma Gandhi Road), Churchgate Street (now Veer Nariman Road) and 
Bhendi Bazaar, far from workers’ quarters. Electrification of street lamps began by 1882 in 
Crawford Market.  
The industrial force of development in the city included the development of 
underdevelopment. As the presence of cotton mills expanded to the north of the Native town, the 
spatial landscape reflected ever-sharper class divisions. Soon the cotton trade would determine 
both urban spatial production and employment in the docks and on the railways. Workers began 
living near the mills, leaving their historic grounds in the Native town to develop a distinctly 
working-class neighborhood known as Girangaon (mill town). A culture of industrial labor and 
town planning agreeable to British colonial authorities and Parsi industrialists alike kept workers 
huddled near the factories—away from Fort and other wealthy areas—while encouraging the 
city’s middle strata to spread north to Salsette. This coincided with the development of the 
increasing commercial character of Fort, which became the city’s central business district after 
its ramparts were leveled in the 1860s and a sanitary program initiated by Municipal 
Commissioner Arthur Crawford to once again cleanse Fort of “offensive trades” such as tanners, 
butchers, and dyers.  
The development of southern Bombay as the commercially advanced “Island City” was 
only possible because 80 percent of the population was housed in cramped tenements over a 
century. This development ambition combined with a determined lack of interest in developing 
public transportation systems that would be affordable and enable mobility across the city. 
Meanwhile, land reclamation in Tarqeo was accomplished by dumping the town sweepings into 
the sea. Thus the city’s industrially driven urbanization was achieved with a double colonization, 
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both of the sea and the land by filling in the swamps of lowland Bombay, and of the native labor 
commanded in the process of dredging and dumping “reclaimed” natures in producing new 
urban space of Bombay.  
 
“A starvation diet”  
At the end of the nineteenth century, the rise in industry accompanied a boom in colonial and 
Indian finance. Bombay boasted more international banks than any other city in India, as well as 
the country’s largest gold and silver markets. But, the poorer sections of the city “experienced 
significant declines in living standards, worsening environmental conditions and escalating 
death-rates” (Quoted in Kidambi 2007: 36). Workers survived on a “starvation diet” (Census of 
India, 1901: vol x, Bombay (Town & Island), part iv, 151, 144; quoted in Hazareesingh 2001: 
238). The influx of migration in the wake of the speculation boom excited by the American Civil 
War did very little to inspire authorities to plan the city and allocate its resources for reasonable 
growth. At the turn of the century, “two out of three coolies that came to Bombay for 
employment [did] not return to their homes, but [were] carried off by fever or other diseases.” 
(Ibid.) 
 Teetering on the edge of industry profit points and labor’s breaking points, with manifold 
crises looming, Bombay was a city integrated in a world system hinged to a vast hinterland. 
Commerce, industry, finance and colonial and native elite territorial power connected the various 
worlds. But so too did the migratory patterns and laboring cultures of the city’s working classes 
constitute Bombay as the meeting grounds for an unprecedented encounter between urban and 
rural life. Bombay’s earliest mill workers originated in the peasantry. The mostly male migrant 
workers came from the Deccan and Konkan coast and as far as hundreds of miles south in 
Ratnagiri and Goa. Others came from the northern parts of the Bombay Presidency, from Sindh 
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and Gujarat, as well as from eastern districts of the United Provinces. Many travelled seasonally 
from October to December, and returned to their districts prior to the monsoon from April to 
September during the agricultural season.  
Working class culture also emerged across the space and time of the colonial capitalist 
economy and in the struggles that determined the rhythms of life. The ways in which workers 
adapted to the temporal demands of the length and conditions of the working day in the factory 
system, if work could be found, shaped broader patterns of urbanization and urban culture during 
Bombay’s industrial boom. Mills in the 1880s opened their gates at dawn. Since there were no 
public clocks and mills were prohibited from blowing their steam whistles at dawn, workers took 
to sleeping on the paths leading to the factories in hopes to be the first to rise in the day’s 
competition for employment. The culture of living within proximity of factories that were 
powered by day labor bought in daily markets remained for decades, transforming and 
imprinting a unique worker culture upon industrial districts of the city where factories became 
but an important node in an integrated sphere of workplace and neighborhood life.  
The working poor mostly lived in Kamathipura, Nagpada, Chakla, Mandvi, Dongri, 
Kumbharwada and Khara Taleo. “In 1872, barely five percent of all cotton mill workers in the 
city lived in the sections that came to constitute the ‘mill districts’; by 1906, this figure had 
increased to 82.1 percent” (Chandavarkar 1997: 169; Kidambi 2007: 37). The 1911 census 
indicates that 69 percent of the population of Bombay lived in one-room tenement 
accommodations (chawls) built by mill owners or municipal agencies. By the 1920s, 90 percent 
of mill workers lived within fifteen minutes of their place of employment (Chandavakar 2009: 
19).  
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The proliferation of small workshops in town, of small-scale opportunities in the bazaars, 
docks, warehouses, led also to swelling pressure on existing housing stock. A report to the Health 
Officer in 1881 summarized their condition as: “poverty-stricken to the bone, and as a matter of 
course they are glad to take any shelter or to get anywhere to lay their heads” (Quoted in 
Kidambi 2007: 36). Those with housing were offered little relief. In the absence of available 
housing, existing buildings were “sweated,” and every room available was subdivided from 
multi-storied tenements, so that the ever-growing working class could be “physically absorbed” 
in the city. Housing provision for workers, provided by factory owners, was subject to 
constraints (cost, space, materials, etc.) dictated by private industry and municipal and city 
planning and took the form of crowded single-room accommodation in chawls, which rapidly 
sprang up in the suburbs to the north and east of town surrounding factories during the 1880s. 
“Neglected by authorities and exploited by private builders, the workers lived in ill-lighted, ill-
ventilated dens in largely undeveloped, undrained areas.” (Upadhyay 1990: 87) These were at its 
origins largely a private enterprise built at the discretion and calculus of mill owners.49 This 
solution to the need for worker housing increased the density of living and the insanitary 
conditions only, and aggravated disease and mortality, e.g. small pox, measles, tuberculosis, etc., 
caused by occupational conditions. Otherwise, workers found housing in self-constructed zavli 
sheds composed of coconut palm and date leaves. So too were the streets appropriated for 
sleeping on a massive scale. This conjuncture of interests and forces, class calculations, and class 
antagonisms has made the chawl, the slum, and the street an indelible architectural feature of the 
history of the working class housing.  
                                                        
49 The Bombay Improvement Trust was also any important provider of worker housing in later decades, as discussed 
later in the chapter.  
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Meanwhile, industrial contaminants, found everywhere in the air, degraded workers and 
their environments. “Coal-powered cotton mills, railway locomotives and government Mint 
churned out thick black smoke. . . lingering dark clouds brought about [what the 1901 census 
described as] a ‘marked change…over localities such as Byculla, Patel, Trade, Tarwadi, and 
even remote Sewri.’” (Hazareesingh 2001: 238) Industrial pollutants in the air would blow in by 
the breeze off the Arabian Sea toward the hills and settle over the town. Lack of adequate drains 
and sewers meant most of the low-lying areas of the city remained waterlogged for much of the 
city, and therefore making them breeding grounds for disease such as malaria and the plague.  
Working conditions were physically, mentally, and morally exhausting both in the mill 
factories and on the various trades and occupations that arose in conjunction with the textile 
industry, from leather workshops and mechanical repair, to garment retail and tailoring, and in 
the construction and warehousing sectors. Even the jailed population of Bombay was seen at that 
time to be “healthier” than the mill workers.50 Alcohol consumption was prevalent among 
workers, and fifteen percent of workers’ wages were routinely spent here, leading to money 
lending with 75 percent interest. For those who could not find steady employment, there was 
petty trading, hawking, and peddling—and if all else failed, begging. This was not merely a 
description of one of several outcomes in the developing urban economy. Rather, it was its 
consequence and the primary mechanism through which the city’s elites deliberately kept labor 
casual, informal, and insecure and therefore also readily available and cheap. 
The proletariat in the cotton-textile industry, the ancillary laboring communities in 
workshops surrounding the factories, and those waiting for work, defined the city’s “toiling” 
                                                        
50 See Marx’s discussion in “The Badly Paid Strata of the British Industrial Class” (Chapter 25, Volume 1 of 
Capital) for a parallel underdevelopment of the English working classes (both in the towns and the agricultural 
sectors in the countryside) due to the cotton industries. 
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culture.51 Most workers experienced casual employment based on the fluctuating demand for 
labor and the flexible production cycles employed by mill owners. These owners devised 
recruitment strategies that delegated responsibility to intermediaries, known as “jobbers,” 
muccadmas, mistries, tindals, and serangs (Kidambi 2007: 31). Their task was also to undermine 
organizing efforts amongst workers by constantly deploying and manipulating casual labor, 
creating and exploiting a surplus labor pool around each trade, and encouraging dependency of 
workers upon particular jobbers. Furthermore, a large substratum of the working classes of 
Bombay consisted of various occupations whose labor was menial, whose prospects dim, and 
whose circumstances were ever precarious. These masses routinely saw their image reflected in 
industrial actions despite being ancillary to its core function. Bourgeois and colonial state 
illiberality toward working and living conditions all but compelled nascent wage struggles and 
industrial action within the factory system toward a larger political arena of the city. Thus, while 
mill and dockworkers politicized the space of the city in a continuum of workplace and 
neighborhood appropriations, the most generalized strikes in the city were not “merely trade 
union actions but also community actions” (Pendse 1995: 24).52  
Workers encountered a range of characters in the fray of competitive urban life, from 
workplace to neighborhood, e.g. grain-dealers, landlords, and rent-collectors. These relations 
were essentially antagonistic, characterized by both dependency and reciprocity, guided both by 
moral expectation and at times outright conflict. Workers’ rural connections enabled them to 
navigate the urban world, access housing, credit, and work. Despite the disruption of family life 
                                                        
51 Pendse (1995) argues that “toiler” is a more inclusive of the variety of laboring processes than is often associated 
with the industrial category of “worker.” See “Toil, sweat, and the city’” in Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner (eds.) 
1995: Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
52 Peter Linebaugh states of the general development of urban spaces and cultures of solidarity: “The street was part 
of the urban commons. It was not only the place of traffic, or the movement of commodities. It joined producer and 
consumer, and it joined the producers of various components in separated workshops. It was the site of sport, of 
theater, of carnival, of song.” (2014: 27)  
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(some women remained in the fields to cultivate or came at different times according to 
opportunities for work), adjustments to the nature of their working lives, experiences of the clear 
distinction between working-time and leisure-time in factory settings, urban workers lived their 
rural associations and cultures as part of the urban rhythm of work and rest, wage earning and 
resistance.53  
So too did the conditions of industrially organized work serve to modernize daily 
experiences and encounters with otherwise entrenched relations of caste, religion, and 
community—whether Muslims, Dalits, Harijans—which dictated occupation and life chances. 
To a certain degree, these mixed relations in workshops and neighborhoods alike also 
revolutionized a sense of freedom, cultural autonomy, and even at times inspired an emergent 
class solidarity.  Historian Rajnarayan Chandavarkar details how 
“caste and kinship ties were vital to the social organization of workers: but so were the affinities of region and 
religion, workplace and neighbourhood, trade unions and political parties, all of which cut across each other. To 
insist that the culture of migrant workers was characterized by ‘strong primordial ties of community, language, 
religion, caste and kinship’ is to obscure the extent to which their interaction produced something quite different and 
it is to remain blind to the extent to which their ‘culture’ was also informed by work and by politics, and indeed, by 
the daily struggles of workplace and neighbourhood” (1997:187). 
 
This was in a sense a struggle over workers’ own cultural identity in the city. The organization of 
work was part of worker’s sensorium and experience of the city (sight, feel, smell, sound) that 
too affected their struggle for space and survival. Though for most it was their first experience in 
city life, the pressures and desires expressed by the working classes and immigrants of the city 
also determined the politics of housing and neighborhood. The development of workers politics 
thus took place in the neighborhoods of Girangaon with increasing frequency in the 1880s.54 The 
                                                        
53 See Shashi Bhushan Upadhyay. “Cotton Mill Workers in Bombay, 1875 to 1918: Conditions of Work and Life.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 25.30 (1990): PE87–PE99. 
54 See Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. 2004. “From Neighbourhood to Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Left in 
Bombay’s Girangaon in the Twentieth Century.” In One Hundred Years, One Hundred Voices: The Mill Workers of 
Girangaon: An Oral History, Meena Menon and Neera Adarkar, eds. Calcutta: Seagull Books. 
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cultural organization of workers’ lifeworld and their claim on the city was dialectically opposed 
to the sense of rationalization in the dominant industrial processes commanding labor in the city. 
Workers’ psychic life imprinted their experiences, their sense of diffusion and reintegration into 
the neighborhood, the discipline at work and the improvisation in their everyday lives, onto the 
city’s space-time rhythms and urban cultures. Proletarian public culture was lived and enacted on 
the streets. Thus did a cultural identity as “toiler” emerge with the growth of both an industrial 
and an unregulated informal economy—however mediated by regional, linguistic, and religious 
difference—as a loosely shared and sometimes collective formation (Pendse 1995).  
The rise of worker consciousness inside the factories and neighborhoods in the 1870s 
raised colonial and native elites’ concern over workers in the city, their politics, and their ability 
to effective control their way of life. From the 1890s onward, after a series of strikes and large-
scale urban riots in 1892–1893, police officials increasingly viewed the workers and the popular 
masses as the source of urban unrest. Mill owners were uncompromising in the wake of workers’ 
demands and intolerant of their perspectives on the city, viewing strikes as a breach of contract 
to be punished harshly lest indolence and indiscipline paralyze the factory system and 
subordinate profit to workers’ wishes. The industrial bosses relied on the colonial state to put 
down these strikes. Wages were suppressed so migrant laborers would not simply abandon their 
posts at their will in favor of village life, while workers organizations were viewed as caustic 
agents threatening bourgeois paternalism toward “reasonable” grievances. The business classes 
of Bombay could only cling more tightly to their dependence on the state to smother the embers 
of labor’s revolt. Certainly, it raised the antipathy of workers for both boss and state. A new tool 
of mediation would be required. Planning the underdevelopment of the working classes in the 
decades to come was key to the coordinated class responses of the bourgeoisie (Kidambi 2004).  
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Plague and Famine during Boom Times  
The rise of the factory system in the city extended into the countryside. The demands of 
Bombay’s factories required further penetration into the hinterland for raw materials and for 
labor. So too did the concomitant rise of technological capabilities such as trains and telephone 
cables exacerbate and reorganize the spatial tensions within the region. As conditions worsened 
in the countryside, the urban worker’s fate remained entangled with the rural fates of family, 
village relations, and indeed, their own life and livelihood. Rural distress drove a wave of 
migration into the city that gave steel to the strikes and insurgencies brewing around the factories 
of Bombay. These same conditions inspired peasant revolt among those who remained in the 
countryside.  
The Deccan Riots of 1875 saw peasants (ryots) from Pune, Satara and Nagar districts, 
where trains now linked Bombay to rural Maharashtra, seize and destroy the tools of their debt 
peonage (kamiuti). The bonds and deeds held by moneylenders were the primary targets of their 
attacks, but so too did they take aim at the general conditions of British rule concomitantly 
threatening their communal ways of life (access to forests restricted which affected access to 
common resources like food and fuel), “reduced to a miserable condition, so much so that their 
ordinary wants cannot be supplied” (Quoted in Kumar 1965: 615).55 By 1876, signs of 
“widespread unemployment and the high price of grain” were everywhere pointing to a “spectre 
of hunger.”  During the British Raj, India experienced some of the worst famines ever recorded, 
including the Great Famine of 1876–1878, in which 6.1 million to 10.3 million people died and 
the Indian famine of 1899–1900, in which an estimated ten million people died. Famines in India 
                                                        
55 Ravinder Kumar, “The Deccan Riots of 1875,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Aug., 1965), p. 615), 
Cf David Hardiman, ed., Peasant Resistance in India 1858–1914, Oxford University Press, Delhi [etc.] (1992)] 
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were made more severe by British policy in India. An El Niño event caused the Indian famine of 
1876–1878.  The colonial state could not manage the growing discontent of the population facing 
a crisis of hunger and livelihood and “several million emaciated laborers and poor peasants 
overwhelmed the relief works belatedly authorized by the Bombay and Madras governments” 
(Davis 2002: 36).  
 Urban development in the city and its hinterland, proceeding apace with advances in the 
rail, canal ways, and telegraph that deepened colonial extraction of surpluses (taken through 
taxation and debt), crushed many villagers and footloose city dwellers alike. They faced 
starvation or a thin chance of survival as proletarianized laborers rushing the city as drought and 
famine refugees. Duplicitous colonial administrators argued that the expansion of transportation 
and communication infrastructures would serve as protection against famine, for no sooner were 
rail networks expanded than they were monopolized by merchants to transfer grains from 
drought-strikes regions to hoards in central depots; meanwhile, the telegraph would ensure 
speculation and ensuring price-hikes in grains would be executed simultaneously across 
hundreds of villages regardless of supply. Modernization of such technologies and infrastructures 
left millions devastated and dying from hunger, whose recourse to relief work manipulated 
starving applicants deeper into their own (and others’) subordination as coolie labor on railroad 
and canal projects (Krishan 2013). Even in such dire circumstances, coolies withheld their labor 
and, in January 1877, famished peasants rejected orders to march to militarized work camps 
where they would be separated from their families (Davis 2002: 41).   
Such were the conditions in the countryside as a new industrial city was coming into 
being at the turn of the twentieth century. In September 1896, Bombay was hit by a bubonic 
plague epidemic. The death toll was estimated at 1,900 people per week. Around 850,000 people 
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amounting to half of the population, fled Bombay during this time. Plague was the leading cause 
of death in the city in the ten years spanning 1897–1907 (Hazareesing 2001: 239). The dock and 
mill workers living in crowded chawls and slums amidst inadequate sewers and sanitation, and 
who were already weakened by the effects of a price rise coinciding with a famine year, were all 
too susceptible to a bubonic plague that spread from a dock worker’s quarters in Mandvi across 
the city of one million in September 1896. Chandavarkar states, “it remained one of the most 
dramatic and destructive manifestations of municipal failure in the nineteenth century” (2009: 
52). By late 1897, Bombay’s population fell by half from death and exodus.  
In the devastating wake of municipal failure, sudden and regular outbreaks of hostility 
rose against measures adopted by the government for suppression of the plague, including police 
searches, forced evacuations, forcible hospitalization, and isolation and detention of the ill. In 
April 1897, handcart pullers (khatarawalas) and carriers (hamaals) of cotton struck against 
official inspection and forcible entry into workers’ homes. It took the police, city officials from 
the Plague Committee, as well as cotton merchants to put the strike down. By late 1897, the city 
was facing a severe shortage of “cooks, tailors, barbers, coolies and mill workers” and officials 
feared what would happen if municipal workers such as “scavengers, sweepers, sewer cleaners,” 
as well as those who depended upon to remove the dead from the hospitals continued to either 
flee or strike (Dossal 2005: 3898). Again, on March 9, 1898, a riot led to a strike of dock and 
railway workers that paralyzed the city for a few days.  
  The convergence of a municipality failing to govern through the adequate satisfaction of 
civic wants and needs and a growing citywide labor mutiny fomented a general crisis in the city. 
Municipal commissioners backed off forced removals of workers’ homes. Police reports at the 
end of the century indicate that police and administrative control was weakest in workers’ 
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districts and the chawls of the northern parts of the city nearest the factories. The abundance of 
easily disciplined labor now turned scarce. Workers who did remain in the city enjoyed 
unprecedented bargaining power. In 1897, there was “open bidding” for labor in the streets, as 
well as in 1899, and during the mill strikes of 1900–1901 (Chandavarkar 2009). Moreover, the 
first two years of the plague manifested as a drama of a wayward labor force whose presence in 
the city the state could neither repress nor rehabilitate. The 1898 labor strike was a matter of life 
and death in—and of—the city and, as such, prompted a drastic turn in colonial administration.  
 The event did more than any other event to crystallize the antagonistic class nature of city 
development. The upheavals forced the colonial administration to rethink its relationship to the 
neighborhood, identifying local “leaders” from which to extend their rule. The bubonic plague of 
1896–1897 that gave rise to the first general strike in the city also inspired the imposition of new 
planning institutions to contain them. Such were the conditions of the emergence of the most 
widespread government planning in the city, under the aegis of its first and singular planning 
institution, the Bombay Improvement Trust (BIT). 56  
 
“Improvement” through land acquisition and social governance 
The Government of Bombay inaugurated the Improvement Trust (BIT) in 1898 in the wake of 
widespread death and civic devastation. It was comprised entirely of local elites, as a response to, 
and in condemnation of, the failures of the Bombay Municipal Corporation in dealing with issues 
of sanitation and social order. Though it was not a planning body in any traditional sense, it 
would be the “sole [body] totally concerned with the development of the city” for the first 
                                                        
56 See Frank. F. Conlon (1984) on Bombay’s working-class housing; Kidambi, Prashant. “Housing the Poor in a 
Colonial City: The Bombay Improvement Trust, 1898-1918.” Studies in History 17, no. 1 (February 1, 2001): 57–
79; Adarkar, Neera, ed. (and Sandeep Pendse) The Chawls of Mumbai: Galleries of Life. ImprintOne, 2011. 
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decades of the twentieth century (Meller 1979: 337). Placed beyond the reach of municipal 
authorities, the Trust was a private seizure of public administrative regulation.  
 British inquiry into the causes of both plague and unrest redoubled planners’ 
determination that social segregation would address the city’s insanitary conditions as well as 
labor’s intransigence. Colonial officials conceptualized the city’s myriad problems as a spatial 
one concerning the arrangement of its many social groupings. The BIT’s main task was to 
improve the sanitary condition of the least developed areas of the city, clear slums, develop lands 
in the north of the island (at the time, Parel was the island’s northern limits above which were the 
rice fields, coconut gardens (oarts) salt pans, and fisher villages of Kolis, Agris, and Adivasis), 
widen roads, and to provide better housing for the city’s workers. Under both the fear of workers 
as pathological vectors and the segregationist fervor to separate such masses from elites, the 
Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897 gave wide powers to the state to demolish buildings and claim 
land. “The inhabitants of the initial slum target areas, in, Nagpada, Mandvi, Market and 
Chandanvadi, found themselves compulsorily evicted without being offered alternative 
accommodation; as a result, they attempted to rehouse themselves in tenements just outside the 
targeted neighbourhoods” (Hazareesing 2001:239). Similar slum clearances occurred in 
Nowrojee Hill, Bhatwadi, and East Agripada.  
Though the Trust’s mandate was the provisioning of “‘sanitary’ housing for the ‘poorer 
and working classes’,” it razed more tenements than it ever erected (Kidambi 2007: 80).57 The 
housing question’s spatial fix was also internal to workers’ houses. The Act enabled municipal 
collectors to remove the living rooms of insanitary buildings for the creation of a chowk [open 
area] to facilitate air and light passage. Even as private interests routinely influenced law (as in 
                                                        
57 Between 1898 and 1920, the BIT razed 24,428 tenements and 21,387 constructed. 
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the Epidemic Disease Act), it also routinely thwarted the deployment of legal statutes and 
planning ordinances. Landlord control over the interests of the Municipal Corporation, for 
instance, prevented the execution of a uniform sanitary building code. The piece-meal as well as 
wholesale agency of landowners to demolish workers housing of course only created an increase 
in demand for housing and therefore pressured the rise of rents. Landlords met this demand by 
building additional stories in their insanitary slum buildings, increasing congestion and 
intensifying housing demand. “As ‘many houses had chowks cut in them’ they ‘also had storeys 
added’” (Hazareesingh 2001:239).  
 When the BIT’s accomplishments were reviewed a decade after its inauguration, an acute 
shortage of workers’ housing was observed. The BIT’s focus on road widening, which created 
more overcrowding, also remained at odds with its central task of alleviating untenable housing 
and sanitation conditions among the poorer districts. The two main road projects it completed 
prior to the First World War did little to facilitate movement in the city except for elites. Princess 
Street (1905) and Sandhurst Road (1909) were both east-west thoroughfares in a town with 
urgent need for north-south transport options. “Princess Street ran from Carnac Bridge, just north 
of the Fort, to Queen’s Road on the south-western seafront,” allowing colonial and native elites 
quicker access to the coast from Fort (Hazareesingh 2001:242). Displaced workers led to 
overcrowding in nearby Cavel, where new stories were added to unsanitary housing, “making 
light and ventilation in neighbouring houses even worse than before.” (Ibid.) 
What the BIT inaugurated was a clear legacy of private interests’ usurpation of state’s 
right to acquire land, a right that implied the right to demolition and the right to redevelopment. 
These rights did not go uncontested. Koli fisherfolk in Mandvi-Koliwada, some of the oldest 
inhabitants of the city, petitioned against the municipal agency’s claims over its lands, making 
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arguments that their livelihoods for generations have depended on access and proximity to the 
sea. The result of forced dispossession, they argued, would be that “we must disperse our 
industry already languishing, [causing its] collapse, and a population numbering over a thousand 
souls, [would] go to ruin” (Kidambi 2007: 80) For Trust officials, urban development was a fait 
accompli for the Koliwadas. Since the city had already surrounded their fishing villages, officials 
argued that their removal and relocation would find them in areas more “suited to their 
calling.”58  
In addition to Kolis, the Bhandari and Agri communities long-settled prior to 
colonization, mobilized against the demotion of their traditional shrines in Lohar Chawl. They 
too registered their dissent in 1905 in a petition stating that the shrines were over sixty years old 
and part of the neighborhood’s history (they also took exception to the fact that no Muslim 
shrines were affected by demolition). The Police Commissioner gave his promise that the shrines 
would be reestablished. Even those who came seeking commercial opportunity with the 
Portuguese and with the Bombay, and who had in their own way become property owners, 
quarreled with the BIT over the suddenly perilous nature of their tenure. Communities in Dadar, 
Matunga, and Sion organized their opposition when faced with the “loss of ancient possessions, 
houses and occupations” despite tenure grants preceding BIT improvement schemes. Ratepayer 
associations sprang up amongst those who felt, “the government was reneging on the ‘promise 
given, the covenants entered into with them, by British Rulers and their predecessors the 
Portuguese, Siddis, and other native Rulers of the Island when they were first invited to domicile 
themselves in this Island.” Dispossession even for Indian petty bourgeois property owners was 
                                                        
58 Furthermore, BIT officials concluded “it would be a mistake for us to encourage them to remain were they are by 
giving them any peculiar facilities for building sites, and the most we need to do is endeavor to provide temporary 
accommodation for them when they are displaced pending their establishing themselves somewhere else” (BIT 
proceedings, 11 October 1904, quoted in Kidambi 2007: 81). 
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tantamount to “exile by thousands without any means of shelter or maintenance, and also without 
any prospect of obtaining other lands or occupations.” (Ibid., 82) It was not only in self-interest 
that these petitions were made. They also criticized the BIT’s approach to disease and sanitation 
as suggesting a general inability to oversee necessary urban development. Moreover, they 
recognized the antidemocratic nature of the BIT and called for greater transparency and 
accountability in its proceedings, as well as greater representation for the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation on the Trust Board. Indeed, when on occasion more diverse propertied interests 
were entertained, there were multiple objections to the operations of the BIT with motions to 
disband the Trust and integrate it into the Municipal Corporation occurring no less than three 
times in ten years.  
 Meanwhile, the BIT had become a major player in the land market.59 The Trust was 
shown repeatedly to surpass its writ, “willfully misinterpreting provisions of the [City 
Improvement Trust Act] 1898 act” concerning the compulsory acquisition of lands required “on 
sanitary grounds for Improvement Schemes or absolutely necessary for street schemes” (quoted 
in Kidamni 2007: 83). All this led to fiercer competition amongst landlords over land and an 
intensification of the commodification and regulation of land. Land prices spiraled in the early 
twentieth century. Moreover, the Bombay Municipal Corporation was the greatest contributor to 
the BIT’s coffers and also incurred a great municipal debt at the hands of an undemocratic 
agency populated by colonial administrators and wealthy Indian landowners. Meanwhile, the 
Trust grew to be one of the larger “public” landowners in the city, owning 10 percent of all land 
                                                        
59. Urban historian Helen Miller states, “The main function of the Improvement Trusts (though there were some 
variations in different cities) was to purchase land outside the built-up areas, and to supervise its orderly 
development. The profits made on the resale of plots of land to the builders and developers provided the income of 
the Trust. In a sense, the Trusts were fulfilling the objectives outlined by the National Housing Reform Council in 
Britain, though without the social purpose or concern for the quality of the housing of the poor which, alone, could 
have lifted such development schemes into the realm of town planning” (1979: 337). 
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by 1915.60 By 1917–1918, more than two-thirds of the land that the BIT had acquired for its 
various schemes remained undeveloped. In 1920, the Trust leased some of its landholdings to 
mill owners for a millennium, all for a pittance.  
The Trust outlined its vision in its annual report in 1907: “It seems, for example, probable 
that the middle classes will eventually find more suitable accommodation in the northern 
sections of the island…; the upper classes, particularly the Europeans will perhaps find relief in 
the reclamation of the western foreshore of the island; while the whole of the central belt of the 
island between Grant Road and Jaigon Cross Road will this be reserved for the industrial and 
lower classes.” (Hazareesingh 2001: 242) The BIT’s representations of the city went hand-in-
hand with the police, who had a more complex grasp of the moods and sentiments of inhabitants 
of the city. Indeed, records indicate that the police were sensitive to how schemes would affect 
local disposition and consequently prepared police tactics accordingly. The city’s millowners, 
merchants, and land owners provided a layer of zeal to this vision, lending argument and 
financial support for scheme after scheme to ensure both the city’s class segregation and the 
preservation of the city’s elite economic and spatial privileges. Thus the BIT became another 
mechanism of double dispossession, both of workers’ housing and the city’s resources, and of 
consolidating space and social wealth for Bombay’s propertied and industrial and merchant 
classes.  
 The years 1905–1925 marked a turn toward “social governance,” which would emphasize 
reforms to the social environment “manifested by programmes of housing, sanitation and 
primary education” (Aspengren 2013: 45). The improvement governance regime of this period 
contrasted with the more brutal approaches of colonial administration to population management 
                                                        
60 From Bombay Chronicle, 6 Feb. 1917, quoted in Hazareesingh 2001: 242. 
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amidst plague and famine. Yet it also continued and intensified a cycle of housing instability and 
worker precarity, as well as entrenched conditions of “make-do” squalor and revanchist 
demolition and displacement, that was central to the municipal planners’ relationship to the city’s 
workers.  
Police continued to be workers’ first contact with state agents of Bombay’s urban 
development. In 1902, a new police act that inaugurated wider discretionary powers brought the 
colonial police further into the fabric of everyday life at the street and neighborhood level. This 
would intensify antagonisms and conflicts between the working and urban poor and the police in 
the decade prior the First World War. Meanwhile, the city’s attention to the urgent matters of 
sanitation, health, and livability for the city’s masses dissipated as the threat of plague receded. 
Yet the integral aspect of the relationship between planners and the popular classes in Bombay is 
revealed in the only other objective planners achieved: to improve the infrastructure necessitated 
by the city’s business elite to make their commercial ventures viable. It widened roads and 
arterial thoroughfares, low-lying lands were drained, and a new commercial district was 
established at Ballard Estate from 1908 to 1914. In short, “the city itself was to be restructured, 
the contours of its social geography to be redrawn” to guarantee the commercial success of the 
industrial city (Chandavarkar 2009: 54).  
Former municipal commissioner Arthur Crawford was the first to make the argument for 
comprehensive urban planning, in a pamphlet entitled “The Development of New Bombay” in 
1908. But even if certain political and business classes so willed it, comprehensive urban 
planning would remain lifeless amidst institutional fracture and state agencies mired in ruling 
class fractions. Thus, while Crawford would argue that housing would only be adequately 
addressed in relation to other pressing issues, such as water, drainage and waste management 
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systems, he would rail against existing bureaus, including his own former municipal corporation, 
for their inadequacies. Meanwhile his sweeping designs would be fiercely contested by certain 
swaths of the city’s landlords singularly focused on extracting rents from workers. Nevertheless, 
Crawford persevered. Interventions for the sake of public health, he argued, would once again 
need to be centered in a Development Plan for the city if Bombay would be rid of “its unenviable 
international reputation as a ‘cholera nest’” (Dossal 2005: 3899). Speaking of the success his 
measures in the health department achieved, Crawford stated, “We had in 1867 stamped out 
Cholera in the fair city; [but] soon after, the Corporation had become ‘muck makers’ filling the 
area of the Flats with refuse and garbage on a large scale.” This, he claimed “…invited the 
demon back and—as God lives above us!—produced the Bubonic plague! One or other of these 
demons will now reign in ‘Urbs Prima in Indis’ for many a year to come” (quoted in Dossal 
2005: 3899). Nevertheless, planning remained selective, indeed framed as a solution to select 
problems. Despite the visions of bourgeois urban reformers, development would be “blocked” by 
the divided attentions of a spectrum of competing class fractions (rentiers, industrialists, 
financiers, merchants) whose economic interests often drew from ethnic, caste and regional 
loyalties.    
 In 1920, Governor George Lloyd (1918–1923) established a new governmental bureau, 
the Bombay Development Department (BDD), to tackle urban problems apart from the 
Municipal Corporation as well as the Improvement Trust. Once again, workers’ housing was on 
the agenda. The BDD scheme was an early attempt to bring millowners into the planning arena 
of housing provision. Most industrialists were willing to accept this rapprochement with workers 
during a time of major profit and relatively low unrest. Fifty thousand chawls meant to house 
250,000 workers in compartmentalized rooms with recreation and shopping outlays intended to 
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keep workers off the streets, were to be erected. By the close of the program, only 16,000 
tenements were constructed, a lackluster performance but an astonishing repetition of the legacy 
of previous urban development. The disappointment came with material consequences. Rents for 
one-room accommodations from 1913–1915 rose by seventy percent, resulting in low occupancy 
in these chawls. It was only the increasing occurrence of disturbances in worker districts that 
lead to new provisions in rent regulation, made under the Defense of India Act of 1915 for “the 
purpose of public safety” (Aspengren 2013). Insofar as planning regulations emerge as a 
response to disturbances caused by workers, development continued to be a police matter even as 
it was articulated through municipal policy.  
 As the industrial boom began to slow (coinciding with industry legislation and 
regulations affecting working hours, compensation, and trade union activity), millowners became 
less generous in their willingness to subsidize urban development through taxes. Moreover, as 
with the BIT, the BDD too would quickly face a fiscal crisis in the course of its operations. Only 
three years into its operations, by 1923, the BDD’s Back Bay scheme would encumber most of 
its resources. Social improvement would not be the intellectual or practical domain of the BDD, 
BIT, or the Municipal Corporation’s legacy.  A master plan for the city would remain elusive for 
decades to come.  
 The mill district was nonetheless a locus of physical infrastructure through mixed-use 
development. Transportation investments in the built environment included two arterial 
roadways and three new railway connections in nine stations. Public hospitals, educational and 
cultural institutions, as well as squares (maidans) and gymnasia (vyayamshalas) were allocated 
on reclaimed land. Further integrated into the fabric of neighborhood redevelopment were 
provisions for community halls, village committees (gaonkari mandals), chawl committees, and 
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even dining spaces run by women in their one room chawl tenements for migrant male workers 
(khanavals). The spatial imprints of popular urban culture were recognized with the city-
sanctioned private development of bhajan mandals for song and ganesh mandals for worship. 
 One can see from this period of urban development in Bombay that the housing question 
was embedded in the labor question. Labor and living conditions were the main arenas in which 
workers made claims on the city. The development of class-consciousness to connect these 
arenas would reveal the limits of immediate struggles in fostering a collective urban imagination. 
Just as economic class conflict was fragmented through a web of relations on the job and in the 
neighborhood (jobbers, shopkeepers), when workers turned their struggles toward housing and 
other demands for adequate reproduction, a myriad of questions emerged. For one, who pays for 
housing provision and to whom were agitations most effectively addressed? Who pays for 
municipal improvement of services? In some cases, claims were made on the state’s various 
agencies; in others it was the landlords, the moneylenders, and finally the employing classes. 
Who represents those claims remains a political issue that as we see throughout the next few 
chapters, is a century-long lineage of workers’ struggles that remains of paramount importance to 
present-day organizations and campaigns.  
 There are related questions about the redistribution of the products of labor. From the 
beginning, state-capital relations over the housing question and who builds housing for workers 
were unstable. While mill owners believed the issue was lack of housing, the state conceived of 
the problem as overcrowding, and landlords considered the issue one of supply and control over 
rents. The responses coming from each faction—industrialists, landowners, and the state—only 
intensified the crisis. As fragmented and competitive as they are, even in momentary instances 
when their class interests align, they could not be relied upon to plan for the city.  
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This is true today, despite a nexus of sympathies in reigning neoliberal ideology and the 
orthodoxy of public-private planning in Mumbai, class-interested development by the elite and 
state sectors do not maintain a coherent force. By 1980, as I shall discuss in Chapter Four, the 
mill lands leased by the city were stripped of their industrial role and plunged into a growing real 
estate market that has since driven a new wave of dispossession (again of house, land, and labor, 
as well as of public assets). The notion that the state is the main loci of collective consumption 
remains prevalent in urban theory. But as this history traces, and as I detail its resonances in the 
contemporary period in later chapters, an understanding of the antagonist nature of the state 
challenges the problematic view of the colonial and postcolonial state as guarantor of societal 
reproduction. As we will see in later chapters, contemporary understandings of the state have 
shifted in light of how societal mobilizations relate to collective demands in which the state is 
just one part of the collective solution.   
 
The City and Nation 
For leaders of the Independence movement, such as Lokmanya Tilak, principal advocate of 
Swadeshi in Bombay, the city was imagined as a growing center of nationalist independence in 
the early twentieth century. The Indian independence movement in Bombay and Bengal was 
inaugurated in 1905. A rising anti-colonial popular movement would take center stage in the city, 
both drawing on existing cross-class affinities and spurning new fractions within a broad-based 
movement for independence. On July 22, 1908, Tilak was sentenced to six years imprisonment 
on the charge of writing inflammatory articles against the Government in his newspaper Kesari. 
The arrest led to huge protests across the city, the frequency of which only increased in the 
coming decade. The nationalist agitations and mobilizations were largely urban affairs and poor 
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city dwellers played a significant part of the emerging anticolonial bloc, even as their immediate 
interests were deferred in the name of independence.   
In the coming decade, the energies of the city’s working-class movements in its 
consistent claims on the city’s administration would be siphoned off by both the largely 
professional nationalist movement and the additional colonial pressures placed on the industrial 
working classes in a time of war. Indeed, British pressures on Bombay’s contribution to war 
effort would exacerbate tensions within working class neighborhoods. Labor camps were opened 
in 1917 in Dadar to aid in military recruitment amongst workers. Meanwhile, workers’ 
conditions certainly worsened during and immediately after the First World War, due to rising 
prices, high rents, and general scarcity (Chandavarkar 1981). The state had to actively take 
measures to prevent food riots as grain prices surged. The independence movements from 1917–
1922 contributed a nationalist politics steeped in cultural self-assertion to growing worker 
resentment of the British and Indian elites as well as the ruling imperial culture.   
The city was now an everyday locus of politics as well as national independence 
movements. The great agitations after World War I culminated in the 1919 movement that surged 
into two decades of resistance in the twenties and thirties. Bombay was the main center of the 
Satyagraha movement started by Mahatma Gandhi from February to April 1919 as a result of the 
Rowlatt Act, which indefinitely extended emergency measures during World War I in order to 
control public unrest (Gordon 1973). Following World War I, which saw large movement of 
Indian troops, supplies, arms and industrial goods to and from Bombay, city life was shut down 
many times during the noncooperation movement from 1920 to 1922. Some of the same sections 
of the city activated in the 1890s surged once again to life in in the Gandhian movement against 
the Rowlatt Act and the general rise of the noncooperation as well as the Khilafat movement. But 
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more often, workers found their interests ill-represented by the Indian National Congress-led 
independence movement, the limiting ideologies of its “all-India politics,” or from religious 
organizations deploying communal idioms (Johnson 1973: 197, Chandavarkar 1981).  
 The first important strike in the textile industry in Bombay occurred over eighteen days in 
January 1919 involving about 150,000 workers. According to Chandavarkar (1981: 603), “the 
Government of Bombay believed that ‘while the workers had no accepted leaders’ the conduct of 
the dispute ‘appeared to indicate the probability of some controlling organ.” By now the city’s 
power and politics were constituted by two realms routinely mixed together in unexpected ways: 
the formal sector of politics (municipal/presidential (regional)), voluntary associations, a range 
of media, “civil society” and an informal sector whose decision and distribution occurred 
through associations and brokers operating in localities (mohallas and wadis), bazaars, factories, 
mills, and other workplaces. 
 Dalit leader B.R. Ambedkar was also mobilizing for the annihilation of caste in the city. 
The development of a concentrated Dalit political program was as much ideological as it was a 
material struggle, with education and consciousness at the center. Ambedkar understood caste to 
be central to the organization of Indian capitalism, serving not merely as an essential division of 
labor, but rather as a deeply penetrating “division of laborers” ([1936], 2014). Moreover, it 
served as a division of spatial relations that could only be effectively combatted in the city. Yet 
his notion of urban modernity as an expanded realm of freedom for which Dalits could aspire 
embraced the entanglements of urban culture and capitalist development. There were both 
analytic and strategic tensions that emerged and would remain divisive issues between Ambedkar 
and members of Marxist groups. Though he was critical of the exclusion of the Communist-led 
movement of workers who neither divested themselves of their caste biases on the shop floor or 
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in the neighborhood, his program was largely confined to a liberal democratic framework of 
recognition and inclusion that could not render an adequate caste-class analysis of the city 
(Jaffrelot 2003). Nonetheless, the movement to which Dalit consciousness and experiences of the 
city gave rise was also steeped in a larger politics of the city as a universal realm of freedom 
(Omvedt 2008). Throughout the 1920s, as both the city’s industries and urban worker cultures 
matured, “the economism of Bombay together with its anonymity, its vibrant interactiveness, 
public spaces, maidans, modes of transport and communication, all combined to create a 
churning of peoples and lifestyles making the prescriptions of ritual purity and pollution 
increasingly difficult to maintain” (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 139). Moreover, the pace of 
industrialization, the swelling ranks of migrants in the city, and the planned scarcity of public 
utilities created a situation of fragmentary class and caste competition for opportunities and 
resources. Lower caste workers were shunted to the peripheries of the city and the margins of 
urban society for both home and occupation. 
 
A Wave of General Strikes 
The long twentieth century in Bombay (from the late colonial era well into the days of Nehruvian 
rule) can be described as the “age of labor” in which working class activity was regarded as both 
a political force and as a target of state policy. As Chandavarkar states, “the powerful public 
presence that the working classes had established in Bombay by the early twentieth century 
exerted a determining influence on the formation and reproduction of the city’s distinctive urban 
character and civic tradition” (2009: 24). Political conflict, militancy, and trade union activism 
were rooted in the everyday lives of construction workers, artisans, of ‘untouchable’ tanners and 
sweepers, seafarers, railway staff, and factory laborers, throughout the late colonial period. 
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Moreover, the anticaste movement coincided with an upsurge of worker organization. While the 
“age of labor” saw wages for work and solidarities expand as a mode of urban subsistence, the 
specter of peasant insurgency and agrarian revolt loomed. “Between the 1930s and 1960s, it was 
primarily the growth of peasant radicalism, sometimes precisely in those areas which lay beyond 
the reaches of the party, which breathed new life and energy into Indian communism” 
(Chandavarkar 1997: 181).  
While urban governance and landscape underwent these dramatic changes in the 1920s, 
labor discipline in the textile industry was also rapidly changing. Taylorist “rationalization” 
schemes on the use of labor and “standardization” of wages gave rise to a wave of general strikes 
against the intensification of work and loss of absolute wages. Workplace insurgency coincided 
with growing anticolonial independence movements within working classes that would turn the 
entire city into a stage for political contestation. There were over one thousand strikes in 
individual mills and factory departments in the twenties and thirties in Bombay. Between 1918 
and 1940, eight general strikes were waged in Girangaon alone, lasting more than a month each.  
A police killing of a worker at a demonstration only fanned the flames. The mill district, 
and to a certain extent all of Bombay, was brought to a standstill during two general strikes 
between April 1928 and September 1929 and involved over 150,000 textile workers and as well 
as sympathetic workers in informal occupations and social positions. The city’s elite came to 
view Girangaon as an incubator of insurrection, believing that the very fabric of the 
neighborhood would have to be undermined if these strikes were to be put down successfully 
(Chandavarkar 2004).61 
                                                        
61 As we shall see in chapter four in greater detail, “informalization” was the strategy, not only in sectors pertaining 
to industrial production, but across the city in spheres of reproduction such as housing. 
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 The strikes came at the prospect of harder work for those able to retain textile 
employment and no work for all others. It was a time when textile workers were paid more than 
the rest of the industrial working classes of Bombay and yet their family nutrition and food 
consumption was reportedly on average lower than those in prisons. According to surveys 
reported in the Labor Gazette in 1923, “at that time (1921–22) the government had estimated that 
‘industrial workers consume the maximum of cereals allowed by the Famine Code but less than 
the diet prescribed in the Bombay Jail Manual’.”62 Nearly half of the workers families were in 
debt of more than two months of earnings, often suffering interest rates of 75 percent or 150 
percent annually. Most of the seventeen demands of the strike took aim to the intensification of 
labor, the “rationalizing” of the industry, and redundancy wrought by technological shifts in both 
machinery and production processes aimed at increasing “efficiency.” Other demands pertained 
to the working conditions on the shop floor (e.g. machine cleaning, attendance records, etc.). In 
all, the autonomy of the workers was expressed in each demand, which called for a 
reorganization of “the government of the factory” through “consultation with representatives of 
workers organizations” and “approval of workers through their own organizations” (Quoted in 
Bhattacharya 1981: PE38–29).  
The capitalist factions represented in the Millowners Association were perceptive in their 
immediate fears of, and repulsed by, what they referred to as “Bolshevik inroads.” A political 
organization for the Indian capitalist class rallied around a “national” option that supported 
Independence, and sought to enlist labor in its own subordination as the best chance for defeating 
                                                        
62. The schedule of food consumption (which included salt, cereals, pulses, meat, oils) detailed in the Famine Code 
was concerned with the measurement of food insecurity (near-scarcity, scarcity, and famine). The Code was a direct 
outcome of the Victorian era famines (what Davis refers to as “late Victorian Holocausts”) that devastated India 
from the 1880s onward. The 1923 study cited in the Labor Gazette was reported in G Findlay Shirras, “Report on an 
Enquiry into Working Class Budgets in Bombay,” (Labour Office, Government of Bombay, 1923, p 21. Quoted in 
S. Bhattacharya. “Capital and Labour in Bombay City, 1928-29.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 
42/43 (Oct. 17-24, 1981), pp. PE36-PE44). 
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the upswell in communist agitation. Indeed, rational and national strategies guided the new labor 
discipline. It was in this spirit then that Bombay’s captains of industry implored the police to 
swiftly “remove” worker leaders, even trying to raise political support in the Legislative 
Assembly for use of extraordinary powers while also agitating for the passing the Criminal 
Intimidation law “to make picketing by strikers a cognisable offense.” Repressive and 
reactionary sentiments against the ascendency of the working class were shared by Indian 
industrialists and the colonial state alike and remained concerned with ridding the nation of the 
“wickedness” of communists. “The best friends of India” it was argued, “have to concentrate on 
this aspect with more earnestness rather than any other aspect” (quoted in Lieten 1982: 702). 
Routinely, police reporters would spy on worker meetings, supervise pickets and escort 
“blacklegs” (scabs) into the mills, and as pickets extended to worker neighborhoods, so too did 
police presence. Most dramatically, the colonial state responded with the Bombay Special 
Emergency Powers Act by arresting and framing communist leaders from Bombay, Calcutta, 
Lahore, Jhansi, Allahabad, Gorakhpur, Dacca, Lucknow, Poona and other places in the Meerut 
Conspiracy Case. Still others in the Independence movement fretted at the further arming of the 
colonial state, yet balked at the independent worker movement, stating  
“They ought to be made to understand that the more important struggle was between the British 
government and the people rather than between labour and capital” [quote from Gordon 
Polonskaya, 1964 p 215, in Lieten 1982: 703)]. 
 
There was certainly cause for concern amongst the diverse beneficiaries of British colonial 
power as well as those in the ascendant Indian political classes who would seek to overthrow it, 
with the mass uprisings that threated to push decolonization toward revolution.  
The communist-led Girni Kamgar Union (GKU) was formed in 1927. The worker 
militancy was in many ways self-organized and autonomous until the GKU took the mantle as 
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the decisive workers organization of the city’s textile workers, serving as an effective agent of 
organization, representing both factory and neighborhood life (from then until the 1960s).63 Prior 
to that, organizations concerned with workers functioned more as self-help welfare associations 
that advocated education as the solution to low wages, better hygiene to cope with inadequate 
housing, and thrift in the face of poverty (Chandavarkar 1981). Because the communist-led 
union spoke directly to the material needs of workers, it enrolled five times as many members as 
the Congress Party in Bombay. Nonetheless, temporary and changing alliances between workers 
within the GKU and other factions weakened internal cohesion due to splits within the union 
itself as well as with other union leadership; meanwhile the solidity of external cross-class 
alliances was vulnerable to the general hostility amongst Indian nationalists to communist 
influence and their complicity in attacks on communist elements within the working class. 
Meanwhile, the Congress party set up rival organizations aimed at reducing working class 
autonomy, self-organization, independence, etc. The Times of India reported in 1920 that 
“The textile workers of Bombay organised under the red flag will fight to the last for their 
organised existence and for their legitimate rights, and they hope to be helped by all other 
sections of the working class in this fight so that they will emerge victorious in the end.” [The 
Times of India, September 10, 1920]. 
 
Two facets of worker mobilization in this time are important for how they would change 
the everyday and lived relations in the city. First, women assumed prominent roles in factory-
specific and general strikes, expanding the political meaning of the wage as it connected 
industrial labor to unpaid reproductive work. Middle class and working mill women alike were 
                                                        
63. The Bombay Textile Labour Union (BTLU), founded in 1926, and the Girni Kamgar Mahamandal (GKM), were 
the only trade unions in the city when in early 1928 a surge of resentment of mill-hands against the rationalisation 
scheme, consequent retrenchment, and coincident wage reduction created the union.  It was the first general strike in 
Bombay that was ideologically and strategically led by Communists, in part members of Bombay’s Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Party (WPP), the name of the Communist Party of India at the time. 
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influenced by Marxist ideologies and through association with Communists in everyday life. 
Some sang at the gates at shift change while others defending these same gates against strike 
breakers. Some cooked in the khanavals (public working-class kitchens) and smuggled 
pamphlets and leaflets into the factories and pasted them on the walls while others still would 
become shop floor and union leaders (Prakash 2010). 
 The second is the growth of militant class neighborhood associations that could 
successfully socially reproduce workers despite steady pauperization and support their ability to 
strike and enable large-scale coordination. During some eight hundred meetings that occurred at 
mill gates and chawls, workers were able to raise the support to sustain a city-wide strike for six 
months in 1928. They were also able to coordinate across workplaces, when for instance, 1929, 
75,000 workers in different mills downed their tools and left their place of work. Several such 
lightning strikes crippled the industry and embolden a larger proletarian spirit in the city that 
linked mill committees, the union, party cells, chawl committees, and the neighborhood. Indeed, 
neighborhood sentiments shifted toward the workers even amongst certain petty bourgeoisie. 
Small grocers in the worker districts, for instance, supplied grain to the strikers while the 
internationalist dimensions of support were evident in the strike fund established with support 
from trade unions as far away as the Soviet Union, Britain, and across Europe (Prakash 2004). 
The growth of the GKU from 1928 seemed inevitable as they swiftly assumed leadership 
during the beginning of the strike years and changed the terrain of working-class urbanism for 
decades to come. Police reports indicate a high degree of political education and revolutionary 
content, with frequent references to the 1917 Russian revolution. If working class consciousness 
developed steadily, its expression in autonomous class activity beyond the confining leadership 
of its representative institutions, would be spasmodic. While it is reported that GKU led every 
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strike following 1928, the union was also at times unable “to check wildcat strikes spontaneously 
generated without reference to factory committees or the trade unions” (Chandavarkar 1981, 
Lieten 1982). The strength of the trade union movement came from solidarities within and across 
various working-class associations and those who acted on their behalf. But so too did caste and 
religious divisions permeate the strike efforts (for instance along Brahmin-non-Brahmin, Hindu-
outcaste, and Hindu-Muslim lines). While autonomous self-representation was important, as in 
the case of Dalits within the labor movement, there were also ideological divisions that 
undermined solidarities, as for instance when Ambedkar split workers along caste lines by 
assisting outcaste workers into the mills; or when the recruitment of Muslim weavers and 
picketers provoked Hindu worker insecurities. Additionally there were risks of aligning to calls 
of unity in the Independence movement, as voiced by GKU union leader S V Deshpande who 
wrote in Kranti, a Marathi-language workers’ weekly organ, on June 9, 1929 that “it would be 
putting the rope round the necks if the workers were to give their destiny in the hands of Gandhi, 
who is careless about workmen and always lives near rich capitalists” (Lieten 1982:702). The 
demands of Independence also put unique pressures on Muslim workers due to communal 
tensions within the nationalist movements for Independence.  
  The swelling class-consciousness during the strikes lingered in the sentiments and 
attitudes of workers across the city. There were established in workers districts military 
barricades during two communal riots (where Pathan moneylenders’ homes and their loan 
ledgers were particularly targeted for destruction) that flared up during the strike that remained 
even after the riots died, justified by the Police Report due to the “state of high nervous tension.” 
So too did communalist tendencies, once provoked by mill managers and political parties alike, 
become entrenched in the antinomies of the worker and the nationalist movements. Communal 
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riots in the 1930s were an exception to the otherwise inter-communal political and civic culture 
that the city enjoyed, precisely because of workers’ traditions of solidarity and collective action 
around labor and general proletarian reproduction in the city (Chandavarkar 2004). 
 The industry had barely recovered from the 1928–1929 strikes when the fluctuating 
world markets during the Great Depression caused a crisis of the economy. Starting in the 1930s, 
the textile industry began casualizing labor and thereby more sharply distinguished between 
permanent workers and a large mass of “informal” workers, not only in the mills but across the 
wider urban labor market. While a few “protected” workers remained, the ranks of the informal 
labor community swelled, receiving fewer benefits, greater discipline, and lower wages from 
state and industry that felt no obligations toward them. Worker power was fragmented. Their 
autonomous ability to directly assault their class enemies was stunted by myriad intermediaries 
and contractors in the labor process, from “patrons, caste fellows, and assorted meddlers of 
influence, power, and credit.” (Chandavarkar 2009: 25) A further round of wages cuts and 
rationalization provoked another wave of strikes in 1933–1934 which briefly extended the 
organization of the general strike of 1928–1929 and also deepened ties to workers’ neighborhood 
associations. In addition to mill committees that were established in the previous cycle of worker 
militancy, chawl committees played a vital role, something the police took direct notice of and 
referred to as “communist cells.” While the state’s presence in the neighborhoods was not all 
repressive in nature, the police were in fact the main contact workers had with the state.64  
Leftist intellectuals articulated working class and popular sentiments in formations such 
as the All India Progressive Writers’ Association (PWA), founded in 1936 and reflected in street 
                                                        
64. A police report bluntly stated, “They have gone to great trouble to establish ‘communist cells’ in mills and 
industrial concerns, and in addition they have appointed Chawl Committees to influence the workers still.” Quoted 
in Chandavarkar 1981: 638. 
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theater (loknatya) such as the Indian People’s Theatre Association (IPTA), founded in 1942. 
Strikes occurred in 1939 and 1940 led by Communist trade unionists who were able to take 
control of the considerable All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) when its leaders were 
jailed for their association with the nationalist independence movement (Kooiman 1980, Lieten 
1982). 
 Nonetheless, the difficulties of building of workers’ collective autonomy fed directly into 
a growing fragmentation of power along caste and communal lines that would give rise over the 
next thirty years to a new political culture in the city. Workers militancy yielded to another more 
reactionary force: communalism and parochialism. Although it would take a few decades to fully 
express itself, by 1960, new street and party formations such as the Shiva Sena were able to 
capture the restrained and frustrated worker energy (Pendse 1984). 
Workers did achieve new housing legislation in the form of rent control and tenancy laws, 
making it impossible for landlords to evict tenants or raise rents, but also enabling renters to pass 
on leaseholds to succeeding generations. Possession of rights of succession to rental housing thus 
conferred a higher status on the housed, and excluded the un-housed from the most crucial of 
livelihood resources. This gave rise to a privatist urban formula of deteriorating social housing 
schemes wherein an undisposed upper middle class increasingly felt only responsible for 
maintenance and upkeep of their private dwellings and appealed to hired muscle rather than the 
law to assert their rights or interests. Meanwhile, those who could afford neither maintenance nor 
defensive muscle would find themselves evicted. In a languid regulatory environment, landlords 
deemed large business corporations preferred tenants, for their reverence of property rights made 
for an easy alliance with the upper and middle classes and they were relatively immune to both 
statutory due process and informal intimidation. Thirty years of this policy culture yielded 
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popular resentment that such tenancy laws served the rich instead of protecting the poor. As 
property prices climbed, scarcity of “affordable” housing resulted in massive squatter 
settlements.65   
   
Struggles for Space 
In the early 1930s, the nationwide civil disobedience movement against the British Salt tax 
spread to Bombay. Vile Parle was the headquarters of the movement in Bombay under Jamnalal 
Baja. Strikes and boycotts, aggravated by the salt satyagrahas (Gandhi-influenced civil 
disobedience) and sit-down strikes begun in the thirties, gained greater power in the wartime 
economy. Yet the war economy forced greater exploitation of workers. There was some 
diversification of industries during this period, alongside a growth in manufacturing and 
engineering. General strikes in 1940 and 1950 conveyed a sense of violent rejection of this 
exploitation and the regimes of work imposed upon workers through the jobber system in which 
jobbers, supervisors, and manager were routinely attacked. Worker militancy during this period 
suggests that Indian labor was not easily subordinated by the British Raj’s war efforts and that 
Independence would not necessarily be politically possible only after the conclusion of the war.  
 Given the intensity of workers’ strike actions, Bombay in the 1940s was considered the 
“nerve centre of Communist agitation in India” alongside Bengal. The spread of popular support 
for communists and workers struggles extended to an “impressive community of political 
sentiments […] and sustained political expression” (Chandavarkar 1981:632). Yet the Quit India 
movement was launched in 1942 without much expectation that workers would support the 
                                                        
65 See Chandavarkar 2009: 21–25; Whitehead, Judy. “Rent gaps, revanchism and regimes of accumulation in 
Mumbai.” Anthropologica (2008): 269-282.) Housing precarity would intensify in the context of the informalization 
of labor.   
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Congress-led effort. On the contrary, in large part, workers were ahead of their unions and 
political party representations during the forties and indeed for the next few decades in their 
decolonial and revolutionary ambitions for independence. The Quit India rebellion was first 
promulgated on August 7, 1942 in Bombay by the Indian National Congress in a public meeting 
at Gowalia Tank. A wave of repression followed in which nationalist leaders were jailed. 
Communists were largely isolated from the nationalist movement, for which the British rewarded 
them by legalizing their Party organization.  
 With World War II, the movements of thousands of troops, military and industrial goods 
and the fleet of the Royal Indian Navy made Bombay an important military base for battles 
fought in West Asia and South East Asia. The Royal Indian Navy mutiny, sparked by a thousand 
sailors engaging a flash sit-down and hunger strike, marked a week-long revolt in Colaba, from 
February 18 to 25 1946, as the first and most serious revolt by the Indian sailors of the Royal 
Indian Navy against British rule. Agitators onboard Navy vessels flew the Congress tricolor, 
Muslim League green, and Communist Red flags. The uprising quickly spread to every branch of 
the British Indian armed services, not only in Bombay, but “every major naval establishment 
(Karachi, Calcutta, Visakhapatnam, Cochin, Lonavala, and even New Delhi), Royal Indian Air 
force stations (Sion, Madras, Kanpur, and Ambala), and even army units in Bombay, Karachi, 
and Calcutta” (Lentin 2015).66  Workers, students from Dadar, small traders from Bhuleshwar 
and Kalbadevi, Muslims from Mohammad Ali Road, wide sections of the city’s middle classes, 
began gathering on the streets, stirring to the call by Communists to rally in support of the 
striking low-ranking Naval officers (Prakash 2010:217). British tanks and troops roamed the 
                                                        
66 Sifrin Lentin. 2015. “Bombay’s little-known role in India’s Independence movement.” Quartz India (August 15 
2015) https://qz.com/480309/bombays-little-known-role-in-indias-independence-movement/ 
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streets of Bombay, while warships trained their guns on an insurgent city. Four days into the 
rising tension, some three hundred workers were killed in police shootings.  
 The unrest only hastened the British timeline for departure of the subcontinent. On 15 
August 1947, India declared independence. People of all caste and class celebrated in the streets 
for two days while Nehru delivered his famous “Tryst with Destiny” speech in Delhi. The last 
British troops to leave India, the First Battalion of the Somerset Light Infantry, passed through 
the arcade of the Gateway of India on 28 February 1948, ending the 282-year period of the 
British rule in Bombay. Partition of India and Pakistan drove refugees to existing and newly 
emerging cities on a wide scale. Between 1947 and 1951, fourteen new towns were built, and in 
that period the population of Indian cities grew by 41 per cent. In this regard (as others) the 
effects of Partition on urbanization were far reaching: there was a three-fold increase in the urban 
population of India between 1951–1981, from 62 million to 159 million, which then reached 217 
million in 1991. Over one hundred thousand Sindhi refugees from the newly created Pakistan 
were relocated in the military camps five kilometers from Kalyan in the Bombay metropolitan 
region. It was converted into a township in 1949, and named Ulhasnagar by the then Governor-
General of India, C. Rajagopalachari. From 1945–1971, driven by migration due to Partition and 
a wartime influx, the city grew five-fold: from one and half million, the city grew to eight 




The working classes of Bombay took central stage politically, from the rise of industrialism in 
the 1870s onward, to the vicissitudes of workers’ demands within the industrial and imperial 
economy in a time of war, to the emergence of a contradictory and fraught class-alliance in the 
nationalist independence movement. Workers in this period projected their demands onto the city 
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itself in multiple waves of general strikes, all the while imprinting their urban ways of life into 
the fabric of the city. While multiple class forces were arrayed against them, workers managed to 
shape the city and its developmental trajectories through decades of militancy. 
 Over all, a long century of such working-class mobilizations imprinted the city with its 
largely pluralist and popular cultures. The business strategies of the industrial classes that relied 
on the colonial state’s willingness to mobilize police repression to limit the concessions given to 
workers on the job and in their neighborhoods, also indelibly imprinted the city with a legacy of 
repression and selective concession. The struggles between these classes would only heighten in 
the post-Independence era, as workers faced a sustained strategy of industrial uneven 






A City for a Nation Yet to Come: 
Class Identity and Difference in Post-Independence Bombay  
 
 
“And now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At 
the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, 
which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a 
nation, long suppressed, finds utterance. . .” —Jawaharlal Nehru 
 
The first decades of Independence, a period roughly between 1950 and 1970, during an import-
substitution manufacturing regime, were a decisive time for Indian capitalists, as 
industrialization was expected to proceed at an eager and unfettered pace. Capitalists keen on a 
stable and profitable productivity worked closely with the state in a new national climate, 
granted concessions to workers, and accepted a degree of unionization. In general, they opted for 
peaceful and legal measures to resolve industrial conflict (Pendse 1981). Yet they remained 
apprehensive of any maneuver that would consolidate the power of workers at the political level 
or to allow workers to recompose their power in their neighborhoods and across industry.  
Workers’ struggles took a definitive turn in the increasingly tumultuous post-
Independence period. These were not confined to textile and railway workers, but also included 
workers employed by the Municipal Corporation, in transport, electricity, as well as hotels and 
restaurants. As social struggles proliferated in this period, new lines of class solidarity were 
drawn beyond official parties. Communist-led union power was already starting to decline by the 
1950s as Congress was ushered into power upon Independence. Hoping to regain their influence 
within agrarian and urban working-class struggles, communists eagerly joined a growing 
coalition led by Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (United Maharashtra Assembly) of nationalists 
working to reorganize the administrative and territorial identity of the city and the region along 
ethnic lines and to establish a Maharashtran state centered around ethnic Marathas and the 
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dominance of the Marathi language. The Communist Party’s calculus was that the marathi manu 
(Marathi man) would be a leading protagonist against moneylenders, industrialists, and other 
exploiters largely from Parsi, Gujarati, and Malwari communities.67 The assumption, however, 
held by intellectuals and activists alike, was flawed and fated for defeat. By reducing the 
working classes to Maharashtran culture and by tying its struggles to the outcomes of a new 
state, linguistic and communal ties took the place of long-standing affiliations amongst a 
culturally heterogeneous urban labor population. Communists and other left organizations who 
participated in what some termed a “second Independence movement” ceded important political 
ground to nativists and nationalists.68 So too did the late fifties witness the growth of Dalit 
political formations such as the Scheduled Caste Federation and the Republican Part of India. 
Although the Republic Party of India failed to unite Dalit interests within this roiling coalition, 
lower caste politics came to the fore around the formation of the state of Maharashtra. 
In January 1955, just days before the scheduled maiden visit of Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev and Minister of Defense Nikolai Bulganin to the city, the Samyukta Maharashtra 
Parishad called for a demonstration to illustrate its capacity to mobilize the popular classes, to 
which six hundred thousand workers responded.69 Popular surges paved the way for violence and 
riots. So too did the Samyukta Maharashtra movement organized satyagrahas (truth processions) 
                                                        
67 See Rao, Anupama. The Caste Question. University of California Press, 2009: 182 
68 As the Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad (SMP) would later inspire far-reaching ethnochauvinist political 
formations such as the Shiv Sena, the fateful involvement of Communists and other left organizations in the 
coalition would have grave consequences for working class solidarities, as discussed in the next chapter. 
69  The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru revealed how significant this historic visit of Soviet leadership to non-
aligned India was for Jawaharlal Nehru and his framing of the “Communist problem” inside the country. It was 
Nehru’s interpretation that the Communist Party of India (then-undivided) was eager to receive instruction from the 
USSR on the correct “line” to take in domestic and international affairs. According to Nehru, “early in 1951–1952, 
some principal leaders of the Communist Party [India] went to Moscow secretly, that is without passports. They 
came back and said that they had got directions from Mr. Stalin. At least this is what they said. The line then laid 
down was one of full opposition (to the Government) and, where possible, petty insurrections." Moreover, there was 
the divisive question within the Indian Communist Part on whether to follow the “China path,” replacing the earlier 
Russian one, or to follow the “Indian path” toward communism. Quoted in The Hindu, September 7, 2003 (“A peep 
into the Past”), https://www.thehindu.com/lr/2003/09/07/stories/2003090700170300.htm 
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for nine months. As before, the police fired on crowds, killing ten and injuring hundreds. Protests 
(morcha) by the movement resulted in a total of 105 people killed by police firing during the 
period of agitation. While Bombay was mobilized by a “democratic nationalism” of the 
“working class, the peasantry, and the toiling middle-classes. . . . the Nehru government was 
unbending. On January 16, 1956, it announced the decision to form three states—Maharashtra, 
Gujarat, and the city of Bombay, which would be administered from New Delhi” (Prakash 2010: 
224). Left leaders were arrested, and workers resumed strikes that again crippled the city. Several 
more police shootings in workers districts attempted to stem the growing tensions, claiming 
between seventy-five and one hundred lives depending on which estimates are considered (Ibid.) 
Nonetheless, the newly organized Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra 
Committee), an alliance of opposition parties comprised of Marathi nationalists, Communists, 
Socialists, and Dalits formed in February 1956, used an electoral strategy as effectively as they 
did with street pressure to fight for the linguistic state of Maharashtra. In the second general 
elections of Bombay state, “they were rewarded with resounding success in” receiving a large 
majority of seats in Maharashtra (Prakash 2013). 
It was not by a diverse proletarian class-lower caste alliance but a multi-class 
Maharashtran community of citizens that Bombay’s contested popular power was consolidated. 
Maharashtra was born on the first of May 1960 with Bombay as its capital.70 The rearrangement 
of states required new administrative centers and capitals and reoriented the direction of 
urbanization at the time. Industrialization during the 1950s–1960s led to the development of 
many new towns apart from the state capital that were linked to the location of heavy industries 
and development projects. By the mid-sixties, capitalist expansion was slowing and the Congress 
                                                        
70 The partition of the State of Bombay along linguistic divisions of Marathi and Gujarati reconstituted the region 
respectively into the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. 
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P arty was losing its grip on workers who faced in their own daily lives incontrovertible evidence 
of the bourgeois control of Independence which would favor the nation’s political classes over its 
working masses. A period of contraction in the textile industry accompanied wider economic and 
spatial policy changes in the city. Older sections of workers were getting restless and other 
sections of the working class, such as service workers as well as a more educated and skilled 
engineering, chemical, and petroleum workers, were getting newly organized in an era in of 
capitalist expansion. However, workers faced informalization in which mill owners took 
advantage of lax labor laws and of state support to the non-mill sector, subcontracted part of their 
production to power looms (where workers were paid far less and were far more insecure) in 
quasi-legal arrangements (Patel 2010: 75). There were signs that an economic transition was on 
the brink: “the differentiation of the textile industry into a backward non-viable sector kept in 
existence by state policy; a modern profitable sector with expanding investment and production; 
and a growing small-scale sector, often producing under subcontract to larger units, became 
characteristic of the entire spectrum of Mumbai industry” (ibid.). 
 The Shiv Sena, the right-wing nativist party and neighborhood-based organization was 
founded in 1966. Its rise since the 1960s has had a major role in the ideological shift in mood 
amongst the popular classes and the claim that workers had to better lives in the city. Hitherto, 
“workers, intellectuals, and political activists saw radical urban dreams expressed in the color 
red” (Prakash 2010: 205). The Shiv Sena, in turn, was used to break the last unities among 
working class organizations in the city, mobilizing “Marathi-speaking upper caste Brahmins, 
Sawaswat, Kayastha, and the OBC [Other Backwards Caste] caste groups”—at the behest of the 
employing classes (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 146). Vehemently anticommunist, the Shiv 
Sena penetrated the popular culture of the streets with a nativist and identitarian logic of 
105 
mobilization. Gujarati and Marwaris (Rajastani) communities were perceived as owning the 
majority of the industry and trade enterprises in the city (from grain, textile, paper and metal 
trade, to diamonds, bullion, to stock trading), while white-collar jobs were mainly sought by the 
South Indian migrants to the city. The Shiv Sena stoked resentment amongst Marathi people 
about their relative marginalization in their state Maharashtra through a nativist narrative of 
historical conquer and subordination by waves of outsiders. Urban desire and political will would 
fuse into a governing redemptive power of mythic past glories for the Marathas.  
Although they were not wholly allied or subordinate to business interests in the city, the 
Shiva Sena accomplished far more in terms of workers’ repression than mill owners and the 
police could. In this regard, the Shiv Sena has been described as an “emanation of the ‘crisis of 
crisis management’,” a party that grew “between two spaces of wealth and poverty in Bombay 
appealing to ‘a class squeezed in between which has neither benefited from close contact with 
the power structure nor as a recipient of the welfare dole.” (Prakash 1993: 2120) 
The Shiv Sena fomented a communal riot in the northern suburbs of Mumbai against 
Muslims from Northern India. Meanwhile, they trained their suspicions on South Indians, who 
were in addition to Communists, the other “aliens” to be purged from the native lands of 
Maharashtra. In the 1960s and 1970s, Shiv Sena cadres became involved in various attacks 
against the South Indian communities, vandalizing South Indian restaurants and pressuring 
employers to hire Marathas. In 1969, the Sena (army) also instigated an “angry rampage” of 
supporters retaliating against the police arrest of Bal Thackery and other leaders after they 
enlisted a crowd to stop the motorcade of a deputy Prime Minister visiting the city on official 
business from Delhi. Sena activists burned shops and buses, attacked police stations, and could 
only be put down by police and army intervention.  
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Worker agitations in the mills under the leadership of the trade unions (led by historic 
organizers such as Datta Samant) continued in the sixties. This wave was characterized by 
“militancy, direct mass action, disregard for legal proprieties and challenge to an established 
union.” One confrontation between workers and Shiv Sena in a Godrej factory resulted in the 
death of a police officer. Dalit youth and workers were increasingly frustrated in the early 1960s 
that their everyday experiences of post-Independence Bombay were not being represented and 
mobilized along the cultural identity of Dalits by the neo-Buddhist Dalit leadership and 
organizations of the day. 
Yet the Dalit movements gained political momentum in the late sixties and early 
seventies, redefining the political of emancipation for lower caste Hindus in the city and beyond. 
The Dalit Panthers were inspired by the Black Panther Party in the United States and the 
dramatic Naxalite uprising to the east in 1967, as well as the student movements at home and 
abroad. The Dalit Panthers were determined to unseat the hierarchical order of the caste system 
in Bombay and in the nation, but they also claimed Dalit identity for all “oppressed” classes and 
therefore included members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, neo-Buddhists, workers, 
women, the landless and farmers. While this militant anti-caste movement arose in the city in the 
sixties and seventies, it was rooted in a decades-long protest movement against caste repression 
and terror in the countryside. Thus they claimed the city as an urban continuum that included the 
countryside in a connected terrain of struggle, more so than the Communists and trade unionists, 
ethnic chauvinists, neighborhood dadas and mafias, and ruling party politicians ever did. They 
organized for empowerment and against caste-imposed scarcity across the Dalit urban world, in 
Bombay, Poona, Nasik, and Aurangabad as well as into rural Maharashtra. Yet the municipality 
was not merely a backdrop or place of politics. It was also their politics of place, their right to 
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reside and cultivate an emancipated future. The situation remained one of abject misery with 
rural Dalits fleeing rural distress only adding to the slums in central Bombay and eastern 
suburbs. Unemployment and economic insecurity amongst Dalit youth and the incidences of 
atrocities committed against Dalits in both urban and rural settings set the stage for a 
radicalization of Dalit consciousness based in fact-finding missions in the countryside as well as 
urban youth centers (chavanis) that illuminated the conditions of Dalit life.  
A communalization of worker politics was emerging in which workers saw themselves 
more reflected in their ethnic as opposed to class background. This had already been set in 
motion with the “dislocations in the labor force in conjunction with the slowing down and 
constriction of industrial growth” (Rodrigues and Gavaskar 2003: 147). As the economy showed 
signs of slowing, new social identities were being mobilized beyond the workers movements. 
Divisive ethnic politics ruled the day as Dalits and Senaiks (Shiv Sena rank and file) alike made 
subaltern claims on the city. Containing the growing political crisis of the city was the state’s 
utmost concern, and as it had done before in moments of crisis, it resorted to municipal reform 
and planning, factional deals, repression and recuperation to stem conflict. While Bombay was 
well represented in the all-India railway strike in 1974, as well as in the cooperation of Dalits in 
workers struggles in the textile mills, everyday violence erupted along the fault lines of new 
ethnic identities. A BDD chawl riot erupted after Dalits were attacked by Senaiks (and supported 
by police) during a public meeting called by the Panthers in Ambedkar Ground in Worli in 1974.  
 
Planning in Post-Independence Bombay 
With its political crises and simmering rebellions, post-Independence Bombay did not look as it 
was to be expected. Indeed, an era of peace and prosperity was imagined to be as much a part of 
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the city’s fate as the nation.71 The first Five Year Plans included considerable state involvement 
in urban policy and planning. During the 1960s, several states enacted such legislation and 
created town planning departments which, with the help of central grants, prepared over five 
hundred master plans for individual cities. These could not cope with the rate of urbanization that 
was already occurring and the plans remained mostly on paper. The building of new towns was 
meant to meet several needs: provide jobs and homes for refugees displaced by the population 
transfers (or movements) that accompanied the Partition; absorb excess population from the 
older urban areas; generate economic development in the local region; and serve as symbols of 
new, modern India.  
An aspirational postcolonial vision optimistically glossed over the brimming struggles 
and antagonisms seeded by colonial urban development. Post-Independence urban planning in 
Bombay was imagined, if only briefly, as a field elevated from class politics and exempt from the 
relations and contests of power. There was nowhere, therefore, to channel the myriad frustrated 
desires and deferred dreams except in harsher and more exacting ethnic tensions. Such was the 
vision to be found in an outline of a master plan for Greater Bombay drafted in 1948 following 
Independence. It was already recognized in the forties and fifties that planning would be 
necessary in order to control commercially-driven growth in the city by strict land-use 
regulations and the regulation of industries on the island city. Yet little of this wisdom translated 
into action. In April 1950, the merger of Bombay suburbs and Bombay city created the Greater 
Bombay District, spanning an area of 235.1 km2 (90.77 sq mi) and inhabited by 2.3 million 
                                                        
71. During the first two Plans (1951–1956; 1956–1961), for instance, several important institutions for urban 
administration and the training of skilled professionals were created by the central government. These include a 
Ministry of Urban Affairs, the National Buildings Organization, the School of Planning and Architecture in New 
Delhi, a Regional and Town Planning Department in the IIT Kharagpur, and the Town and Country Planning 
Organization, the technical unit of the Ministry of Urban Affairs, which prepared the Master Plan for Delhi in 1957 
and also model legislation for town planning to be enacted by state governments. Chandigarh is exemplary in the 
modernist aspirations and visions of these plans.  
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people. The Municipal Corporation limits were extended up to Jogeshwari along the Western 
Railway and Bhandup along the Central Railway. This limit was further extended in February 
1957 up to Dahisar along the Western Railway and Mulund on the Central Railway.  
 
Figure 7: Railway Map of Greater Mumbai. Image credit: mapsofindia.com. 
 
The Maharashtra state-legislated Bombay Town Planning Act of 1954 (which updated 
and replaced the 1915 Act) mandated the city’s municipal corporation preparation of a 
Development Plan for twenty years for the Greater Mumbai Metropolitan Region, which was to 
include zoning for residential, commercial, industrial and non-development zones as well as 
public provisions for amenities and utilities, including road networks. The vision for a 
comprehensive Development Plan for the city was also based on the Maharashtra Regional and 
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Town Planning Act, 1966 (revised in 1994 to appoint the Bombay Metropolitan Regional 
Development Authority for planning), which aimed to take a regional planning approach to the 
Maharashtra state, regulate development in both urban and urbanizing areas with regard to land 
use reservations, utilities and amenities, preservation and conservation, and distribution of 
population.72   
In 1964, the city’s very first Development Plan was proposed. It primarily concentrated 
on: providing various amenities in line with a land use plan, shifting development to the near 
suburbs; and restricting the operations of industries, trade and population concentration on the 
island city (Hamara Shehar Mumbai 2014). The plan detailed a large-scale restructuring of the 
city through zoning, dispersal of the pressures of urban growth and governing a vast population 
to suburbs and town satellites, decentralization of industries, and a massive housing campaign 
which included improved water supplies, power, sewage, social services such as education and 
medical care, and an attention to traffic flow. Intended to be financed mainly through loans and 
subsidies from the Maharashtran state and the central government, its call for a development tax 
alongside its proposal for zoning regulations was nevertheless perceived as conflicting with 
business interests that enjoyed relative autonomy in their use of urban space. Assessing these 
disadvantages, the business community first sought to delay the implementation of Bombay’s 
first Development Plan, and then to present the municipal government with an alternative to the 
plan. This plan met with some inevitable failures: failure to comply with timelines, failure to 
expand and improve existing infrastructure, and failure to develop amenities proposed in the plan 
(Hamara Shehar Mumbai 2014). The 1964 Development Plan was not approved until 1967.  
                                                        
72 From 1960 to 1970, sixty percent of all factory workers in Maharashtra were located in Bombay as were 88 
percent of all joint-stock companies (Shaw 1999). In the late 1960s, Nariman Point and Cuffe Parade were reclaimed 
and developed, largely for elite consumption.   
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By then, a much grander vision was gaining force. At the same time that the city began to 
be imagined as a zone of crisis, it also became imagined anew as a region. Navi Bombay (now 
known as Navi Mumbai), one of the world’s largest planned cities, was conceived by several 
prominent architects and implemented by the government-owned City and Industrial 
Development Corporation (CIDCO) as a rebirth of the city across the bay to the east.  
 






The Modern Architectural Research Group (MARG), whose vision of urban development 
in its 1965 journal issue first presented the idea of a “twin city,” argued that nothing good would 
come of developing Bombay piece-meal. A bold and sweeping planning imagination was 
conjured with a new town built from the ground up as its focus. The New Bombay was to act as 
a countermagnet to a “decaying city” faced with impending “strangulation” lest population 
growth be directed elsewhere (Times of India 1969, 6:2, 6:7–8 as quoted in Shaw 1999).73 The 
hope of comprehensive planning for Bombay was deferred to the “dream across the water” 
(Ibid.) 
More importantly, the “twin city” concept functioned as a counterplan that enabled the 
business community to deviate from the original Development Plan’s proposal for spatial 
regulation and zoning. This would recreate spatial patterns in a new, planned direction, stemming 
the rapid rate of “haphazard” urban growth and accomplish the important task of spatially 
“deconcentrating” Bombay. This would formally plan the already ongoing process of 

















Figure 9: Page 112. Urban expansion into the Mumbai 
Metropolitan Region. Image Source: 
http://gsalgeog.blogspot.com. 
                                                        
73. Times of India, Bombay, Editorial, ‘Decaying City,’ 21 April 1969, 6: 2; also, Times of India, Bombay, ‘Saving 
Bombay City: Strangulation Threat,’ 15 Oct. 1969, 6: 7-8. Quoted in Shaw 1999: 965.   
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In 1970, the entire area east of the harbor—55,000 acres of land, from hills to water—
was notified for acquisition. In 1971, planning of the new township began with a focus on a 
better living environment for an urban majority provided through basic, accessible, and amenity-
oriented housing for those who could not afford to live in Bombay. This mainly benefited middle 
class professionals, service sector workers and workers in organized industries who had already 
migrated from Bombay; the poorer classes of Greater Bombay in unorganized sectors would not 
benefit from the expansion of urban land and housing opportunities.  
In 1975, Charles Correa’s film “City on the Water” states in exceptionally clear terms, 
this is the city and it is dying. Yet it understood that it was congestion that would cause the city to 
explode. The film opens, “Incredible, it’s it? Half a million people arriving each morning. No one 
leaving.” While the poor are shown favorably by Correa, the camera typically direct its gaze 
downward to render a view the poor in need of rescue by development. If not, the city would 
crumble—through neglect, overuse, and sheer numbers. “Where would there be space 
enough?”—it asked. Indeed, urban growth in India throughout the twentieth century was rapid 
and didn’t show signs of slowing in the seventies. The faster growth of large towns and cities 
than smaller cities and town in the last century led to an increasing concentration of the urban 
population in these settlements. This is the associated phenomenon of metropolization, of the 
large, swirling economic urban magnet of major cities such as Bombay.74 Slums only increased 
in both cities, while rural-to-urban migration to Navi Mumbai from nearby small towns and 
villages supplied laborers for domestic work.  
                                                        
74. While at the beginning of the last century, small towns with less than twenty thousand people were the 
predominant kind of town and accounted for 47 per cent of the total urban population, since 1901, small towns have 
lost population, and by 1991 this figure dropped to 11 per cent. At the same time, towns with a population over 
100,000, called Class I towns, accounted for 65 per cent of the total urban population. Whereas in 1901, there was 
only once such metropolis (over one million in population, in this case Calcutta), by 1951, there were four (Mumbai, 
Delhi, Chennai, and Calcutta); by 1981 there were 12 and by 1991 there were 23. 
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As increasing migration to the cities, and specifically to informal settlements, pushed 
urbanization outward from the peripheries of established cities, the city was forced to expand 
laterally in some ways that were planned (suburbs, satellite towns such as Navi Mumbai 
developed in 1972). The urban conglomerate of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, consisting of 
Greater Mumbai, Navi Mumbai and many satellite towns, became formally administered by the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) that very year. MMRDA 
served as an apex body for planning and coordination of development activities in the Bombay 
metropolitan region, and set up a regional plan that included zones for industrial, agrarian, 
protected and reserved forest, expansion areas, urbanizable areas and restricted areas. As such, 
urban growth emerges across the transit corridors in the region. Coastal Regulation Zones were 
established for the preservation of coastal and agricultural landscapes. Maharashtra Housing and 
Development Authority, established in 1977, was and remains engaged primarily in constructing 
and selling housing to low- and middle-income groups in urban and semi-urban areas. 
In August 1979, the sister township of New Bombay was founded by City and Industrial 
Development Corporation (CIDCO) across Thane and Raigad districts to help the dispersal and 
control of Bombay’s population. Similarly, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port was commissioned on May 
26, 1989 at Nhava Sheva with a view to decongest Bombay Harbour and to serve as a hub port 
for the city. Bombay is was among the most populous metropolitan regions in the world, home to 
numerous multinational corporations, includes special economic zones, and haphazard 
development has facilitated some of the largest warehousing zones in India. The populist 
imaginary of the city at a time of independence, one that could fulfill its destiny and expand the 
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realm of freedom, was being replaced by a city elite concerned with maximizing market and 
consumerist opportunities. 75    
  
A Theater of Popular Struggles 
In the period of 1974–1975, a wide field of anti-state struggles emerged, from independent trade 
union agitations, to opposition and left parties, social and mass organizations. The 1973 oil shock 
and ensuing global crisis was felt in India, whose crude oil and petroleum product imports more 
than doubled year-over-year. The state was already fiscally under strain from war with Pakistan 
(1965) and the war of supersession with Bangladesh (1971). Prices nearly doubled while wages 
remained frozen or were cut; inflation soared and a black market expanded. Two anticorruption 
popular rebellions emerged amongst students and professional workers and their trade unions, in 
Gujarat and Bihar. In May 1974, an all-India railway strike mobilized 1.7 million workers for 
greater wagers and shorter hours. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi invoked the colonial-era the 
“Defense of India Rules” and “the Maintenance of Internal Security Act” to arrest over 50,000 
workers and suppress the strike in a move that was mere prelude to the coming Emergency a year 
later. These struggles, inspired as they were by the social and economic crises of 1973, were an 
indication of India’s integration in the world system. 
The twenty-one-month Emergency during 1975 to 1977 dramatically escalated a situation 
of class conflict, further expanding from industrial and informal worker sectors into professional 
classes. Bank employees, workers in state-owned insurance firms, university teachers, and others 
participated in marches. Engineers and workers at Siemens protested against both the company 
and Siemens Workers Union (SWU) leadership who took advantage of the Emergency to pass 
                                                        
75 Shaw traces these shifts to the “changes taking place in the economy and polity of Indian society as a whole” 
(1999: 985). 
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unfair settlements. A strike emerged after the company declared a lockout, inspiring workers’ 
militancy and violence. Only the intervention of the Chief Minister of the State, the strike was 
called off after ten months. Siemans restructured its manufacturing into small workshops and 
relocated them in distant districts of Maharashtra such as Nashik, rather than confront labor’s 
intransigence.  
There was an effervescence of democratic and radical politics in Bombay that sought to 
experiment with the idioms of everyday life and the culture of work. Several study groups 
emerged all across the city which were led by young intellectuals.76 Student groups actively 
resisted the autocratic and capitalist tendencies in the education system as well as in society. 
Vidyarthi Pragati Sanghatana was one such group that comprised students of the more elite 
colleges of Mumbai such as St. Xavier’s, St. Wilson and Elphinstone. A few of the other student 
groups active in this period were Progressive Students movement (PROYOM), which later 
transformed for a time into the Pragatisheel Vidyarthi Sanghatana, All India Students Federation 
(AISF), and Law Spectrum (a collective of law students which brought out a magazine for a time 
of that same name). One of the more militant initiatives by the student groups was to oppose the 
fee hike in universities in the late 1970s. The student movement against this fee hike, which was 
led by a coalition of groups called SAFAC (Student Anti-Fee Rise Action Committee), 
culminated in the occupation of university buildings on the Fort campus which eventually 
compelled the state government to scrap the fee hike (ibid.) 
Several politically oriented magazines were also brought out during this period, such as 
Scan (by radical students in Elphinstone College), Kalam (published first in English and Marathi, 
it would later become the mouthpiece of the All India Revolutionary Students Federation), and 
                                                        
76 The following account is based on oral histories obtained from Sanober Keshwaar (fieldnotes, April 18, 2015). 
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Blast (by a trade union). Several street theatre groups emerged in the city, one of which was 
Avahan (आवाहन, a call or challenge). In its early phase, Avahan was influenced by Badal Sircar’s 
Third Theatre which encouraged direct communication between the performers and the 
spectators and removal of all elaborate props. Such theatre was more portable, radical, accessible 
and intimate. For the activists associated with the group, it was a medium through which political 
ideas could be disseminated at the grassroots in a more effective manner. Even the process of 
writing scripts and directing plays was democratic, with no one person calling the shots and all 
bearing responsibility for the play. 
Avahan was formed by students and youth from largely affluent backgrounds and, in the 
initial period, it bore the imprint of bourgeois theatre. While its members were left- oriented, 
they lacked an idiom to reach out to the working people and oppressed social groups. Two 
factors played an important role in the transformation of the group’s political character and 
outreach. Firstly, there was a change in its social composition. As they started performing in low-
income colleges and bastis (slum settlements), several students from working-class and Dalit 
families joined the group (some of them went on to become well-known balladeers and activists 
such as Vilas Ghogre and Sambhaji Bhagat). The diversification in the membership led to 
changes in its forms of doing theatre. Since the oral tradition was very strong among Dalits, 
songs became an integral means of expression and communication in Avahan’s performances. 
The second factor had to do with the fact that Avahan’s work among the oppressed and 
the exploited at the grassroots shaped the way its members performed and interacted with these 
classes. As they entered into a sustained and meaningful dialogue with the people, the latter’s 
stories, folk traditions, language, forms of expression influenced Avahan’s theatre and songs. 
Their politics acquired a working class and anti-caste character. It moved away from the usual 
118 
forms and substance of bourgeois theatre and acquired a revolutionary character. It had found its 
idiom. 
Avahan was more an activist theatre engaged in contemporary political and social 
struggles than it was an artists’ group. In the 1980s, it actively participated in the civil liberties 
and democratic rights movement, struggles against forced evictions of slum dwellers and the 
long militant strike of the mill workers. Its plays would adapt to the changes within the 
movement. For instance, in case of the mill workers’ movement, as the strike and the ensuing 
repression unleashed by the state entered different stages, Avahan’s plays were reconstructed 
several times, sometimes overnight, in order to reflect the sentiments and demands of the 
protesting masses. The reason behind this flexibility and relevance of Avahan’s cultural politics 
was the dialectical link between their theatre and the consciousness and action of the working 
classes. The group was more than simply a tool to mobilize public opinion. Avahan was about 
inspiring people to act. It was more of an agitprop (agitation and propaganda) theatre. On the 
other hand, people’s responses towards its performances also influenced the group’s theatre. It 
learnt from people’s feedback, their ideas, stories and styles. Such an agitprop theatre strives to 
push people’s struggles in a certain direction and in doing so, also undergoes metamorphoses on 
account of the struggle. Though Avahan was active in the city of Mumbai, it also developed its 
network with other regional and local cultural troupes and was part of the All India League for 
Revolutionary Culture (Bhattacharya 2013). Its activists translated the works of regional artists 
and activists such as Gaddar, Cherabandaraju, Ram Bali Yadav in local languages and used them 
in their theatre, thus widening the audience for revolutionary poetry and songs. Avahan’s unique 
style of weaving dialogues with songs in its plays also influenced radical traditions elsewhere.  
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Sanober Keshwaar, a participant in Avahan at the time, noted that “since the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People’s War was perhaps the first communist revolutionary 
party that looked at the question of annihilation of caste seriously and that also had Dalit activists 
among its leadership, it was no surprise that the leading lokshahirs (political poets and 
performers) of the day were generated from its ranks.” She continued, “or that the glorious 
tradition of communist oriented peoples’ songs and poetry of lokshahirs like Annabhau Sathe and 
Amar Sheikh continued and was advanced by lokshahirs like Vilas Ghogre and Sambhaji Bhagat. 
The songs penned by these lokshahirs of Avahan—a potent combination of the folk music form 
and revolutionary content will be found on the lips of every left-of-centre group of activists in 
Maharashtra. Such was their reach and contribution.”77 
 
“The Last Great Strike”  
It was only after the Emergency ended that Bombay’s second Development Plan, initially 
prepared for the period of 1981–2001, was drafted. This Development Plan once again was 
impeded by inordinate delays. By far the most deleterious delays were in financing and the 
smooth procedural functioning of the bureaucratic machinery of the city. Yet nothing would seem 
to stand in the way so significantly than the city’s last great strike. Indeed, though workers were 
temporarily quiescent under the Emergency conditions of martial law and extreme repression, a 
wave of rebellion once again burst forth as soon as the Emergency was lifted and showed signs 
of bubbling into a city-wide revolt (Tarlo 2003).  
There was a total of 140 strikes in the Bombay-Thane-Belapur belt between March 25 
and December 31, 1977 (Pendse 1981). From April 1977 to June 1980, a cycle of direct action in 
                                                        
77. Adapted from the oral history by Sanober Keshwaar (fieldnotes, April 18, 2015). Keshwaar also notes that today 
the same militant tradition is being advanced by the performance troupe of the Republican Panthers. 
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newer struggles and newer demands cascaded directly from militant workers who were at this 
point far in advance of the unions and political parties.  At the end of 1981, workers gathered in 
the tens of thousands at Nare Park and in the hundreds of thousands in Jamboree Maidan. “The 
post-1977 period was one of challenging and overthrowing the state and management-imposed 
codes of conduct. It was a period of the working class shaking up their own organizations and 
casting them aside” (Pendse 1981: 747). Few exceptional leaders, such as the spectacular 
personality cult of Datta Samant, who lead the historic strike of 1982–1983, knew that workers 
were militantly organized on their own and could only be mobilized by those who “effectively 
articulated the general distrust of capitalists which the workers were feeling. [Those who] echoed 
the disgust which the worker was feeling towards the legal system [and the] time-consuming, 
murderously slow and essentially biased labour law machinery” (Pendse 1981: 747). 
On January 18, 1982, nearly 250,000 permanent and insecure workers across fifty mills 
went on strike. The majority of workers remained on strike for eighteen months and successfully 
closed most factories for over a year. Along with the increase of wages, a major demand of the 
strike was the abolition of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, which sought to quell 
unionization by recognizing a single state-sanctioned union that made strikes illegal. The 
autonomous Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union, that would lead the strike under the prominent 
direction of Datta Samant, was barely one year old. On August 1, 1983, some 250,000 workers 
marched in the pouring rain, joined in a new “political alliance of industrial workers, the rural 
poor, Dalits and women” (Omvedt 1983: 1509). The industrial actions of this period differed 
from previous ones in this crucial regard. “Workers of Sangli district, for instance, have begun to 
formulate strategies for leading struggles of rural labourers and poor- middle peasants against the 
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kulak elite entrenched in the villages and sugar factories of the central irrigated areas of the 
district.” (Ibid).  
Others marched for Employment Guarantee Schemes, while on July 15, 1983, women 
rallied against price rises and targeted the center of merchant power in the wholesale markets. A 
range of actions “included huge rallies, marches and jail bharo [filling the jails] campaigns in 
Bombay as well as in rural areas, and, in February-March 1983 district-level ‘long marches’ in 
which 5,000 to 12,000 workers walked 3–4 days from their villages to district headquarters in 
four districts” (Ibid.). The connections between industrial workers and rural struggles, such as 
mine workers joining and supporting Adivasi peasant struggles in the Jharkhand-Chattisgarh 
movements were parallel developments in the broad-based working-class movements in India at 
the time. These illustrate the instances of solidarity between struggles and the degree of 
coordination readily exercised and potentially available for sustaining a generalized rebellion. 
This in part explains why the state and various bourgeois factions’ refusal to acquiesce to 
the textile mill strike’s demands was so phenomenal. Both were clear about the national 
significance of a potential working-class victory and therefore adamant about crushing the rising 
tide of workers’ power in central Bombay, whatever the cost.78 As such the textile industry and 
the city itself suffered major economic losses. “The strike began in what Indira Gandhi had 
declared to be the ‘Year of Productivity—and by the time the year was over it had resulted in 50 
million ‘man days’ lost,” most of it due to lockouts (Omvedt 1983: 1510). Constant police 
                                                        
78 Javed Anand, a labor journalist who covered the strike as a correspondent for The Daily, a Bombay-based tabloid 
newspaper, remarked, “prime minister Indira Gandhi was concerned that if Samant [the strike’s prominent leader] 
had his way in the textile industry, port and dock workers from Bombay would come under his sway next and there 
would be no stopping him thereafter. So, no concessions.” Source: “In the experience of blue-collared men, he 





pressure, sporadic arrests of workers, who were sometimes dragged from their chawls, the 
beatings and torture of workers who maintained rural connections during the strike were chased 
down to the villages, where patils (village chiefs), police, local politicians all brought pressure 
down on individuals. Worker militancy was also sustained with support of “tons of grain from 
peasants, donations from workers and employees in other industries, as well as support strikes at 
the state level” as well as by leftist student movements (Ibid.). But the leadership of the strike 
movement was also prone to sectionalism, favoring certain more protected workers over a 
broader coalition of the city’s workers (Sherlock 1996). This only played into the hands of the 
Shiv Sena who were actively stoking regional-chauvinist identity nascent amongst Marathi 
workers. While they largely failed to communalize the workplaces, “in sites where the Sena has 
succeeded, the nexus between union boss, politician and criminal seems complete” (Sherlock 
1996: L37). As such, a platform from which to mobilize the range of experiences as workers of 
the city never congealed.  
Eventually the longest and largest strike in the country collapsed, inaugurating an era of 
retrenchment and precarity. Meanwhile, the city came to be home to myriad complex social 
struggles in the post-Independence period. As these social struggles crisscrossed the city, a 
central contradiction became apparent: on the one hand, the expansion of the field of social 
struggle in the wake of repression broadened the meaning of class exploitation and oppression. 
On the other hand, the transformation of identities beyond class resulted in the loss of immediate 
solidarities as ethnic and communal affiliations replaced ready identification and social 






The Production of Urban Informality:  
Industrial Decline and Urban Fragmentation 
 
"Strikes . . . teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can struggle against the capitalists only when they 
are united; strikes teach the workers to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of 
factory owners and against the arbitrary police government. This is the reason that the socialists call strikes `a school 
of war'. . . . A school of war is however not war itself."  




This chapter follows the preceding ones in offering a select political-economic history of 
planning in Mumbai—both the articulations of developmentalism from above and popular urban 
struggles from below—and how specific conflicts have produced the space and politics of the 
city. The discussion covers the political and economic transformations in Bombay/Mumbai from 
1982, during a crescendo of workers’ militancy, until the present day, tracing the city’s 
devastating shift from an industrial-based economy to a largely informal economy propelled by 
real estate and speculative land-based accumulation strategies. The major drivers of this 
transformation were the fateful end of the 1982 strike, the 1991 liberalization of economic 
policy, the sudden rise in land prices and speculation fervor, and the increasing international 
consulting/NGO/governmental effort to turn Bombay/Mumbai into a “world-class city” 
hospitable to ever new investment and business requirements of global elites. In particular, 
chapter four analyzes the history and production of urban informality that has marked 
Bombay/Mumbai over the last thirty years, and also chronicles the parallel rise of unorganized 
labor and communal violence. The chapter’s central argument is that this informality, 
unprecedented in the city’s history, was not due to a lack of sufficient planning or economic 
development, but rather was a direct consequence of these decades’ class relations and urban 
planning strategies. 
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I argue that informality is the result of a hegemonic class strategy of materially and 
categorically producing subjugated urban spaces across society through apparatuses of planning 
and state processes. Recent critical planning scholarship has demonstrated the ways in which the 
formal and informal are “interconnected” or constitute “hybrid arrangements” along a 
“continuum” of urban processes (Daniels 2004, Roy and AlSayyad 2004). These approaches 
offer insight into the ways which informality is embedded in a range of contradictory processes 
that pass through experiences of work (and varied forms of labor valorization), housing 
possibilities, as well as resource distribution structures and the organization of everyday 
reproduction (water, electricity, transport, health, sanitation and waste). However, this chapter 
brings attention to the class antagonisms that arise from informality as a central aspect of the 
capitalist mode of urbanization in Mumbai. These antagonisms are rooted in both material and 
symbolic productions of space. For instance, urban space is created in the unsanctioned forms of 
housing among the poor, both in the manner in which land is reclaimed for informal settlements 
as well as the manner in which state and municipal authorities sanction informal space by 
notifying or de-notifying settlements. Moreover, parallel processes of unofficially sanctioning 
non-legal housing projects for the rich create informal enclaves and housing projects out of urban 
lands zoned for public housing or open space. So too are informalities embedded in speculative 
real estate transactions of significant note, where they are found in both official “discrepancies” 
and unscripted planning exceptions, uneven policy applications, arbitrary juridical enactments, 
and as well as judgments that favor the bias of elite aesthetics. 
 While informality has long been a reality of Bombay’s urban history and, as such, a 
recurring terrain of antagonism and struggle, its spread was curtailed by an industrial economy 
that made vital use of labor power and was repeatedly forced to capitulate to various popular 
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movements that organized against workers’ informalization at home and on the job. This 
dynamic fundamentally shifted after the historic defeat of the workers movement in 1982—
inaugurating a new period in which informality has become both the predominant planning 
paradigm and lived experience of the city.  
How did the collapse of the mill workers’ strike break workers’ capacities to make wider 
claims on the city and precipitate the ensuing era of intensified informality? I show how a new 
land-based strategy rendered the mill economy superfluous, significantly reducing the power of 
workers’ positions and demands—both in the workplace and in the city at large. Meanwhile, a 
rise in communal divisions and violence, particularly at the street level, hampered city residents’ 
ability to make wholesale planning demands.  
In this context, I lay out the political, cultural, and economic domains of informality that 
arose in the city through the lens of the unstable force of Mumbai’s urban development regimes, 
critically defining urban informality as a basic feature of contemporary development and urban 
developmentalism in Mumbai. I show that informality in housing, sanitation, services, labor, 
land use, and urban planning across Mumbai constitutes a complex of governing and governed 
relations that is central to the spatial antagonisms of planning in the city.79 Drawing on what 
H.L.T. Quan (2012) has called “savage developmentalism,” this chapter interrogates informality 
through the relations of control and consent, consolidation and diffusion, concentration and 
                                                        
79 These antagonisms constitute both the production of state-space and development politics as well as an unraveling 
of those politics, in both molar and minor expressions. This is a particularly important dynamic to investigated as 
“popular” politics have become the domain of the state as well as various classes in the city, and as these politics 
become entangled in both everyday life and government planning policy. Gayatri Spivak suggests, “If democracy is 
a major, molar, political system par excellence, with its firmly established equivalent identities, sanctioned by the 
law, political anthropology today, with its ethnographies of contemporary society might methodologically and 
theoretically be well suited to study the condition of a proliferation of minor identities and various contingent 
actions and articulations that eschew the abstract pre-given notions of ‘People’ and ‘nation’.” (Gayatri Spivak, 
“Ethnographies of Democracy and Minor Politics: In Conversation with Gayatri Spivak,” American Anthropological 
Association Annual Meeting session, November 17, 2011).  
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differentiation that cut across society’s norms and regulations, as well as the institutions of 
political power.  
 
The Informal Trinity: Capital, Land, and Labor 
 
The astonishing decline of textile manufacturing in the 1980s was a watershed moment in the 
generalized urbanization of informality in Bombay. The eclipse of industrial production also 
ended the ability of Mumbai’s broad working classes to act as central determinations of 
development, in which their struggles in part shaped the pathways and possibilities of planning. 
A consummate form of underdevelopment rooted in permanent informality and instability 
emerged in the wake of this defeat. Three essential relationships mediated by the state—between 
workers, capital, and land—were central to this transition.  
 
Capital 
Millowners fought against the strike at every turn. They appealed to the state to deploy police 
forces to beat and arrest workers. In concert with the press, they waged a detailed propaganda 
campaign aimed at the middle and upper classes to discredit the workers movement as 
unreasonable, ineffective against the power of the mill owners, and unwinnable. Newspapers 
supported the propaganda effort by reporting little about the workers’ actions or points of view. 
Owners paid huge sums of money to scabs and clerical staff while fabric produced elsewhere 
was stamped as Bombay manufactured, all in an effort to make it appear that production was 
uninterrupted. In all, “the propaganda blitz did have an effect in creating a puzzled and defeatist 
mood about the strike among the urban middle classes” (Omvedt 1983: 1510).  
 Puzzling as the atmosphere was, sharp class tensions permeated the city. In the midst of 
the strike, a short-lived police rebellion took city stage as sections of the police defected and 
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demanded higher pay. The National Guard was airlifted into the city and violence resulting in a 
few deaths erupted between intransigent police, who were occasionally joined by supportive mill 
workers, on the one hand; and national guard and loyal police on the other. “There were 
indications that officials feared that the unrest might spread among other police forces [and so 
the] Maharashtra state government suspended the police union and all police associations in 
Pune, sixty miles southeast of Bombay, and ordered border security force personnel into the 
city.”80 
The sharp class antagonisms, which climaxed in the 1980s, had been building for 
decades. Worker power, uneven as it was, increased for a considerable portion of the laboring 
populations in both the city’s main industries and across a wide range of manufacturing jobs in 
the years after Independence. While the mill industry was already on decline by the sixties, 
legislative and political constraints sustained the industry and its workers for decades. The 
restructuring wasn’t simply a result of the competitive compulsions of a technological fix to class 
struggle, for “it needed a violent blow to silence the workers unrest after the blanket of the 
Emergency had not been able to suffocate it.”81 It took the violent repression of the seventies for 
the economic restructuring of the eighties to have a key impact on the textile industry. Just as the 
Emergency provided factory owners the opportunity to lockout workers as well as restructure 
and intensify their work and still gain in productivity, during the Bombay’s millowners were 
quick to shut down their factories and relocate them to the outskirts of the city where workers 
were more disintegrated and thus paid far less.  
                                                        
80 “Four are Killed in Bombay Riots Set off by Rebellion of Policemen.” New York Times August 19, 1982, A4. 
81 “The cycle of struggle 1973 to 1979 in India.” Gurgaon Workers News, no.60 – November 2013 (October 31, 
2013). 
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While the popular perception of the strike is that it directly contributed to the decline in 
the textile industry, the roots of the industry’s collapse and restructuring are to be found in capital 
abandonment. As the overall textile industry declined, the growing incidence of underperforming 
and less competitive “sick” mills was used as justification for the harsher retrenchment of 
workers and greater automation. But “sickness” was also the result of transfer of capital—both 
through the nationalization of certain mills in the seventies (which were later resold to private 
owners during the Emergency) and through investments in more profitable enterprises, such as 
real estate. Amid declining profits, mill owners increasingly began selling their lands in the 
industrial heart of Bombay. Thus did the textile industry lend support to the rise of speculation 
and real estate-driven capitalization, and eventually, deindustrialization, of urban lands.  
Fatefully, the momentous “indefinite” strike of 1982–1983 gave employers the tools they 
sought to wholesale restructure the mill industry and to break their labor dependency once and 
for all.  Run-down mills were “temporarily” closed and never reopened, starving workers out. 
The majority of the eighty or so mills in central Bombay closed during or immediately after the 
strike, no longer choosing to endure rising costs and the plague of decades-long worker 
militancy. Some owners relocated surplus stock to new small-scale manufacturing centers, where 
more vulnerable workers could be exploited. Others went bankrupt, while still more owners 
chose to employ modernizing technology to make workers redundant. 
 Some 150,000 workers were left unemployed in the wake of the strike, and this number 
only continued to increase. The backbone of Bombay’s industrial economy was broken. Over 
eighteen months, the city sustained the world’s longest textile strike, formally involving a quarter 
of a million workers. The defeat would not only have a lasting impact on workers movements in 
the city, but its consequences would also be written in the coming decades into the very fabric of 
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the city’s economy, built environment, and the cultural identities of various strata of its laboring 
populations. The city has since witnessed increased and entrenched inequalities across the social 
body of the city—between an old land-owning and industrial elite; an emerging middle class 
comprising those with a firm base in the government sector and the security of public sector 
housing as well as expanded earning opportunities in new industries; small business owners and 
traders; declining formal working class with jobs in organized manufacturing sector; and 
increasing number of poor, many of whom are former mill workers, eking out a living in the 
informal service sectors.  
 
Land 
Labor and housing activists have long argued that mill owners, the state government, and the 
Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMSS) conspired to dismantle the mill factories and redevelop 
the land for speculative real estate ventures. No sooner did the historic 1982–1983 mill workers 
strike collapse did owners begin shifting from manufacturing to redevelopment of former mill 
lands.  One of the goals, according to housing activists, was “linking the central business districts 
in Fort and Nariman point with the northern suburbs” (Whitehead 2008: 272). The 
informalization of industrial labor coincided with a boom in land prices in the early eighties and 
through the post-1991 liberalization that enabled the rapid conversion of public and private mill 
lands. This transformation was facilitated by the removal of land use controls and a more flexible 
use of land toward market diktats of “highest and best” use (Smith 1996:68).82  
                                                        
82 Crucially, low rents in workers’ chawls and the Bombay Rent Act of 1948, which more or less froze rents at a 
1940 baseline and created a hereditary line of sub-tenancy, were impediments to higher rents. These rent regulations 
are still intact and have facilitated the rise of a renting “aristocracy” in Mumbai, who cling to their deteriorating 
apartments decades later. 
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Propelled by new institutional policies and informal state and market mechanisms, the 
post-1991 liberalization ushered in multinational investments in real estate speculation and 
commercial opportunities that quickly reshaped the city’s land markets. It also consolidated and 
deepened a state-real estate nexus influenced by the commercial interests of developers and 
financiers. Much of the industrial core of the city—previously home to a distinctive working 
class culture around the factories and chawls—was supplanted by new commercial, financial, 
and service centers. The remaining manufacturing industry was displaced to special areas north 
and east beyond the boundaries of the city to suburbs and satellite cities such as Pune and 
Nashik, as well in special economic zones in the hinterland. (Nijman 2011)83 By the early 
nineties, subcontracted labor was also part of the new management of public infrastructure such 
as Nhava Sheva and Kandla port facilities. (Sherlock 1996) By extending the economic limits of 
the city and expanding the labor market to reserves of exploitable labor, capital also enjoyed a 
downward pressure on wages.  
As office jobs grew faster than factory jobs, prospects for redevelopment of commercial 
lands shifted from south Bombay to the northern industrial districts (Adarkar and Phatak 2005). 
Mill lands between Fort and a newly designated financial hub at Bandra-Kurla Complex now 
acquired new and soaring land values, making the industrial area ripe for lucrative commercial 
and residential real estate take over.84 Land that was once neglected as the reviled domain of 
workers now became iconic of Bombay’s potential transition to world status.  
                                                        
83 Some firms shifted their low-value and low-skill manufacture to outside the city and also to subcontractors, while 
higher-skilled production remained in the city. Jan Nijman. 2011. “Mumbai as a global city: a theoretical essay.” 
International handbook of globalization and world cities. 
84 Moody describes a similar expansion of New York’s financial center through a tidal of office building 
construction from 1967 to 1973. “There was here a chain of dependency and vulnerability. Finance at the center, 
vulnerable to the changing world system, and business services largely dependent on finance, on the one hand, and 
its own exports on the other. These, in turn, affected the city’s important real estate market.” (Moody 2007: 13) 
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One of the city’s most significant spatial planning decisions was the policy of “recycling” 
mill lands in an effort to rezone and integrate the formerly industrial land into the world market. 
The use and planning of mill lands were administered by the Maharashtra Regional and Town 
Planning Act (MRTP Act) of 1966. The 1967 Development Plan designated these areas for the 
purpose of textile manufacturing. Yet, these land use controls were removed under revisions to 
the plan—first prepared in 1977 and then implemented in 1985—ushering in a new flexible use 
of land previously occupied by public and private mills.  
Secretary of the Urban Development Department of the Government of Maharashtra DT 
Joseph would oversee a “a rational formula…by which it was decided that the development of 
land and built-up property of the cotton mills would be governed by the consideration of 
environment, housing and the need to generate resources for modernisation or diversification” 
(Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5366). The formula, known as Development Control Regulation (or 
DCR 58), was incorporated into the new development regulations in 1991, which allowed for 
lands to be redeveloped according to a one-third stipulation for public housing, one-third 
designated for public open space, and one-third for unregulated commercial use.85 For the two-
thirds of the lands to be surrendered for public use, the owner would be compensated with 
transferable development rights (TDRs). The presentation of the scheme as balanced and fair did 
much to stymie true dissent arising from public debate and media accounts. None of these 
schemes, however, would offer jobs to those rendered jobless in these land conversions, and 
indeed, a protest was launched under the banner of GKSS Mill Workers Action Committee 
                                                        
85 Development Control Rules (DCR) permitted the sick or closed cotton textile mills, subject to a layout approved 
by the municipal commissioner, to use the existing or newly built up areas for the same cotton textile mills and 
related uses, for diversified industrial uses or for commercial purposes. However, if open land—whether already 
existing or resulting from the demolition of the existing structure—was to be developed, total open land had to be 
divided into roughly three equal parts. Part one for public housing, part two for local government to develop public 
open spaces and part three for the mill to exploit commercially (Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5366). 
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(Girni Kamgar Sangarsh Samiti), which united workers, artists, and area residents against the 
imposition of the development rules. Others in the workers movement articulated modest 
responses to the deal between the state, private land market, including the workers at the All 
India Textile Workers Conference in 1990, who demanded “surplus land in proper proportion for 
construction of houses for low income groups and for industries” (Bagaram Tulpule, paper 
presented at Poddar College, Bombay, April 1990).   
Improvements to existing chawls and the promise of new housing to be given to former 
mill workers, however, proved to illusory. Contrary to stipulations and public perception, many 
loopholes, irregularities, and informalities meant that less than 8 percent of the land was 
ultimately made available for Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) 
and Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) respectively. 
 The years 1991–1995 saw a 700 percent increase in land prices and put private pressures 
on the government to revise the regulations for public and open spaces, reducing them to less 
than 5 percent. A public interest litigation in 2004 resulted in a Mumbai High Court decision on 
October 17, 2005, which “restored the original formula of sharing land, granting higher priority 
to the environment and public good than private financial gains” (Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 
5367). Despite the ruling, the skyrocketing land prices inaugurated an era of “land scams,” in 
which developers and their allies in official state positions operated with near complete impunity.  
Indeed, the smashing of the trade unionists and other independent forces in Bombay’s working 
classes, whose struggles had traditionally functioned as far better enforcers of regulatory 
standards than the legal system, contributed to the consolidation of class power in the builder-
state nexus.  Moreover, redevelopment regulations did not require any integrative planning of 
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roads or additional infrastructures. The open spaces that did emerge were fragmented and 
unplanned, pushing the developmental trajectory toward increasingly splintered use of land.  
Doshi (2013) has argued that contemporary governance in Mumbai works over highly 
uneven governable spaces that extend market-based neoliberal solutions to the informal masses 
of the city for their rehabilitation and redevelopment. These are routinely managed through two 
circuits of power: on the one hand, the violent eviction of slum communities through police 
injunctions and bulldozers, a mobilization of the coercive machinery of the state often spurred on 
by builders’ interests. On the other, informal residents are managed by a nexus of state and non-
state actors, through partnerships between local state agencies, builders and developers, foreign 
and often transnational financial institutions, and non-governmental organizations who often 
have a history of advocacy and sometimes grassroots activism within the communities. 
Central to the process by which the decreasing collective power of workers and their 
communities in Bombay has resulted in their informalization is the political mediation of 
dispossession and distribution.86 Individuals, families, and communities who are dispossessed of 
their land, for instance, are still incorporated into the overall thrust of the city’s Development 
Plans through various rehabilitative schemes. Thus, development of urban lands proceed while 
the dispossessed urban populations are increasingly fragmented and marginalized, and at the 
same time made dependent on various circuits of capital and the “redistributive” governance 
schemes that sustain them. The structural coherence of developmentalism relies on an essential 
form of mediation through the promise (often deferred and betrayed) of rehabilitation. This 
                                                        
86 Urban theorists focusing on informality have outlined multiple pathways and degrees of disenfranchisement or 
dispossession, the diverse types of ‘sub-economies’ that undergird a wide range of developing cities, as well as 
multiple strategies of the “dispossessed” that evolve from these conditions (Banerjee-Guha 2010a; Doshi 2012a; 
Harvey 2003, 2005). The rise in urban inequality that is a consequence of the restructuring of Mumbai’s global 
economy linked to international finance and real estate accumulation also reveals how urban informality is produced 
and articulated across local, global and translocal scales (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Marcuse 2000; Smith 2002; 
Roy and Ong 2011). 
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political management has an integrative function in an otherwise extremely fragmented and 
differentiated economy.  
Many of those dispossessed by development schemes are not directly drawn into circuits 
of capital as sources of labor but rather are “an unwanted possessor or occupier of economic 
resources”—most notably land—from which they must be separated “to free those resources for 
use in the circuit of capital” (Sanyal and Bhattacharyya 2009:35). Thus, they are the continued 
targets of urban redevelopment schemes that perpetuate cycles of dispossession and displacement 
on an expanding urban and periurban scale. It is in this manner that informal growth continues to 
outpace urban development in cities such as Mumbai (Nijman 2009).  
A market-led approach is increasingly common and extended to those who suffered 
brutal, sometimes illegal, evictions to begin with. So too market-led redevelopment schemes, 
even if they successfully rehouse the dispossessed, often end in further evictions and 
displacements due to rising costs, exploitative service arrangements, and the loss of livelihood to 
even begin paying for homes that were previously affordable because they were incrementally 
“self-made.”  
Planning institutions are central in both causing and managing the outcomes of 
differential dispossession in the city by setting zoning and development regulations. These forces 
together are themselves cultural constructions that have arisen within a distinct social and 
historical context. They are deeply layered with traces of colonial procedure and jurisprudence, 
imaginaries of development, the global co-constitution of imperial and accumulative ambition, 
moral sentiments about deserving communities, the remainders of past workers’ defeats, and the 
present incitements of violence of centuries-old legacies of caste and religious hierarchies.  
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Both the skylines and foot paths of the central district’s former mill lands were 
redeveloped dramatically as residential high-rises, private clubs, office and shopping complexes, 
and other luxury commercial and entertainment establishments transformed the built 
environment, all but erasing the historic imprint of the vibrant urban workers cultures whose 
labors built the city itself. At the same time, the symbolic environment of the popular “city of 
dreams” would be transformed as workers’ identities and political allegiances began to shift to 
narrower ethnic notions of place. 
  
Labor 
The expulsion of hundreds of thousands of workers amidst lockouts and mill closures pushed a 
significant portion of Bombay’s working class into crisis. Some, unable to provide for their 
families, committed suicide. Others returned to their villages in the Konkan region, relied on 
food grains from landholdings, or resumed agricultural labor before returning to the city to 
resume a cycle of rural-to-urban migration. Still others stayed in the city and took on petty jobs 
where they could find them in the informal sectors as hawkers, coolies, or watchmen, earning 
half or a quarter of the wages they received in the mills (Bhowmik and More 2002:4825). 
Women worked menial jobs or as domestic servants, and children were removed from school so 
they could contribute earnings wherever possible. The self-employed mainly reestablished the 
roads, alleys, corners and intersections of the city as their workplaces: as street hawkers, vendors, 
service providers, craft makers, or other home-based workers. Those engaged in contract work 
would now do so for longer hours for lower wages, and without any housing or health benefits. 
A new era of labor fragmentation and differentiation emerged, deepening the historic 
imposition of labor informality layered in the legacies of the colonial and industrial economy, 
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with a remarkable and steadily growing population dependent on informal livelihoods and 
informal housing, mainly in slums and squatter settlements in the last three decades (Cross 2010, 
Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001, Harriss-White 2012, Breman 2003, de Neve 2005). Plunged 
into the ranks of the informal urban poor, a “drastic reduction of their income, further pushed 
them into informal housing” (Adarkar and Phatak 2005: 5368). The “informal” strata of the city 
were now represented by a growing multitude of unemployed, underemployed, casual labor, 
subsistence workers, and members of the urban “underworld.” As the urban economy 
reorganized industry and land in the era of liberalization, the urban poor also experienced greater 
intolerance and criminalization of their poverty.  
The 1961 census indicates that 65 percent of the workforce was in the “organized sector” 
(the manufacturing sector that is formally recognized and registered by the government), while 
only 35 percent was in the “unorganized sector.”87 By 1991, this proportion was reversed: 65 
percent of the urban workforce was now in the “unorganized sectors,” mainly working as 
contract or casual labor with no protections.88 With retrenchment, layoffs and dismissal of labor, 
capital withdrawal, and austerity measures, only 35 percent remained in registered industries that 
offered steady income, modest social security, regulation and legal protection. Bombay/Mumbai 
also saw an explosion in slums, while worker provided housing became increasingly scarce. 
As late as 1989, chawls—worker housing provided by either the state or mill owners—accounted 
for as much as 75 percent of formal housing in Greater Mumbai. But only two years later, in 
1991, 43 percent of Mumbai’s city dwellers were living in slums—twice the national average. 
                                                        
87 The situation declined rapidly in the seventies and the 1982 strike only dramatized a consolidating larger trend 
that in thirty years. 
88 Today informal sector figures remain around 68 percent of the total employment in the city. 
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By 2001, 60 percent of Mumbai’s population lived in informal, self-made houses (UN-Habitat, 
2002; India Exclusion Report 2013–14).  
The restructuring of land and labor policies through economic liberalization catalyzed the 
rise of informal urban relations (Harvey 2005, Smith 2011). This entailed the “systematic non-
implementation and circumvention, rather than formally abolishing the legal frameworks” of 
established social policies (Ahuja 2013: x). Thus the political machinery of economic and social 
regulation was repurposed toward a deliberate failure to address and deliver the promises of 
social and urban development effectively. While this failure has fundamentally disrupted 
centralized and state-modernist institutions as drivers of development, the politics of 
development nonetheless remained heavily state-mediated processes.  
A celebratory account of the effects of state regulatory failure on development can be 
found in the subaltern urbanist literature, for instance in Abdoumaliq Simone’s commentaries on 
postcolonial institutional settings of cities such as “Mumbai and Jakarta, as in many other 
locations,” as Simone describes, where in  
“institutionally thick cities, the simultaneous enactment of differentiated forms of 
expressions and constituencies render ambiguous the concretized summations and fixities 
that large-scale development seems to guarantee. There are too many neighborhoods and 
old housing conglomerations to clear, too many vested interests to wade through, too 
many failed projects to cover up, too many commercial activities immune to 
corporatization, and too many lives indifferent to their own apparent capture to take their 
purported summations seriously.” (Simone 2016).  
 
As Ahuja states, on the other hand, “both articulations of liberalization—labor relations and town 
planning—worked in tandem to do away altogether with those cores of labor militancy that old 
regime had failed to reign in” to the degree that ‘labor’ and ‘town planning’ have become almost 
unusable categories of Indian political thought” (2013: x).  This non-implementation and 
circumvention in the realm of urban development fundamentally transformed Mumbai’s urban 
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governance over the last three decades. At the core of this transformation was the strategy to 
reorganize labor and land into a “property-based regime of accumulation.”89  
As policies assisting in the new regime of accumulation were put in place, large sections 
of the city’s labor force were forced into a “need economy.” The late Indian economist Kalyan 
Sanyal (2007) defines the “need economy,” as a set of activities which exist largely outside the 
circuits of capital accumulation whose orientation is subsistence transacted through a range of 
markets.90 Sanyal insists that there is an important dynamic wrought by the structural necessity 
of ongoing primitive accumulation that must continually, whether legally or through force, 
dispossess those in the need economy. While the accumulation economy directly destroys the 
livelihoods that individuals and communities make of their “need economies,” it also instigates 
new, more fractured need economies for those churned up by cycles of dispossession and left 
otherwise to organize the conditions of life again. The dispossession and distributive processes at 
the base of the urban economy are fundamental to the political economic and spatial categories 
of informality. Sanyal states 
the social outcome of the exclusionary expansion of capital that relegates the victims of 
its expansion—dispossessed informal producers, the detritus of modern capitalism—to a 
non-capitalist outside reproduces a basic fault line running through the economy’ (Sanyal 
and Bhattacharya 2009: 38).91  
 
He and other commentators have argued that unlike the original accumulation of capital that 
Marx describes, the nature of this dispossession is not the introduction of the dispossessed into 
the capitalist wage economy. While processes of proletarianization accelerated during India’s 
                                                        
89 “This has involved changes from a predominantly Fordist city dominated by large-scale manufacturing towards a 
property-based regime of accumulation. Manufacturing has been relocated to the hinterlands, based on small-scale 
units with flexible and cheaper labor force employed on temporary contracts” (Whitehead 2008: 270)  
90 Sanyal, Kalyan. 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, Governmentality and Post-
colonial Capitalism. London; New York: Routledge. This formulation departs from the familiar formal-informal 
dichotomy emerging from the informal sector debates since the 1970s. 
91 Sanyal, Kalyan and R. Bhattacharyya. 2009. “Beyond the factory: globalisation, informalisation of production and 
the new locations of labour.” Economic and Political Weekly, 35–44. 
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post-Independence era of Nehruvian state-centered growth, it remained uneven and some fifty 
years later, was interrupted by a new orientation toward a global economy that required far fewer 
laborers in the higher levels of the accumulation economy than ever before, and far more 
contingent, casual, irregular, and involuntary workers at the lowest levels of the accumulation 
economy. Rather, and most significantly, it is the release of land that is in question. Their 
dispossession from the land coupled with their exclusion from the wage system is what 
subordinates workers to more tenuous and fragmented informal economies. 
 
The Savage Trinity: Chauvinism, Revanchism, Developmentalism 
 
The reorganization of the relations of capital, land, and labor under a new property-based regime 
of accumulation and informality led to the increased cultural fragmentation of the city’s workers 
and the land use regime. An unstable urban developmental regime would emerge characterized 
by communal mistrust and resentment among workers, upper class revanchism against the 
informal classes, and an informalization of the municipal state in selectively withdrawing 
provision for housing, sanitation, services, labor, land use. The city’s developmental trajectory 
has been based increasingly on a property-based regime of accumulation that produces urban 





In 1996, the newly elected Shiv Sena-led government renamed the city of Bombay to the native 
Marathi name Mumbai, and soon colonial British-era street and building names were shed to 
assert or reassert local names in homage to mythic Marathi warriors and Indian freedom fighters. 
The ethnic nationalist movement mobilized language and identitarian power—to the violent 
exclusion of many other cultures and communities in the metropolis—to make citywide planning 
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decisions. The renaming of the city was more than a culturalist expression of consolidation of 
elite and popular status in the city. It was a profound planning event in the history of the city, 
signally the symbolic and intentional ways in which the city was being imagined and planned by 
a section of the ruling class in the name of a certain “popular” Marathi history. Yet this was by 
no means a popular expression of the imagined and desired city. It was only possible after 
decades of stoked communal tensions. The result was a consolidation of identities in a largely 
cosmopolitan working-class Bombay that gave way to a saffron pall of nativism cloaking the city 
in a growing parochialism and ethnic chauvinism.  
The fundamental restructuring of the urban economy and spatial environment into 
financial, real estate, and newer service and producer sectors accentuated the crisis of this 
cosmopolitan vision and the abrupt imposition of a new vision of the city as a financial center. 
Bombay/Mumbai increasingly wavered under the weight of a central paradox: “being the 
preeminent symbol of India’s secular, industrial modernity” following Independence, the city 
also became “a powerful symbol of the very crisis of this vision” (Hansen 2004:8). The rise of a 
new planning paradigm around the financialization of land was concomitant with a re-socialized 
and re-spatialized labor force with a dwindling base for the common experience of work.92 In the 
absence of broad-based organizations capable of responding to the challenges of social 
fragmentation and informality, a wave of ethnic chauvinism swept the city in the early days of 
liberalization. The new vernacular struggles amongst residents over the identity and the 
imagination of the city was a major expression of both a crisis in the everyday experiences of 
                                                        
92 Veteran labor organizers such as Vasudevan Naimtah, President of New Trade Union Initiative felt that the 
commonalities found in work ceased to provide a basis for workers to formulate a wider consciousness and political 
formation based on their everyday experiences. (Fieldnotes, December 8, 2014). 
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work and urban space as well as the image of the city as a beacon of modernization and 
industrial development.   
A chasm has developed between the organised workers and the others. . . Self-identification as members, 
however removed, of the working class begins to recede. . .[The working class’s] social and ideological 
weight exhibited a proportional decline. Informalisation and expansion of self-employment also saps the 
basis of any occupational or class identity. It leads to a greater atomisation and competition. The 
exploitative and oppressive nature of the system becomes increasingly invisible. Anger becomes ever more 
vague and unfocused. Dreams tend to be acquisitive and consumerist (Pendse 1995: 25). 
 
Workers’ movements could no longer organize widely, as they once did, across the city on the 
shared experience of an “autarkic political economy, a conducive ideological environment and a 
manufacturing sector dominated by a single large-scale industry” (Sherlock 1996: L38). The 
everyday and ideological conditions of a shared urban consciousness declined with a 
communalization of politics.93 
 The city was the site of episodes of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims 
corresponding with the breaking of the historic strike of 1982. Two years later, on 17 May 1984, 
riots broke out in Bombay, Thane, and Bhiwandi after a saffron flag was placed at the top of a 
mosque. Nearly three hundred people were killed and a thousand were wounded. The 
liberalization period following 1991 only accelerated communal tensions. In December 1992–
January 1993, over one thousand people were killed and the city was paralyzed by communal 
riots between the Hindus and the Muslims caused by the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 
Ayodhya. A series of thirteen coordinated bomb explosions took place in Bombay on 12 March 
1993, which resulted in more than two hundred and fifty deaths and seven hundred injuries.94  
                                                        
93 “In concrete terms, there is no alternative to the slow, often unrewarding work of organizing in the small-scale 
sector where the working class is actually growing” (Sherlock 1996: L38). 
94 It is widely believed that the attacks were orchestrated by mafia don Dawood Ibrahim in retaliation for the Babri 
Mosque demolition. In the current century, there have been at least eight additional episodes of terrorism associated 
with communal violence. On December 6, 2002, a bomb placed under a seat of an empty BEST (Brihanmumbai 
Electric Supply and Transport) bus exploded near Ghatkopar station in Mumbai. Two people were killed and 
twenty-eight were injured. The bombing occurred on the tenth anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Mosque in 
Ayodhya. On 27 January 2003, a bomb placed on a bicycle exploded near the Vile Parle station in Mumbai. The 
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The “saffron wave” also divided the anticaste movement and generally made it 
vulnerable to the wholesale attempt to tame and “Hinduize” Dalit politics (Hansen 1999). 
Through renaming certain ex-untouchable castes (and indeed the entire city), mobility and 
recognition within political circles would be a sancritized affair too. Dalit communities were 
increasingly fractured on the basis of their caste identities: while some were directly antagonized 
by Shiv Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party (SS-BJP) governments coming to state power in 1995, 
others were induced or intimidated into the coalition’s base of support. By 1997, signals of the 
end of the anticaste movement, passing from impasse to terminal crisis, were sounding across the 
city.  
Communalism would effectively extinguish both working class and lower caste 
movements in the city. The Shiv Sena have thus been a significant cultural force for 
strikebreaking and breaking solidarities embedded in the city for generations. Insofar as those 
solidarities and workers culture were replaced by a Marathi identity as the cultural identity of the 
city, the Shiv Sena have been an undeniable force of change in the recent history of Mumbai. 
Moreover, their cultural reorganization of the city has been effected by their organization of 
urban space rooted both in the orchestrated exercise of municipal power as well as in the 
improvised politics of the lanes and bi-lanes (Hansen 2004). 
                                                        
bomb killed one and injured twenty-five. The blast occurred a day ahead of the visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then 
Prime Minister of India, to the city. On 13 March 2003, a bomb exploded in a train compartment, as the train was 
entering the Mulund station in Mumbai. Ten people were killed and seventy were injured. The blast occurred a day 
after the tenth anniversary of the 1993 Bombay bombings. On July 28, 2003, a bomb placed under a seat of a BEST 
bus exploded in Ghatkopar. The bomb killed four people and injured thirty-two. On August 25, 2003, two blasts in 
South Mumbai—one near the Gateway of India and the other at Zaveri Bazaar in Kalbadevi occurred. At least 44 
people were killed and 150 injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but it had been hinted that the 
Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba was behind the attacks. In 2008, the city experienced xenophobic attacks by the 
activists of the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) under Raj Thackeray on the North Indian migrants in Mumbai. 
Attacks included assault on North Indian taxi drivers and damage of their vehicle. There were a series of ten 
coordinated terrorist attacks by ten armed Pakistani men using automatic weapons and grenades over three days on 
November 26–29, 2008. The city again saw a series of three coordinated bomb explosions at different locations on 
July 13, 2011. The blasts occurred at the Opera House, Zaveri Bazaar, and Dadar, which left twenty-six killed, and 





In 2003, an elite consultation group published a report on the failures of existing planning 
approaches to the city. The “Vision Mumbai” Report would serve as a magna carta of the 
“developer-state nexus” for the next ten years.95 A new vision of urban growth was promoted by 
the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and the Asian Development Bank, which came together to 
form a new a kind of urban think tank of the city’s industrialists (more than eighty private and 
public trading companies were part of its roster) called Mumbai First to represent real estate and 
multinational corporate interests in the city. The report was commissioned by Mumbai First and 
McKinsey Global Institute, a global management consultancy.96 “The inclusion of private sector 
actors in Mumbai First and private and civil society actors in Open Mumbai has allowed for the 
inclusion of valuable tacit knowledge in the Mumbai Development Plan—knowledge that the 
MCGM would otherwise not have obtained” (van der Heijden 2016: 18). One estimate for 
needed investments for the realization of its vision to redevelop the city through, and most 
crucially for, a lively international investment culture was 200,000 crores rupees ($40 billion).97 
The Credit Rating Service Institute (CRSL), which provided ratings to different cities as to its 
investment opportunities, would provide the rational basis from which to diagnose the problems 
ailing the city, evaluate the infrastructural weaknesses of the city, assess the investments 
necessary to become competitive with other Asian cities, and formulate a plan to reform the 
economy and its spatial structure. In time, and with the right investments and improvements, 
                                                        
95 Bombay First and The McKinsey Report (2003), See van der Heijden (2016) for a detailed sketch of Mumbai 
First. 
96 McKinsey was previously invited a decade earlier for the task of “Positioning Maharashtra for leadership in the 
economic liberalisation era,” with far less success. Their suggestions for structural reorganization did not find a 
hospitable government climate of the Sharad Pawar-led Congress government or next ruling coalition, the Shiv Sena 
and Bharatiya Janata Party.  
97 See Marie-Helene Zerah in Accumulation by Dispossession: Transformative Cities in the New Global Order, 
edited by Swapna Banerjee-Guha. 
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Mumbai would become a “global city” competitively attracting a flow of international 
investments. 
The new planning paradigm that emerged from this vision of the city aggressively fused 
financial deregulation and land market reform. Through the real estate market, land values would 
dominate concerns over use. The financial and spatial medicine would come with the 
subordination of labor relations to finance; the vigorous courting of private and foreign 
investment; the development of a new face for the city through new business districts connected 
to transport nodes, communication, etc. An aggressive approach that equated urban development 
with capitalist development could only plan for the “poor” when viewed as an underdeveloped 
form of human capital. The roots of the problems of the city were perceived to be in the 
“backwardness” of the majority populations, and that their problems, as well as the city’s 
problems, lie in the lack of development. (This mirrors the colonial-era Victorian perception that 
hygiene, for example, was an issue of lack of education rather than lack of infrastructure.) 
The report became the new “common sense” of urban development in Mumbai, 
articulating and legitimating neoliberal cultural values while establishing a spectrum of consent 
for largely antidemocratic policy initiatives. It focused on “growth” through investment as an 
entrepreneurial, technocratic, and urban-centered national development strategy. Economic 
development, privatization of urban services, and competition were to become the hallmarks of 
municipal government. Moving from an “adopted report” to a state government “Task Force 
report,” its wisdom has been incorporated into the draft Development Plan 2014–2034 for the 
city.  
A new planning policy environment to transform Mumbai into a world class city was also 
introduced in the Mumbai Transformation Programme (2005), a formal policy comprising more 
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than forty projects to improve economic growth in Mumbai, reduce poverty, and improve the 
quality of the built environment (Cities Alliance, 2013). These goals would be accomplished by 
the creation of “a multi-stakeholder, public-private planning process” and a private-state think 
tank mainly set up to address the city’s housing informality. While claiming to be a citizen’s 
group, it was a partnership between the Cities Alliance (whose tagline is “A city without 
Slums”), the World Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the municipal 
government. The Mumbai Transformation Support Unit (MTSU) was created in 2005, “to serve 
as an interface between the government and all other stakeholders involved in this ambitious 
long-term programme. Its duties also include providing administrative and technical support, and 
documenting the process.”98 
 As real estate and financial powers commanded urban development, therefore, they 
promoted revanchist urban policies that relied heavily on legal and extralegal dispossessions, 
evictions, displacements, and other forms of class and caste “cleansing.”99 A wave of such 
demolitions and evictions of informal settlements occurred in Mumbai in late 2004 and early 
2005, as the Indian National Congress-led Maharasthra state government, elected on a platform 
of redeveloping slums, began clearing them through brutal demolitions with the purpose of 
making Mumbai, in the words of the McKinsey Report, “a world class city.”100  
                                                        
98 The Cities Alliance states its rationale for urban redevelopment: “The strain on infrastructure and services has 
already lowered the quality of life and slowed down economic growth. Seeking to reverse this decline, in 2003 a 
group of citizens began pressing for drastic infrastructure improvements and better planning and governance.” 
(Website, http://www.citiesalliance.org/node/4395). 
99 See these accounts that highlight forms of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ driven by gentrification, real estate 
speculation, and financialization (Smith 2002, Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2003, 2005; Peck and Tickell 
2002, Banerjee 2010b; Doshi 2012b). 
100 Between December 2004 and February 2005, 50,000 to 70,000 hutments were demolished in Maharashtra (whose 
capital is Mumbai), in violation of poll promises and of international covenants to which India is a signatory (Burra, 
2005). 
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The first popular response to these evictions and the McKinsey Report was a grassroots 
direct action anti-eviction campaign called Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao (GBGB, Defend Homes 
Build Homes). As the urban offshoot of the popular network of rural social movement National 
Alliance of Peoples Movements and the Narmada Bachao Andolan, GBGB was endowed with 
decades of experience fighting big development politics in the region.101 Its foray into urban 
politics, which included occupations of various spaces in the city and protests at municipal 
offices, was strategically focused on, and tactically bold in confronting, what it called the 
“builder-state nexus.”   
 Neighborhood demolition and redevelopment has been a recurring feature of the 
postcolonial governance of Indian cities since Independence (Weinstein 2013, Appadurai 2000; 
Roy 2003; Tarlo 2003; Hansen 2004; Benjamin 2008). In this regard, housing is the “spectral” 
issue haunting postcolonial urbanization (Appadurai 2000, Anand and Rademacher 2011), 
revealing the complex and shifting negotiations of the poor with spatial authority and 
sovereignty. Mass demolitions exist side-by-side, and routinely interrupt, enduring campaigns at 
the national, state, and municipal level for slum upgrading and improvement, most often with 
support and legitimacy provided by international development financiers such as the World Bank 
and the city’s local business communities. The “power to demolish” and the “will to improve” 
through upgrading and rehabilitations, exercised by different members of the developer-state 
                                                        
101 In the year following the publication of the McKinsey report, Mumbai hosted the World Social Forum. 
Thousands of individuals, local and international activists, community groups, and NGOs gathered at Azad Maidan 
to celebrate “another world” of popular power. Many regarded the inauguration of the antiglobalization movement 
as occurring in southern and western India in 1982, with dramatic burning of Monsanto crops by the Karnataka State 
Farmers Association (KKSS) in Kerala and the anti-dam protest movement organized by the National Association of 
Peoples Movements (NAPM) which lead the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Campaign) in Gujarat 
and Madya Pradesh. Both movements would have enormous peasant and rural roots, but were also sustained by 
urban activists and intellectuals.  
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nexus, reveal the contradictory nature of urban governance in Mumbai (Li 2007, Weinstein 
2013). 
The spatial organization and structural adjustment of industry, the removal of working-
class labor and housing from industrial centers in the city, and the redevelopment of Mumbai’s 
economy and built environment, are not only factors in an economic explanation of 
gentrification. Patel (2003) argues that Bombay did not deindustrialize so much as its industries 
spatially reorganized and its city boundaries expanded, as manufacturing was relocated to the 
suburbs and satellite centers. Meanwhile, the industrial center of the city was transformed for 
new economic activities based in finance, real estate, and services. While spatial changes in the 
city “have clearly followed the rising curve of rent gaps,” the political orchestration of these 
changes indicates how capital flows and extra-economic violence have combined with 
government policies (Whitehead 2008: 72).  
Housing activists using the Right to Information Act (2005) have exposed several “land 
scams” in Mumbai’s development in the last decade: building and planning codes pertaining to 
former mill lands flouted, lands reserved for municipal schools or protected by environmental 
zoning regulations misappropriated, regulations governing the encroachment of roads secretly 
ignored, and the illegal granting of additional FSI building rights—all in order to illegally 
acquire land for luxury developments such as condos and malls.  
These scams have shown the collusion between developers, high court judges, state 
bureaucrats in municipal offices, and builders’ associations. They point to the informality of the 
state as real estate developers have increasingly relied on illicit deals to appropriate lands marked 
for the city’s development. Housing activist Simpreet Singh, a dedicated organizer with GBGB, 
stated, “when the Maharashtra government said they will convert Mumbai into Shanghai and 
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began doling out land reserved for the poor and homeless to developers, we began looking into 
this issue. It began as a social movement, but we could not get enough information….We used 
the RTI Act to expose several housing frauds’”102 Singh stated, “I remember that whenever I 
went to the collector’s office in Mumbai, the concerned person used to disappear. But you had to 
get know the low-level employees who would let some information slip,” he said. “It took 
months, years, to get a clear picture. But as it became clearer that things were fishy, our resolve 
got stronger.” The RTI Act allowed people to do the careful work of exposing misappropriation 
of land and other resources in the unseen channels of influence between powerful landowners 
and the state. Singh states, “it just takes 10 rupees to right a wrong. The biggest achievement of 
RTI is that it tells the most powerful people that they are not beyond the reach of a common 
man.” According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, over sixty RTI activists have 
been attacked, harassed or killed in Maharashtra in the last ten years, greater than any other state 
in India.103  
The 2008 crash of the global economy pushed the question of corruption onto the center 
stage of politics, which had long been a specter haunting post-Independence political life. 
Mumbai—as well as Dehli and other cities and rural towns in India—has witnessed a recent 
wave of anti-corruption insurgency. Beginning in 2011, the protest movements sustained an 
electoral mobilization of a new national political energy behind the social reformer and activist 
Anna Hazare and the popular Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man Party).104 Interestingly, at a 
                                                        
102 Based on interview with Simpreet Singh, April 20, 2014. Quote from Singh in Times of India. February 25, 2011, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/edit-page/We-used-the-RTI-Act-to-expose-several-housing-
frauds/articleshow/7564335.cms. 
103 Quoted in Betwa Sharma. 2015. “5 Scams the RTI Act Helped Bust In Its First 10 Years.” Huffington Post. 
December 10, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2015/10/12/5-most-critical-scams-exp_n_8263302.html; “The 
Right to Information Act Is a Powerful Tool. Here’s How You Can Use It to Your Benefit,” The Better India, 
August 1, 2017, https://www.thebetterindia.com/110189/how-to-effectively-use-right-to-information-act/. 
104 In the same time period, there were variants of anti-corruption movements that emerged in the explosive 2010–
2011 cycle of struggles in Tunisia and Egypt, in Spain and Greek, and in the United States. 
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moment of crisis of neoliberalism—a significant driver of the conditions of spatiopolitical and 
economic subordination of informal life to market developmentalism—the popular masses 
identified “corruption” as the culprit. The state and corporate “scams” that became the routine in 
the preceding years had primed the masses to consider the deficiencies of democracy over the 
deficiencies of neoliberal capital.105  
An “underground” real estate development sector intent on breaking Mumbai’s relative 
land immobility through both economic and extra-economic interventions in the land markets 
has been “crucial in lubricating the transition from manufacturing to finance-dominated 
economy” (Whitehead 2008: 271).106 Thus the emergence of a municipal government whose 
informalized exercise of state powers are articulated through the role of non-state interventions 
for disciplining workers’ resistance to displacement, “mediating” conflicts between landowners 
and tenants organizing police support through bribes, facilitating “consensus” on redevelopment 
projects that require 70 percent assent of inhabitants, and extortions, intimidations, and other 
persuasions to remove barriers to those higher and better uses of land. 
In such conditions of state and non-state informality, urban violence has been both 
episodic and routinized. The growth of real estate ventures and its links to “black money” and 
organized crime, the use of force and intimidation at the local and state level to displace 
                                                        
105 The Adarsh Housing Society scam, the 2010 housing loan scam, the Niira Radia tapes controversy, and the 2G-
spectrum case were incidents of national interest. For more, see “The Radia Tapes,” The Outlook, 18 November 
2010, https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-radia-tapes/268214; “Adarsh scam: The story of a posh high-
rise with not-so-posh occupants,” The Hindu, April 16 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/adarsh-scam-
backgrounder/article14264528.ece; and “The 2G Spectrum Case,” Times of India, Jul y 3, 2018, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/2G-spectrum-scam. 
106 Land supply has always been geographically limited by the peninsular contours of the narrow strip of coastal land 
that juts out from mainland Maharashtra; it has equally been shaped by historic land grants given under conditions 
of colonial loyalty and complicity. The biggest landlords and owners are public agencies, such as the Bombay Port 
Trust, the BMC, MHADA as well as those owned by major private land trust. “While the property details of some of 
the large public sector bodies are well known, not much information about the private sector landholding pattern is 
available” (Singh 2003). Today, approximately nine developers and trusts form much of the land oligopoly and 
control all available private land on Mumbai island (Bharucha 2015).  
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inhabitants from their lands, as well as an intensifying right-wing communalization of politics 
have made for a more violent daily existence in the city’s distinctly anti-poor and anti-worker 
urban environment. Both factors of the aggressive capitalization of land markets as well as 
changing patterns of individual and collective identity in the city amid aggressive 
communalization of urban culture have constituted a wide scale attack on workers’ broad and 
heterogeneous power that so influenced Mumbai’s urban culture and determined its political 
possibilities in both industrial policy and urban development. Thus both revanchism and 
chauvinism have cleared the way for a generalization of informality in the city that has come to 
define the liberalization period in Mumbai in the pervasive social conditions of marginality, 




H.L.T. Quan (2012) describes “savage developmentalism” as a metalogic of antidemocratic 
development. It involves, centrally and tangibly, the “undevelopment” of life through neglect, 
repression, violence, and improvement schemes, which are all part of the “telos” of development. 
Social disruption as opposed to planned stability, everyday as well as episodic forms of violence, 
and cynicism, cruelty and neglect form the juggernaut of this form of development. Its savagery 
is premised on the “terms of order” (Robinson [1980] 2016) of what is possible and what is not, 
but so too in an implicit lack of choice and a betrayal of promises by the ongoing functioning of 
development.108 What are the categories and practices of political life and the “future in 
                                                        
107 There has been much attention to conditions of informality amongst urban poor as accelerated through urban 
development schemes (Banerjee-Guha 2010a, Rao 2007). 
108 In Spivak’s terms, the politics of this situation is best addressed by deconstruction, wherein “one cannot not 
desire development.” As I trace in the emergence of the contemporary planning culture in Mumbai as a terrain of 
mobilization and demand, other politics are possible. Spivak defines deconstruction in these terms, as “a persistent 
critique of what one cannot not want.” See her introduction to Of Grammatology (1976), “Deconstruction does not 
say there is no subject, there is no truth, there is no history. It simply questions the privileging of identity so that 
someone is believed to have the truth. It is not the exposure of error. It is constantly and persistently looking into 
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question” endowed and contested in the present forms of developmentalism (Coronil 2011)?109 
Addressing this is necessary if we are to understand how urban mobilizations for claims to the 
city take shape under conditions of such informality. Only then can we understand how different 
strata of a fragmented urban working class make claims on the city.110  
The savage work of development through violence, repression, and anti-democratic 
identitarian politics was further enabled by forces of nativist and defensive ethnic chauvinism 
that dislodged broad if unstable class solidarities that emerged through the rise of Bombay’s 
industrial and informal working classes.111 Both secular and communal forces were entangled in 
the savage development of Bombay during the city’s industrial, post-Independence, and 
liberalization periods. What defined Bombay’s experience of modernity and democracy, and the 
possibilities of a different and far more cosmopolitan development history, was largely rooted in 
its plural proletarian classes, who created an urban culture that was differently mobilized through 
a mixing of regional, caste, and religious traditions. It was the myriad forces arrayed against this 
plural and popular urban culture where one finds the sources of rupture of these democratic 
possibilities.  
                                                        
how truths are produced. That’s why deconstruction doesn’t say logocentrism is a pathology, or metaphysical 
enclosures are something you can escape. Deconstruction, if one wants a formula, is among other things, a persistent 
critique of what one cannot not want.” (28) 
109 Coronil describes the contested imaginaries of the future in the present: “This future imaginary can be glimpsed 
in everyday political actions and discourses as well as through concrete cultural artifacts such as plans, projects, and 
constitutions. Yet, since fundamental conceptions of history—not their specific content but their 
framing temporal structure—are often implicit or taken for granted, I focus on how ineffable imaginaries of the 
future inhabit the present, how the ‘what is to be’ saturates the ‘what is’ or, in Reinhardt Koselleck’s terms, how the 
‘horizon of expectation’ relates to the ‘space of experience’. . . .” (2011: 232) 
110 Claims for inclusion, in housing schemes, water and other essential life infrastructures, in the entitlements of 
urban citizenship and belonging and participation in the urbanization process constitute the arena in which 
contestations over displacement are a part (Bhan 2009, Von Schnitzler 2008, Graham and Simon 2001, Desai and 
Loftus 2012, McFarlane 2008). 
111 Hansen suggests that the disintegration into unstable naming practices (vernacular politics that culminated in the 
historical renaming of Bombay to Mumbai in 1995) and exclusionary and fragmentary micro-communities should 
not be understood as anomalous, but rather the immanent “possibilities always folded into India’s unique experience 
of modernity and democracy.” (2004: 9)  
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The development histories of Bombay can be seen as the informal production of space as 
it has relied upon and also in turn shaped the production of difference. Wherein early colonial 
urbanization divided and differently developed laborers and elites, Indians and British, the city’s 
economy relied upon a precarious political integration of these differences as well as the 
governance, most often characterized through neglect, of a surplus population remaindered 
outside the spatioeconomic requirements of colonial development. As Doshi (2012b) shows, the 
development politics of the contemporary neoliberal state continue to drive a differential 
production of space and subjectivity among the urban poor. The syncretic nature of urban 
administration and governance has consolidated this history as it has cohered into a complex 
system of governing informality. Market and state informality in terms of spatial planning, extra-
economic and extra-state violence, as well as uneven governance that has striated urban 
citizenship, has now largely come to define the experience of a poor urban class and how they 
are managed politically. As Doshi (2012b) has shown, displacement and redevelopment in 
Mumbai is experienced in highly gendered and caste-differentiated ways that have also affected 
how the urban poor mobilize against displacement. This “differentiated displacement” hinges on 
the role of marginalized subjectivity in representations and consensus among diverse poor 
communities whose forms of resistances result in what Doshi refers to as “graduated slum 
citizenship.” Such anti-displacement politics are entangled in urban governmentality and 
governance schemes, yet nonetheless constitute an arena in which alternative or possible futures 
and urban aspirations are staged. These include documenting schemes in which slum dwellers 
themselves are induced into financial speculation schemes or asked to self-manage their own 
dispossession through slum redevelopment schemes (Mukhija 2003, Blomley 2004, Echanove 
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and Srivastrava 2011, McAuslan 2002, Weinstein 2008), as well as investigations of cultural 
attachments to property and sensibilities of propriety (Murphy 2015). 
Decades of development that differently exclude and marginalize the majority of the 
city’s populations have led, according to architect-activist PK Das, to “critical levels of social 
alienation and apathy.” “Policy after policy continues to doll out concessions to regulate people’s 
demands in measured doses, without altering the fundamental premise of permitting land grabs 
for real estate business interests by private agencies.” He emphasizes the need to situate planning 
and design questions at the heart of urban movements for social justice, such as the NGO he is 
centrally involved in called Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (Right to Shelter Welfare Committee), 
a prominent NGO fighting against slum dwellers’ displacement, to formulate planning and 
design as part of the right to the city: “citizen’s movements in many Indian towns and cities are 
actively engaged, not just in questioning the government’s plans, but also evolving people’s 
vision and alternatives for democratization (2015: 92, 94).” 
Urban informality can be understood as the spatial expression of savage 
developmentalism. Informality also constitutes a mode of urban governance, through unstable 
and improvised relations of control and consent, consolidation and subversion of official norms 
and regulations, as well as a dispersion of political power across a number of authoritarian 
networks and actors. Urban development has evolved over the course of Mumbai’s history on an 
asymmetrical terrain of urban politics based on various cultural logics of exclusion that is 
mediated through a range of property and labor relations that, in the contemporary period, 
enables only the most striated senses of urban citizenship with respect to allocation of resources 
and claims to space.112 As the production of informality has been so embedded in mode of urban 
                                                        
112 Much recent scholarship on informality draws inspiration from philosophies that posit exclusion and 
dispossession as primarily political processes (Li 2009, Agamben 2002, Bauman 2003). 
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governance that governs selectively and differently, it also therefore opens up the city to a terrain 
of differentiated struggle.113  
Complimenting an urban governance framework is one that critically analyses the 
planning culture of the city. Mumbai’s planning culture is shaped largely by a mix of top-down 
technocratic, officially democratic, and postcolonial liberal traditions that mix both the post-
Independence ideologies of state planning and the British colonial legacies with neoliberal 
market-orientations for resource deliveries. These cultures of planning are important to address 
for it is in culture that “the future-oriented logic of planning and development finds a natural 
ally” (Pal 2008: 11). As Pal shows, “in recent years, there has been a growing interest among 
scholars in various disciplines to include both political and planning culture (Cullingworth, 1993; 
Friedmann, 2005b; Bishwapriya Sanyal, 2005a) and culture in general (Appadurai, 2004; Rao 
and Walton, 2004; Sen, 2004) in the debate over development and public action. [Moreover] it is 
in culture that ideas of the future, as much as those about the past, are embedded and nurtured 




The historic production of informality in Mumbai has deep class origins. As the discussion of the 
historical development of Bombay has shown, informality represents the transmutation of 
previous modes of production and processes of governing (Chakrabarty 2008; Chatterjee 2011), 
instead of spaces of ‘exceptionality’ to the logic of neoliberalism as some have argued (Ong 
                                                        
113 In this regard, the politics of urban informality can be understood as unfolding as a “milieu” comprised by 
“qualities, substances, powers, and events” that combine in ways that are unplanned but that create the context for 
what is next possible. Deleuze suggests that “a milieu is made up of qualities, substances, powers, and events: the 
street, for example, with its materials […], its noises […], its animals […] or its dramas […]” And he adds, further, 
“the trajectory merges not only with the subjectivity of those who travel through a milieu, but also with the 
subjectivity of the milieu itself, insofar as it is reflected by those who travel through it.” (Deleuze 1997, Essays 
Critical and Clinical) [Quoted by Vyjayanthi Rao, “Proximate Distances: Paradoxes of Conviviality in Urban India” 
In What Makes India Urban (Berlin: Aedes 2009: 54)] 
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2006, Cross 2010.) The working together of the informal trinity of capital, land, and labor 
alongside the reorganization of the popular and working classes of the city through the savage 
trinity of chauvinism, revanchism, and developmentalism have consolidated class power in space 
and economy and rendered informal a significant spatial and political terrain of struggle. While 
informality is, as this chapter has shown, intentionally created and perpetuated by planning 
institutions, capital flows, and class rule, there are also unpredicted and unplanned powers at 
work in these informal spaces and economies. The conditions of informality create a terrain of 
contestation among the informalized, the dispossessed, and the subaltern. From their struggles, 
we can best discern the class dynamics of informality and the fault lines that cut across urban 
society.  
 This approach critically departs from prevailing anthropological theories of popular 
politics among subaltern groups. Holston’s (2008) notion of “insurgent citizenship” partially 
reconstructs this question in the limited framework of citizenship. He describes the strategies of 
the urban poor to gain access to land tenure, infrastructure, and recognition for inclusion, and in 
the process challenges and expands existing property and citizenship regimes mediated by the 
state. Here “insurgence” is predicated on land tenure and the ability to negotiate within existing 
property regimes as the pathway to citizenship. These insurgencies consequently shape 
entanglements with governmental schemes that aim to potentially displace residents in the name 
of redevelopment. Chatterjee’s (2004) conception of “popular politics” illuminates how the urban 
poor negotiate with the state despite lacking recognition as proper citizens by mobilizing a 
selective governmental agency fashioned out of associations of moral community. These are 
fraught and temporary spaces of popular politics in the sphere of “political society,” in which the 
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poor identify as a population to be governed as an exception to the rule of law, what Li has 
described as “government through community” (2007: 232, Chatterjee 2011).  
Our understanding of these democratic urban aspirations have been complicated by more 
recent theorizations that attest to the flexible and fragmentary nature of contemporary regimes of 
citizenship enacted by diverse governmental arrangements. Roy (2009b, 2011) has called for 
research into this question through the development of the concept of “subaltern urbanism” as a 
contradictory set of policies, practices, and relations amongst “governed” populations. Bayat 
(2000), relying on Scott’s notion of everyday resistance, suggests that an enlarged political frame 
is required to interrogate practices of informality that constitute “a quiet encroachment on the 
ordinary.” This approach renders an image of a dynamic urban world of informality that is in 
various ways affected by the governed relations of the city, but except in extraordinary moments 
of transcended, do not challenge urban relations of power but exist in the space between 
representation and transformation.  
While the focus of such studies aims to counter narratives of incapacity, 
underdevelopment, and dispossession in urban slums, and rather to redeploy these spaces as a 
“terrain of habitation, livelihood, self-organization, and politics,” (Roy 2011:224), they render 
the politics of informality as incredibly dynamic yet ineffective. As I argue in greater detail in the 
following chapters, what is missing is attention to the class antagonisms that are the base of 
urban society, and their role within accumulation strategies that produce both urban and state 
spaces of informality. How do the “governed” see themselves as governing—not only their 
neighborhoods, but the entire city? What happens when fragmented urban communities 
differently affected by the legacies of informality and developmentalism seek to collectively 
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“When We Demand Our Share of this World”:  
Hamara Shehar Mumbai and New Municipalist Politics 
 
 
“The writing of new spatial relations (territorialization) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries 
and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements; the classification of people 
according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural 
imaginaries. These imaginaries gave meaning to the enactment of differential rights to differing categories of people 
for different purposes within the same space; in brief, the exercise of sovereignty. Space was therefore the raw 
material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it.” —Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, emphasis added. 
 
“The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and 
keep promises. Both faculties depend upon plurality, on the presence and acting of others, for no man can forgive 
himself and no one can be bound by a promise made only to himself.” —Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the emergence of an array of populist urban agendas responsive to the 
opportunities and perils involved in Mumbai’s development planning. It draws on ethnographic 
research within the recent citywide campaign Hamara Shehar Mumbai (HSM, Mumbai – Our 
City), a grassroots urban movement that contested municipal planning paradigms at the heart of 
the city’s implementation of its recent twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034. The chapter 
traces the five-year arc of Hamara Shehar, beginning with its early efforts to transform planning 
rubrics such as community consultation and participation process into a terrain of democratic 
contestation. From there, the campaign sought to intervene in, and occasionally interrupt, state 
planning through a democratic municipalist movement. Finally, the campaign formulated a 
populist planning vision that endeavored to shape the future-oriented development of the city 
through a nexus of popular decision and distribution. This chapter discusses the strategies of this 
cycle of citywide grassroots coordination and mobilization to shape planning “from below,” 
which has included processes of diverse community consultations, community mapping of land 
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use, the valorization of local knowledges of land use and place, and public protests against layers 
of enclosures articulated through technical planning regimes and developmental governance.  
I develop an anthropological critique of planning to understand the condition of urban 
development in Mumbai. I show how collective sociospatial practices that produce alternative 
knowledge of municipal forms of life—what I refer to as new popular “counter-municipal 
cartographies”—emerged among disparate sectors of the city mobilized to intervene in the 
shaping of the city’s twenty-year Development Plan. In the process, the chapter details how 
planning operates as both an apparatus of control as well as a horizon of democratic populist 
realization. At the center of these counter-municipal cartographies, as I discuss below and in the 
following chapter, are numerous questions of enclosures and commons, livelihood, land use, 
social difference, and spatial organization not typically addressed by established planning 
paradigms.  
Given the specific history preceding these mobilizations—a period during which 
collective demands on the city’s resources and specific appeals to its overall planning cultures 
were scattered—this cycle of mobilization was both unlikely and unprecedented. Its existence in 
and of itself represents a new vision of the city. Not only did the campaign arise as a series of 
mobilizations to push a new planning agenda on the municipal corporation, but it also 
demonstrated a different vision of the city: one that is plural (opposed to communal and 
chauvinistic), populist, participatory, accessible, multilingual, ecological, working class, oriented 
around the common, rooted in various Indigenous histories of the region, and above all, based on 
an accurate lived experience of the city itself. 
 The campaign, as I discuss below, was fiercely pitched on the terrain of juggernaut 
developmentalism. Given its entanglements with the state and the limits of working within the 
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confines of developmentalism, the campaign was not fully able to realize its own vision.  
Nevertheless, both the campaign and wider popular mobilizations it participated in reveal that 
established understandings of planning in Mumbai have to be reframed.  
Anthropology has much to offer established ways of thinking about planning and urban 
development. The anthropology of planning, as Abram and Weszkalnys suggest, approaches the 
city from the perspective of “what people think is possible and desirable, and what the future 
promises” (2011:4). The question of the future of Mumbai for its residents is a spatiotemporal 
one, but most crucially one expressed in the present through shared and divergent senses of 
possibility. The desired future came to be a central focus for many of Mumbai’s residents as the 
municipal and state government, planning consultants, and a range of developers’ interests 
conspired to draft a twenty-year Development Plan 2014–2034 for the city. Despite Mumbai 
being a city with a deep history of conflict and transformation, the historic character of these 
urban antagonisms seem dormant. Absent wide and popular mobilizations of collective urban 
struggles, the city’s developmental regime has grown increasingly anti-democratic and 
depoliticizing. The nature of planning has suspended the time of historical transformation. 
Possibilities inherent in planning, where the realms of everyday sensory experience mix with the 
ether of dreams and desire are compressed, contained.114  
Revenge (revanchism) and deceit (promises made in bad faith, obligations indefinitely 
deferred) are defining qualities of Mumbai’s history of developmentalism. The history and 
politics of the city determine the horizons of development, but how that horizon is traced, 
                                                        
114 “Today historic time seems to be compressed and the future temporality of desires deleted: the present is eternal, 
unchangeable, and necessary. All this is registered and overdetermined by the sovereign ruling powers. Therefore 
the modern history that had previously been depicted as the continuous emergence of social conflicts and the 
repeated modification of constitutional structures must be paralyzed around a political center celebrated as the Eden 
of Equilibrium.” (Hardt and Negri 2017: 247) 
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through what intersections and geometries of power, what emergent conflicts and antagonisms, 
has a great deal to do with how the city is planned and unplanned. The planning of urban worlds 
takes shape through myriad relations of debt, obligation, and commitment. Realizing an 
alternative planning process, therefore, also requires extracting “planning” from the world of 
betrayals, coercions, and domination that it is currently mired in and instead renewing the 
intentions and promises people can make to each other.  
 I reflect on what these mobilizations reveal about the ways people claim, hold, and use 
space, and on the challenges the campaign faced in a planning culture shaped by pervasive 
informality that produce uneven and unequal access to land and services, structured around 
salient social experiences of difference such as caste, class, religion, and gender. I also explore 
Mumbai’s contested geographies and layers of diverse relationships to land and place, especially 
those often neglected by planning. How do developmental imaginaries and practices contribute 
to these novel inscriptions of social and spatial boundaries as well as generate enclosures across 
multiple social and environmental terrains? Finally, this chapter addresses the political cultures 
and imaginary these mobilizations give expression to, and how we might understand their 
beginnings, affects, and unlikely combinations and durations. It concludes with a reflection on 
the new orientations to time and space articulated in the city’s layered history of enclosure and 
commons in the mobilizations that come together and come apart, but nevertheless reconstitute 
the city as a terrain of struggle. 
 
The Failed Histories of Development Plans 
The conceptual and practical failures of development planning in Bombay stretch back more 
than a century. The Bombay Act of 1915 called for the preparation of town planning schemes for 
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Bombay State, though planning remained for the next several decades piecemeal and without a 
conception of adjoining areas. In hindsight, the MCGM claims the first Development Plan of 
Mumbai, for the period of 1964–1981, was “not effective as it did not involve any public 
participation and relied entirely upon the Municipal Corporation to generate resources to meet 
the cost of acquisition of land, removal of encumbrances, and development of the amenities.” 
Furthermore, “it is felt that the citizens should be made aware of the broad outlines of the 
Development Plan and the Development Control Regulations 1991, so that they would be able to 
understand and participate more effectively in the implementation of the said Development 
Plan.” 
The second Development Plan, prepared for the period of 1981–2001, was only 
sanctioned in parts between 1991 and 1993, due to “several procedural difficulties” (M-Ward 
publication). This second Development Plan once again experienced inordinate delays in the 
making of plan proposals and getting approvals. Since the municipal corporation could not 
“provide adequate financial resources” to bear the costs of rehabilitation and development in its 
second Development Plan, “the amenities could not be developed to the desired extent.” 
(MCGM M-Ward publication, 2014) The plan made provisions for residential land use and 
housing for a population projected to be 9.87 million by 2001, whereas the city’s actual 
population topped 11.9 million by that year, leaving an unaccounted-for population of 2 million 
to be accommodated. 
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Figure 10: Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Sanctioned Development Plan for 1981–2001. City DP 
Sheets. Image source: The Indian Institute of Architects, http://iiamumbai.com/dcr1991.php?name=eastern_areas. 
 
According to Hamara Shehar, both the plans “acted against the spirit of urban planning.” 
Because of inadequacies in the plan design, making and implementation, only 5 percent to 7 
percent of the plan actually got implemented.115 The Hamara Shehar Mumbai campaign sought 
to break Bombay/Mumbai’s long history of failing to meaningfully implement its own 
development plans—a century-long failure that allowed the “builder-state nexus” to instead fuel 
                                                        
115 According to early analyses of Hamara Shahar, the preceding Development Plans failed to meet the expectations 
of the citizens as well as the decision makers for several reasons: design and approach were far too simplistic in 
anticipating citizens’ needs and aspirations; very long tenure was a major hindrance to anticipating socioeconomic 
changes over time; a restrictive approach taken to implementation without adequate flexibility to meet the changing 
needs of the city. Hamara Shehar Mumbai. 2014. “The People’s Development Plan.” Circulated as an email and 
later published online at https://hamarasheharmumbai.org/the-peoples-development-plan/. See also Aravind Unni 
and Dhanraj Khare. Mumbai Development Plan Implementation and its Biases: From the Perspective of the Urban 
Poor. Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action: Mumbai: 2013.  
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uneven, market-driven development that drove informality, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
At its most fundamental level, therefore, the campaign wanted to facilitate popular engagement 
with a development plan that would actually be fulfilled. 
 
A Web of Development Actors   
Mumbai’s 2014-2034 Development Plan was developed by an array of state and non-state 
actors.116 While the public authority responsible for implementing the Development Plan is the 
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), important revisions were the responsibility 
of outside consultants, a consortium of Indian and French urban planning companies that were 
hired through a tendering process. Indeed, the domain of planning in Mumbai had long been the 
domain of a piecemeal collection of overlapping political institutions and private interests. An 
urban governance framework (Cf Pierre 2005:16, Sellers, 2002a: 6) allows us to “disentangle the 
complex web of actors in the planning process of a large metropolis in the context of limited 
resources.” (Pal 2008: 21) These include the formal political institutions charged with urban 
governance: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM117), the primary agency 
responsible for urban governance in the city; the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development 
Authority (MMRDA), a body of the Maharashtra Government that is responsible for 
infrastructure development in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, chaired by the Minister for 
Urban Development in Maharashtra Devendra Fadnavis (who is also the current Chief Minister 
                                                        
116 A revised Development Plan for Mumbai, its third in fifty years, was a requirement of the central government’s 
Ministry of Urban Development. The Government of India’s 2005 urban modernization policy, known as Jawaharlal 
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, promoted equity and sustainability alongside infrastructure development as 
the desired features of the urbanization process to come.  
117 Established under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, it is responsible for the civic infrastructure and 
administration of the city and some suburbs of Mumbai. The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation is India’s first 
municipal corporation (founded in 1882) and is one of the largest local governments in the Asian continent. The 
BMC is the civic body that governs the city of Mumbai, Maharashtra and is India’s richest municipal organization.  
The BMC’s annual budget is more than that of some states of India. 
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of Maharashtra)118; the Government of Maharashtra, and the Government of India through 
support from programs such as Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission.119  
The web of planning agents and authorities also extends to a range of international non-
state actors: management consulting firms such as McKinsey, special interest groups such as 
Mumbai First, aid agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, and Cities Alliance. Adding to this 
are actors and institutions such as private sector businesses, both corporate and informal; 
professional such as including expert planners, civil society, including community-based 
organizations, NGOs, local political parties, religious groups, trade unions and trade association, 
and marginalized communities whose interests are often represented by professional 
organizations. 
On January 1, 2011, Group SCE India, a consultation group that previously prepared 
Bangalore’s Development Plan, began work on Mumbai’s new Development Plan. This work 
involved thematic mapping, tracking growth scenarios, and the aim to finish a comprehensive 
land-use plan in the next eleven months. The government’s own preparatory studies revealed the 
dismal state of planning in the preceding years that resulted in inadequate public utilities and 
amenities, low per capita open space ratio, failing record of housing provision, and unregulated 
vertical growth. Many urban planners consider the municipal corporation’s inability to 
implement the previous Development Plan dating back to 1991 to be the central cause of this 
                                                        
118 See for example the First report of the Chief Minister's Task Force, “Transforming Mumbai Into a World-Class 
City” (Government of Maharashtra, 2004) 
119 “Apart from municipal institutions, the Indian urban scene is cluttered with a host of parastatals, and 
departmental agencies dealing with urban services, in addition to the general regulatory activities through the police 
and district administration, so much so that the substance of urban governance really lies with the state government, 
rather than in the municipal institutions.” (Pal 2008: 76) 
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state of planning.120 Others have identified the lack of public participation and the inability to 
anticipate citizen’s needs.  
Public participation has become increasingly important to the privatization agendas that 
are central to the city making projects of urban neoliberalism. Both are crucial to the urban 
management strategies of city governments and private entities representing developer’s 
interests, to implement globalizing development agendas that enable cities like Mumbai to be 
competitive landing strips for territorializing capital. Yet the discourse of participation has 
contributed to a range of populist imaginations and urban agendas that competed for inclusion in 
the Development Plan process in Mumbai. The concern with equity, like participation, have been 
central demands of these populist expressions, and have extended the project of consent-based 
hegemony, wherein increased inequalities are part of a calculated risk of governability. In 
addition to infrastructural developments, which have also been tied to both security and 
development concerns and investment opportunities alike, ideals of participatory and equitable 
cities have increasingly been a central strategic concern for neoliberal urban agendas (Smith 
2002). This points to a central paradox in the planning of Indian cities: inclusive and equitable 
planning is widely heralded by the state and municipal agents as the favored means of achieving 
an “urban awakening,” in which “housing for all” is the guarantee of a “slum free India” 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2010). Yet the majority of urban Development Plans have remained 
fiercely exclusionary, entrenching and indeed relying upon salient social differences such as 
                                                        
120 “This, most urban planners conclude, has a lot to do with the MCGM’s [Municipal Corporation of Greater 
Mumbai, also known as Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, BMC] failure in implementing the 1991 DP.” Kunal 




caste, class, religion, and gender to produce an uneven and unequal landscape of access to land 
and services (Government of India 2014, Centre for Equity Studies 2014), and thus less equity. 
 
In the Name of the People 
 
“Cities are lived through the diverse ways in which they are conceptualized. Not only do imaginaries shape how 
people understand their own city, but they also shape how cities are actually made. How people work, live, and play 
in a city, as well as how a city should look, how local government should function and what kinds of developments 
should be prioritized are all shaped by urban imaginaries.” (Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria and Colin McFarlane, Urban 
Navigations: Politics, Space, and the City in South Asia, 2011:4) 
 
One of the first populist impulses to arise from citizen groups came from Urban Design Research 
Institute (UDRI), a trust of planners, urban designers, architects, and other urban affairs 
professionals focused since the early eighties on progressive interventions in the built 
environment. UDRI was early in bringing attention to the 2014–2034 Development Plan and 
identifying the opportunity to shape the proposal process by advocating for participation and 
started raising awareness shortly after the decision to revise the current Development Plan was 
taken in 2009. Beginning in September 2009, UDRI organized a few workshops, foremost 
amongst urban planners and architects, to contribute, in their own words, to the “formulation of a 
public participation process for the revision of the Development Plan for Mumbai 2014–
2034.”121 Their audience was limited to an existing circle of urban professionals with influence 
in the political apparatuses of the city but who nevertheless self-consciously considered 
themselves insufficiently represented in official planning discussions.  
As part of “a public participation planning process” UDRI conducted surveys of about 
two thousand people on a variety of issues. It formed “ten different stakeholder groups on 
education, health, livelihoods, energy, environment, water, housing, transport, urban form, and 
                                                        
121 See http://www.mumbaidp24seven.in/index.php/about-us 
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governance [which] met regularly to formulate the principles that should guide the Development 
Planning process of the city.”122 UDRI’s surveys and meetings were largely discussions between 
professionals and experts, consciously identifying the emerging consensus as representative of a 
number of public stakeholder’s interests. In order to enter into dialogue with the city 
government, members of UDRI thus sought to mobilize influence based on their own planning 
expertise and demand inclusion based on their professional credentials. Citizen involvement 
remained limited to discussions, workshops, and exhibitions, all designed and managed by the 
organization itself. Nonetheless, UDRI produced what it referred to as “A People’s Brief” 
consisting of thirty-five “stakeholder principles” derived through its consultation process that it 
presented to the city government and to the planning consultant Group SCE in December 2011.  
 Meanwhile, beginning in June 2011, the group YUVA Urban (Youth for Unity and 
Voluntary Action) initiated a separate “peoples’ process” aimed at influencing the development 
plan. YUVA is a left-leaning national NGO founded in 1984 with paid staff of directors, 
researchers, and community organizers concerned with urban indices of development. Its work 
on issues of urban poverty and marginalization has been in a critical human rights framework but 
its analysis and reputation as an important NGO in the country stems largely from its community 
organizing campaign and base building efforts among the urban poor. Alarmed by the 
exclusionary histories of the city’s development plans, YUVA committed its field office in 
Mumbai to investigating the likely consequences of the forthcoming development plan on the 
lowest strata of the city. The goal was to assess the official development itineraries of the city 
from the perspective of the communities least benefited by the city’s uneven histories of urban 
                                                        
122 The surveys queried a range of topics, from governance, urban life (housing, environment, water and sanitation, 
health, education, energy, livelihood) and urban form. These groups held an extensive series of consultation 
workshops scheduled with stakeholders, including key municipal departments, NGOs and concerned citizens (42 in 
total), “to understand the needs and solutions for sector wise planning issues.” 
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development schemes. YUVA’s office in Mumbai initiated what it referred to as “awareness 
building workshops” and “network building” as well as large-scale training meetings. The group 
also used its constituents and connections across the city from past campaigns against the 
privatization of water rights and the demolition of informal housing to host several rallies, the 
first of which were held in the P/North Ward six months later, in January 2012.  
 
Figure 11: Map of P/N Ward. Image source: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. R/S – Ward Existing Lan 
Use 2012.  
 
This municipal ward was already a significant territory for the non-governmental community 
organization, which had been organizing in the area slums and had developed significant ties to 
the community. Following the rallies, the group hosted a three-month “ground truthing” study 
from March 2012 to June 2012. Through direct observation and verification of lived experience, 
170 
mobilized communities situated the place and politics of urban land in their own actual, concrete 
relations as an incitement against the municipality’s rendering of localities into plannable 
abstract space. While ground truthing has its own technical geospatial-planning connotation 
(with geographic information systems), in its community form, it also conveyed the moral force 
of satya, of insisting on the truth. The point was to understand the land use pattern in the district 
in order to assess how poor communities in the locality had fared under the previous and current 
twenty-year development plans. A set of concrete demands emerged from residents at the 
settlement and P/North ward level. This was later published as Mumbai Development Plan 
Implementation and Bias: From the Perspective of the Urban Poor (2013) and has been widely 
circulated and subsequently accepted by professional planning groups and the municipality as 
one of the most detailed primary studies of the implementations of the 1991 Development Plan 
in Mumbai. It recognizes that the housing situation has been in crisis since the seventies and 
draws immediate connections between the rise in informality and precarity in housing and other 
provisions on the one hand, and the liberalization of the land markets in the city on the other. 
Moreover, the report identifies the limitations of existing planning at the scale of the informal 
settlement and argues that the Development Plan 2014–2034 process is a politically important 
opportunity to reverse a longstanding anti-poor urban agenda and so that the many issues 
plaguing the development of the city may be “planned and participated at the level of the city.” 
The demands that YUVA’s researchers and community organizers list in this document include 
planning with the recognition that the majority of the city’s population is not “illegal” though 
they reside in slums (estimated 70 percent) unassisted by the state; allocating specific planning 
resources for the urban poor, including coastal communities and others excluded by the 
municipality; using the development plan process to build equity in the city; and reducing the 
171 
duration of the plan from twenty to five years with a robust process for monitoring and 
modifying plans in regular intervals; among other specific ward-level demands such as improved 
housing, health care provisions, schools, playgrounds, and “real open spaces” accessible to all. 
 
Mapping the City: Residents’ First Encounter with the Development Plan 
 
In September 2012, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai released Existing Land Use 
(ELU) maps of the city, marking residents’ first encounter with the development plan. This was 
one of the most crucial stages of the multi-year development plan process. It would set the tone 
for the planning process to come by either acknowledging or refuting an understanding of how 
land across the city was currently being used, and by whom. It also demonstrated how prepared 
planning authorities would be to deal with the complex spatial realties of how people use urban 
land, and how likely city officials would be to impose their development vision on top of it. 
Finally, the moment clearly crystallized relations of consent among the state and the governed in 
how city agencies and consultants would mold a vision for the city’s future land use with—or 
against—those who are most vulnerable and those who are most interested in profiting from a 
development agenda. The release of the Existing Land Use maps also offered a crucial moment 
for the city to respond to the government’s development interests and visions, and attempt to 
shape the plans with their own vision. 
Led by prominent architect and urban designer Pankaj Joshi, the Urban Design Research 
Institute continued to organize, host, or facilitate Stakeholder Meetings and Workshops 
throughout 2012 and periodically until 2014. UDRI also launched a web platform imbued with a 
quasi-populist spirit to facilitate citizen involvement in the development plan process under the 
name “DP24Seven Project.” The website featured a mapping resource guide for citizens to check 
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the MCGM’s Existing Land Use maps for errors and inconsistencies.123 Published in both Hindi 
and English, UDRI’s guide to citizen existing land use verification was the first online tool made 
available to Mumbai’s residents. The DP24Seven Project encouraged people to directly send 
comments to the MCGM’s email account dedicated to land use questions. UDRI also published 
three “inception reports.” In its language and appeal to “citizens” to take notice and contribute to 
the visioning of their city, UDRI seemed mostly to address the city’s university students, 
professionals, and middle classes. Whether the group’s vision and expertise could adequately 
engage other strata of the city and accommodate their strategic leadership for a more popular 
development plan would remain an unaddressed question in its campaign to bring popular 
attention to the planning process. This question of audience and engagement remained a 
distinguishing difference between UDRI and YUVA in their shared use of broadly populist 
rhetoric and technical planning consultation language.  
From October 2012 to February 2013, multiple groups engaged in a large-scale effort to 
verify—and correct—existing land use maps released by the MCGM. YUVA sponsored a 
community-level verification process in several in the city’s twenty-four wards, as a diverse 
“peoples movement” was slowly emerging from poorer districts in the city. YUVA’s aim was to 
involve as many communities of slum dwellers, coastal communities, urban villagers, and 
informal laborers in the process, identifying a range of community “stakeholders” who would 
ensure that ELU maps were marked correctly.  
Members of the “people’s process” were concerned with how well the existing land use 
maps could reflect both the physical geographic and lived spatial reality of Mumbai, which in 
                                                        
123 The MCGM had uploaded the Existing Land Use (ELU) maps and report on the MCGM website and invited 
comments on the ELU maps and report. The deadline for submission of comments on the Existing Land Use Maps 
and Reports (ELU) published by the MCGM, was extended to March 28, 2013. 
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many instances is defined by the coarticulation of informality, various laboring and ecological 
commons, and dispossessions and enclosures. Yet there are also economic and spatial commons 
that transverse this categorization and mapping process, whose historical patterns predate 
capitalist urbanization in Mumbai and have long been entangled with its formations. Fisher 
communities (kolis)124 along the western coast and Indigenous tribes (adivasis) in Sanjay 
National Park and Aarey Colony are two such communities. In these important instances, the 
commons maintain their livelihoods, and contribute to their reproduction as a community.125  
There are indeed a variety of commoners—most notably hunters, gatherers, foragers, and 
fishers—in the metropolitan space of Mumbai, some of whom partially enter into commodity 
relations within the capitalist economy but whose existence in the city raises important and 
largely unanswered questions of how multiple and different commons connect to the urban 
economy, its governance, and larger issues of livelihood, land use, and resistance 
(Parthasarathy 2011). The vision of the city as a global metropolis does very little to recognize 
these communities’ original claims on space, their laboring traditions, their ongoing and dynamic 
spatial needs, and their hopes for the city. Moreover, the global metropolis vision willfully erases 
“the economic and cultural contributions of ‘commoners’ whose everyday labours make possible 
the city as we know it” (Gidwani and Baviskar 2011: 43). 
                                                        
124 “Koli is an umbrella term to refer to a number of castes and tribal groups in coastal Maharashtra, Gujarat and 
Goa, and who profess different religious faiths. A majority of the Koli fisher people in Mumbai are either Son-Kolis 
or Mahadev Kolis.”  (Parthasarathy 2011: 62 fn20) 
125 Parthasarathy suggests that “users of these resources tend to differentiate between rights over property and rights 
over embedded resources in a property available for access to external actors who own no property (the second 
being regarded as the commons). ‘Commonising’ or ‘commoning’ is perhaps a better description of the processes 
and actions described here rather than the term “commons.” There is no public notion of the commons, but the idea 
is seen in more immanent terms. The idea of accessing resources that are not commodities and are not strictly 
classified as property is different from the concept of poaching. In many ways, especially in a sociological and also 
political sense, Mumbai itself constitutes a commons for the people of the south Asian subcontinent.” (Parthasarathy 
2011) 
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The commons are routinely misrecognized as “informal” economies and spaces, both in 
planning regimes and spatial mapping exercises that mark the urban commons of fishing 
communities or urban villages as slums, or as laboring Adivasi communities as engaged in 
informal sector transactions. Correctly mapping these common spaces would also bring into 
focus a view of Mumbai as an urban society organized through many types of subsistence 
laboring. Recognizing the existence of these communities of commons is an important way to 
situate a diverse urban poor as active interpreters and collaborators in contested urban political 
and ecological fabrics, and not merely as victims of restructuring and redevelopment processes. 
Moreover, the urban commons serve both as a political lens for approaching the city as well as a 
means for recognizing and recovering the history of diverse values and experiences of laboring 
communities in Mumbai.126  
Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh, participants in the early “peoples” campaign and 
activist-researchers teaching at the well-known Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute for 
Architecture and Environmental Studies, recall “the result [of the community mapping] was 
dramatic: over the next six months, institutions and individuals pointed out 5,134 errors in the 
maps.” Land that was marked as “slums” on municipal maps were indeed fisher villages 
(koliwadas) and urban villages (goathans). Land marked as green and open spaces actually 
                                                        
126 “Research on the urban commons in India is scarce, though there are signs of increasing interest. The focus, 
however, is on issues that reflect the core concerns of urban sociology and critical urban studies; streets, maidans, 
lakes, parks, and garbage disposal sites are usually identified as the commons. The identification of the commons by 
researchers does recognise issues of class, gender, inequality and the concerns of the urban poor, but on the whole 
seems to be more of a reaction to exclusionary tendencies and the takeover of common facilities and sites by the 
middle classes and the elite. Questions are rarely raised beyond the routine ones of struggles over access and 
exclusion with reference to common civic natural resources such as lakes and parks, common facilities 
(playgrounds), or the use of streets and foot- paths for vending, hawking, housing, and so on. How and from where 
do the urban poor meet their fuelwood needs? What are the sources of food and fodder for urban livestock holders? 
How do the urban poor and lower middle classes meet their food requirements? What kind of resource dependencies 
are exhibited in the livelihood strategies of street vendors and hawkers, and of sundry artisanal groups working in 
the city? Are urban and peri- urban natural resource pools and commons (for instance, fish from lakes, rivulets, 
creeks, ponds and other water bodies) integrated into the supply chains of small retailers, wholesalers and 
supermarkets, as well as of eateries and restaurants?” (Parthasarathy 2011: 55)  
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included inaccessible parts of the rock coast. Housing settlements were designated as 
commercially zoned and vice versa. The development plan was mired at the start in controversy 
as a number of community groups alleged innumerable inconsistencies and errors in the ELU 
maps.  
In response, the Standing Committee Chairperson of the Development Plan, bowing to 
the increasing pressure over the inconsistencies in the ELU, agreed to meet with community-
based organizations and NGOs. This was the first meeting regarding the Development Plan 
where officials met with the public and made certain assurances. Coming out of this meeting, 
according to the MCGM, the “civic body promises to make all reports, maps on Development 
Plan process accessible to the public.” The public and participatory nature, however limited, of 
the development process was briefly guaranteed. Yet in a meeting in May 2013 with stakeholder 
groups, the MCGM rejected all of the communities’ corrections to the maps except “250 
discrepancies,” claiming the other corrections were mere “comments” or “suggestions” 
(Indorewala and Wagh 2013). Public pressure nonetheless forced the MCGM to review all 
recorded errors and present them in an “Action Report.” The people’s campaign that YUVA 
initiated among the poorest sections of city had compelled its first response from the city 
government and seemed to have won its first victory in what would be a long battle. Yet even 
consequential errors that were admitted—such as the lack of mapping of existing slums, urban 
villages, hawkers, the homeless and other vulnerable groups—were dismissively filed away for 
the proposal stage, a flouting of the planning regulations about how existing use is to be notated 




Real and Imaginary Populism 
Mumbai is often represented as a “popular” city famous for its public cultures and celebrated for 
the marvels of the spectacularly ordinary routines that its masses engage in across the city. In 
their imaginaries if not their direct experiences or everyday expectations, so too do ordinary 
citizens, politicians, as well as experts such as planners, routinely invoke a long tradition of 
popular engagement in the city’s development. The “popular” is a powerful but a contradictory 
construct available for use by diverse interests to draw from, reinterpret, and mobilize for their 
own purposes. What I refer to as “imaginary populism” is an essential construct that allows 
various visions of the city to find justification, to represent certain mass and elite agendas as 
immanent urban imaginaries that are already in the pulse and air of the city.127 Imaginary 
populism enables a simultaneously shared and different city that links the “popular” with forms 
of accessibility and acceptability. The “people” and the “popular” also mask the enclosures and 
appropriations in the process of Mumbai’s urban development. This is what makes it possible for 
the city government to claim it ensures the “public participatory nature of the Development Plan” 
while dismissing people’s submissions. Citizen outrage at the very process can even be contorted 
into an example of people’s participation, as it was in the press and by MCGM officials.128 
“Imaginary populism” is also what allows officials to generate consent to development and 
manage implementation of its schemes; it also allows experts such as the members of the UDRI 
                                                        
127 In proposing the term “imaginary populism,” I draw on Ernesto Laclau’s discussion of populism as an inherent 
dimension of a democratic politics and interpret Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined community” as part of a 
larger process of how imagination contributes to political community building. Laclau, E., 2005. On Populist 
Reason. New York and London: Verso; Anderson, B. 1993. Imagined Communities. New York and London: Verso. 
128 Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh. 2013. “People’s Participation in Planning Mumbai?” Kafila. December 
17, 2013. See also Kunal Purohit, “MCGM Agrees to Review ELU Map Errors Found by Mumbaiites,” Hindustan 
Times, January 18, 2013. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/mumbai/MCGM-agrees-to-review-elu-map-
errors-found-by-mumbaiites/article1-992622.aspx. 
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to lament previous failures of participation but not interrogate what popular participation should 
or could have looked like, or to articulate their proposed notion of public participation.  
In April 2013, as a consequence to the error-riddled process and lack of incorporation of 
popular sentiments in the development plan process, YUVA began organizing meetings and 
discussions between more than a hundred community groups and other grassroots organizations, 
activists, researchers and experts. The result was a polyvocal formulation called The People’s 
Vision for Mumbai’s Development Plan. The process of drafting the document began some 
eighteen months earlier and brought together hundreds of different organizations and individuals 
in the city to contribute their lived understanding of the city’s existing land use against official 
estimates. YUVA and other community groups initiated assemblies for debate and inquiry in 
various geographic wards and social sectors (for instance, labor and housing communities) of the 
city, where different groups came together around specified issues and themes, such as housing, 
informal livelihoods, education, health, and gender. These discussions and the resulting 
publication took about three months and involved a lot of debate before demands were finalized. 
A remarkable statement that draws on diverse experiences of exclusion in the city and YUVA’s 
earlier work among the urban poor of P/N Ward, The People’s Vision imagines a popular 
citywide twenty-year development plan that supplants the one that the municipal state was 
concurrently drafting. Here, a range of diverse everyday experiences of the city clashed with 
state assessments routinely obscuring slum settlements, urban villages, homeless persons, and 
land used by street hawkers and “casualized” workers.  
The process that YUVA initiated with community meetings, rallies, mapping exercises 
was now taking shape as a larger more autonomous movement that prioritizes the abilities of 
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“people to articulate their own needs and priorities.”129 In May 2013, the Hamara Shehar 
Mumbai campaign was inaugurated, an important organizational moment for formulating 
popular demands on the city.130 On October 22, 2013, more than 1,500 people, including a loose 
formation of eighty organizations, gathered at Azad Maidan, a historic open space in the city of 
public demonstration and protest, to formally present their collectively-authored vision of 
development based on the diverse experiences of exclusion in the city to the MCGM. The 
People’s Vision interestingly juxtaposed with the MCGM’s own Vision Document of the 
Development Plan 2014–2034 published in 2013. While the People’s Vision demanded that 
future planning recognize and account for the myriad ways laboring communities already make 
Mumbai the city it is, the city’s official document calls for Mumbai to be transformed according 
to three distinct but related visions—of a competitive city, an inclusive city, and a sustainable 
city.” Its vision makes spatial arguments for the intensive redevelopment of certain areas rather 
than approaching a plan for the city according to existing issues (Rangwala 2013).131  
The aims of the nascent campaign at this moment were revealingly complex and 
contradictory. On the one hand, by addressing the municipal corporation as the main agent of 
development, the campaign largely accommodates the current distribution of power, and seeks 
                                                        
129 Moreover, the campaign is “self-financed, with its own name, and a convener group comprising of individuals 
from various community groups and organizations.” Hussain Indorewala and Shweta Wagh. 2013. “People’s 
Participation in Planning Mumbai?” Kafila. December 17, 2013 
130 Officially titled Hamara Shehar Mumbai Vikas Niyojan Abhiyaan (Mumbai People’s City Development Plan 
Campaign, hereafter shortened to Hamara Shehar Mumbai). The campaign announced its founding with the 
following note: “The people’s Mumbai Development Plan (DP) campaign (unanimously named by its members as 
Hamara Shahar, Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan Abhiyan, Mumbai, Our City, Our Development, Our Planning 
campaign).” 
131 “These visions however benevolent do not seem to carry forward to the level strategies and projections. The 
document thus reads as argument towards intensification of built-up area to meet various demands, rather than a 
careful approach towards mapping identified issues comprehensively and thus developing frameworks that are bold, 
and inclusive in the real sense. Organizations representing marginalized communities have therefore been working 
arduously right from the initial stages of plan preparation to ensure adequate representation.” Lubaina Rangwala, 
“The Mumbai Development Plan: A Politics of Representation” December 11, 2013, 
https://favelissues.com/2013/12/11/the-mumbai-development-plan-a-politics-of-representation/ 
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only to negotiate with power holders for increased participation in the planning of the city. On 
the other hand, the popular energies mobilized in the campaign envision a wholly different 
approach to development that would require a significantly new balance of powers in city 
planning.  
The campaign was galvanized by some of the most marginalized communities in the city. 
Working class and poor Muslims, Dalits (untouchables), and Kolis (traditional communities), 
though very often more men than women, constituted the majority of those who participated in 
ongoing monthly meetings and day-to-day operations of Hamara Shehar (Field notes, December 
8, 2014).132 Among those who joined the campaign were members of the 128 gaothans (urban 
villages). These are home to Mumbai’s East Indians, Marathi-speaking “original inhabitants” 
who lived on the islands of Bombay, the island of Salsette, Chaul and Thana and who converted 
to Christianity (Roman Catholic) during the sixth century. They’ve been living on their land 
since centuries before Portuguese arrived in 1498, and their housing and village formations have 
existed long before the city’s modern development control rules were established. These East 
Indian communities became involved in the people’s campaign because their gaothans were 
marked incorrectly on the land use maps as slum clusters. The goathans are quite differentiated 
by class, with some suffering crumbling infrastructure, illegal displacement, and poorly planned 
Slum Rehabilitation Schemes that are destroying the fabric of the village. Others are susceptible 
to buy outs and redevelopment amidst the difficulty of house repairs and as compensatory 
amounts are often too high to resist. Even relatively well-off villages suffer dwindling numbers 
of households often triggered by water and sewage problems. The Development Plan 2014–2034 
would also later threaten gaothans with road-widening projects that would disrupt these urban 
                                                        
132 Agarwal (2001:1623) has referred to these gendered tendencies within popular organizations as “participatory 
exclusions”—“exclusions within seemingly participatory institutions.” 
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villages permanently, ripping the fabric of century-old processes of community urban 
development. Their settlements have narrow alleys latticed through century old bungalows 
(trellised balconies, open porches, curling staircases, and sloping tiled roofs are all regular 
architectural features) and are sometimes regarded as an aspect of Mumbai’s living heritage to be 
preserved, though the sentiment rarely impedes “higher and best uses” practice by developers. 
Like koliwada and adivasipada settlements, many East Indian gaothans are organized 
through association and maintenance of village affairs to defend their right to live on their own 
land, as well as to follow the customs and traditions they have been following for generations. 
These self-organization and resistance histories galvanized the nascent people’s campaign and, at 
crucial moments, helped mobilize thousands of community members to demonstrate the broad 
and popular backing of the campaign’s demands. 
 
A City Entangled by the State 
 
The campaign was self-conscious in its “attempt to overcome various obstacles to [its] own 
development in partnership with the powerholders,” as it stated in a campaign communiqué to its 
members in 2013 (Hamara Shehar email, 2013). While it described the development plan process 
as a “top down, secretive process,” Hamara Shehar also believed its struggles could push the 
government toward a more democratic process of planning. The campaign even lauded the 
MCGM’s openness to participation when the municipal government recognized the campaign’s 
early demands for community consultation workshops.133  
                                                        
133 The campaign wrote in September that “the Development Plan process – till now – has not been participatory; it 
has been a perfect example of a top down, secretive process.” Hamara Shehar in its continuing struggle for a more 
participatory and inclusive planning process appreciates the most recent undertaking by the Brihanmumbai 
Municipal Corporation (MCGM) as a definite step in the right direction. In a first of its kind endeavor in the country 
where urban planning is still primarily “expert”- driven and considered too technical an exercise to be opened up to 
the public, the MCGM has organized several thematic consultations to gather public opinion directly pertaining to 
the Development Plan under varied pertinent categories affecting the city. (Hamara Shehar campaign communiqué) 
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The campaign had to grapple with the tendency for planning officials and other state-
oriented experts to appropriate the citywide attempt at shaping the process of consultations and 
informing the development process. Yet it proceeded with the assumption that only by allowing 
itself to be entangled with the state would the process open up to more than experts. The 
municipal commissioner, however, showed repeated disinterest in distinguishing elite and 
ordinary “stakeholders.”134 The pressure that the individuals and groups comprising Hamara 
Shehar placed on the state were instrumental in the formation of the process involving these 
consultations in order to solicit  “feedback from various stakeholders” as the Development Plan’s 
Existing Land Use, Proposed Land Use, and Development Control Regulations were being 
drafted, anchored by various NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) having a record 
of working for ordinary citizen’s concerns. It was Hamara Shehar that pushed the consultative 
process to be carried to each of the twenty-four administrative wards in the city where “people’s 
representatives and common citizens” could understand the challenges at the ward level and 
express their concerns.  
                                                        
134 According to the MCGM, initial consultation meetings in June 2013 were “followed by thematic workshops 
organized by the NGOs and professionals [starting in December 2013]. They also claimed that MCGM “meetings 
with experts and all the wards” from late 2013 to early 2014 which were a result of its own mandate.” Municipal 
Corporation of Greater Mumbai, “Greater Mumbai Draft Development Plan 2034: Executive Summary” released on 
February 16 2015. 
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Figure 12: Ward Map of Mumbai. Image Source: BMC Elections: BMC New Ward Maps, Ward Boundaries, New 
MCGM Wards. 
  
The campaign argued that there is a long history in Bombay of the majority of its residents not 
even becoming aware of, and thereby claiming no ownership over, the development plans 
intended for them. In this light, it’s beginning—although rudimentary and contradictory—
augured a positive step toward recognition of the importance of a differently conceived 
participatory process. The success of these consultations lay in the actual participation of people 
in large numbers. The campaign therefore relied heavily on the media to disseminate the 
information, far and wide. But it also pressured the MCGM to take responsibility for notifying 
the public of meetings and listing the schedule on its website.  
On November 29, 2013, the MCGM held its first open public meeting for community 
members to present their aspirations and grievances with the Development Plan process thus far. 
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The MCGM published its Preparatory Studies Report one week earlier, which included valuable 
data about the proposed spatial vision of the forthcoming Development Plan that was hitherto 
unavailable.135 On November 29th, various civil society organizations, NGOs, CBOs, officials 
and individuals gathered to voice “their ideas, aspirations and most evidently their fears” 
(Rangwala 2013). The meeting concluded with a clear mandate for the MCGM to organize and 
anchor various thematic, sector-wise consultations supported by various NGOs working on 
specific issues.  
The first consultative meeting of the “MCGM Workshops with Stakeholders for the 
Revision of Development Plan for Mumbai 2014–2034” was held on December 17, 2013 and 
focused on the issue of transportation. The second MCGM consultative meeting on January 7, 
2014, debated the spatial implications of Development Control Regulations (DCRs), which were 
crucial to the framework and implementation of development rights for the city. A third thematic 
consultation called “education” proposed a set of technical recommendations by the city’s 
architects in anticipation of both the DCR and Proposed Land Use Plan. Subsequent meetings 
dealt with the environment and sustainable city, slum housing, and the urban form by 
professional groups involved in these matters. Various social welfare groups working with the 
poor in slums drafted five-point plans for making Mumbai slum-free through an integrated work 
and life concept relying on slum redevelopment and affordable housing, as well as proposals to 
give those working in the informal economy legal entitlements and jobs. These initiatives came 
in response to “the Development Plan consultative exercise initiated by municipal commissioner 
                                                        
135 The report is supposed to be a well-researched document that informs the creation of the Development Plan (DP). 
It is one of the most important steps towards creating a well-informed Development Plan through detailed 
information on the existing situation, possible growth scenarios over the next three decades and suggestions on 
amenity/land provisions based on these projections. 
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Sitaram Kunte to ensure maximum participation and consultations before finalizing the city’s 
fate for the next 20 years.”136  
Community-based organizations also hosted a series of meetings with members of social 
movements in the city. A meeting on water issues was hosted by Pani Haq Samiti, which has 
been organizing for public rights to water provision and against privatization over the course of 
the previous decade. Feminist organizations hosted a gender workshop on January 20, 2014 to 
pose the question of women’s labor, safety, and autonomy in the city as central to a popular 
definition of urban development. Sanitation and the informal sector, which included trade unions, 
street vendor (or hawker) associations, waste pickers associations and taxi/auto workers’ 
associations both met on January 21. Formal housing and physical infrastructure, health, and 
finally, digital inclusion rounded out the thirteen thematic meetings that occurred over six weeks 
from December 2013 to February 2014. The various perspectives on city development and the 
mix of expertise and direct experience presented in these meetings were unprecedented in the 
history of Mumbai’s development plan process.  
One of the campaign’s criticisms of the Development Plan preparatory studies report was 
its definition of “open space” and “natural areas.” Open space—specifically designed, 
designated, and provided public space by city planning for use and recreation—is an important 
index for how planners and municipalities prioritize and act to make the city more livable. At its 
foundation, the question of open space is a clear articulation of the dispute over land use for 
profit and land use for social reproduction, whether public or through existing commons. 
“Natural areas” is a demarcation that spatially maps the city’s embeddedness in natural and 
                                                        
136 “A public workshop [was] conducted on January 11 at the F-South office between 2pm and 6pm. Groups such as 
Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti, CRH, Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action (YUVA), Slum Rehabilitation Society, 
along with Tata Institute of Social Sciences, want the MCGM to publish a map of all slum-occupied land with areas 
and population.” Clara Lewis, 2014. “NGOs draw plans to free Mumbai of slums,” Times of India, January 5, 2014 
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ecological systems, its regulatory relationship to the region’s biodiversity and its fragile 
ecosystems, and its understanding of the economic and cultural ways communities relate to 
natural resources, for instance primary activity, which in the case of urban village communities 
constitute their “commons” in distinction from public spaces.137 The reports have attempted to 
include a series of natural areas such as swampy mangroves, mudflats, saltpans, nallahs (creeks), 
rocky coastlines, and dense forests that are either largely unavailable to the public or inaccessible 
through various exclusions (time, fee-based, membership, fenced, policed, suitable for certain 
classes or lifestyle activities) into its open space calculations. Meanwhile, areas marked by the 
MCGM as open spaces are in fact garbage dumps or other socially engaged (“encroached” upon) 
spaces. Boat storage on beaches, fish drying, and plantations of Adivasi communities are 
examples. These productive spaces and activities are as threatened by privatization as they are by 
disingenuous municipal mapping of primary spaces as “public” or “open.” The campaign has 
been among the only groups in the city to argue that these distinctions are important to maintain, 
and that all three (natural spaces, open spaces, and commons) should be prioritized in the city’s 
own understanding of itself as reflected in its spatial use and Development Plan. 
While core members of Hamara Shehar seized on the opportunity to present diverse 
perspectives on the Development Plan to the city government, the organizers also prepared a 
strategy to reach communities with participatory workshops and presentations on ward-wise 
planning issues in order to prepare the ground for consultations and the forthcoming 
development proposals (Field notes, December 8, 2014). The campaign worked with 
                                                        
137 Open space is simply calculated as total available gardens, parks, recreation grounds, and playgrounds per 
person, an estimated 14 square km of open spaces for 12.4 million people according to Open Mumbai, it is ranked 
among the lowest of all the world’s major metropolitan areas (the existing per capita open space of 1.1–1.24 square 
meters per 1000 persons indicates an alarming shortfall of the nine meters prescribed by the World Health 
Organization, or the 25 square meters in New York) and verifies the ubiquitous image of a teeming city population 
living and breathing on top of one another). 
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communities on the technical aspects of the planning process—translating, for instance, official 
municipal documents to draw out the significance of ELU (Existing Land Use), PLUs (Proposed 
Land Use), DCRs (Development Control Regulations) in the statistics, graphs, and technocratic 
language used in the Development Plan documentation. Meanwhile, in its meetings and 
campaign communiqués Hamara Shehar routinely relied on the popular imaginary of a shared 
city, as well as a shared collective consciousness of belonging, and a citywide entitlement to the 
decision making processes that would steer its future.138 For instance, one evening on December 
13, 2014, Hamara Shehar Mumbai convened a campaign meeting in an open space between a 
maze of alleys deep inside a slum community in the P/N ward. Members hung a banner outside 
of a shack on the side of atrium where people gathered to hear speakers. As the banner flapped in 
the wind under darkening skies, its painted message—a poem by Urdu poet Sahir Ludhianavi—
was unwavering in its call for a collective world-making populist aspiration:  
“When we labourers demand our share of this world, 
not just an orchard, 
not merely a field, 
we will demand the entire world.” 
 
Thus, while part of the campaign’s strategy focused on presenting a “people’s” perspective to the 
state, the campaign also launched a parallel process of raising awareness and formulating 
community-based perspectives on a collective vision of the city.139  
 
The Port Evictions and the Fracturing of Solidarity 
                                                        
138 For instance, Hamara Shehar’s rallying cries during those weeks of consultative meetings typically made the 
following appeals: “As a campaign we must come together in the coming days to demand our share of the city over 
the next twenty years!” (Field notes, February 19, 2015).  
139 On March 25 and 26, 2014, YUVA hosted the National Symposium on Urban Planning and Governance (the 
theme was ‘Towards Inclusive and Equitable Cities’, an urban forum to share both experiences and to facilitate more 
debate. At the meeting, city officials, professionals, and certain mobilized communities encountered one another on 
a highly uneven terrain of urban knowledge and urban experience.  
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While the campaign was envisioning a more equitable future Mumbai, the city and state 
governments, meanwhile, were not only deliberating on the changes to come; they were actively 
clearing the way. From January 8 to 9, 2015, authorities demolished 150 homes and warehouses 
on Mumbai Port land at Powder Bundar, where five thousand people worked in informal trades 
and daily contract work of shipbreaking, warehousing and scrapping at Mazagaon docks. Though 
the demolitions were an official action called for by Union Minister for Transport, Highways and 
Shipping Nitin Gadkari, involving Maharashtra State Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis and 
Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) officials, only one Marathi newspaper covered it. One of the Hamara 
Shehar campaign members (referred to as saathis, or comrades) who was working with the Port 
laboring communities went with people from Powder Bunder to meet a lawyer to obtain a stay 
order on the eviction. While Hamara Shehar had direct connections to individuals and groups 
across the city, its core members could not mobilize them quickly in a direct demonstration of 
solidarity for eviction defense. Rather, the campaign appealed to those who have been 
participating in planning and development discussions in light of the Development Plan via 
emails and phone calls to come forward merely to offer any support and advice. At the same 
time, they called for an urgent in-person meeting the next day to discuss the future steps of the 
campaign in the light of the demolitions at the Port land. 
In Mumbai, the demolition of informal settlements is a frequent and strategic action on 
the part of government authorities, and the Port Trust eviction was no exception. The Mumbai 
Port Trust constitutes approximately one-eighth of the area of the city, including a 28-kilometer 
coastline. It is government-held public land. Though formally outside of the city’s development 
plan, a Mumbai Port Land Development Committee (MPLDC) has drawn plans for a “vision for 
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the future development of the eastern water front.”140 These redevelopment plans were largely 
revealed to the public in celebratory news clips, which presented the plans as in the larger public 
interest. It includes a consolidated five hundred acres to the south of Mazagaon for port 
activities, and a new transition corridor billed as “an international-class promenade, a marina, a 
floating hotel and restaurant, water sports facilities, jetties and a Ferris Wheel along the lines of 
the London Eye.” It was also designed to include a special trade zone, a world-class cruise 
terminal, and three one-hundred story buildings (Field notes, February 18, 2015).141  
 According to authorities, a Special Planning Authority (SPA) with powers to appropriate 
and develop the land would be established to oversee the work. Under the Maharashtra Regional 
and Town Planning Act, an SPA replaces an elected local authority such as the MCGM as the 
new development control authority, wresting control from democratic institutions and giving the 
unelected bureaucrats the power to acquire land in a notified area for the purpose of 
development, to formulate policies regarding land use and zoning, and to tax and levy charges, 
among other powers. For residents, the problem of special planning authorities was not only an 
issue at the port; nearly 10 percent of the total land area of Greater Mumbai was already under 
SPAs and therefore beyond the reach of the MCGM’s planning jurisdiction. 
 Following the demolitions, Hamara Shehar organized meetings on December 30, 2014 
“to get local residents to voice their concerns and speak about their aspirations as rightful 
stakeholders in the development process” of the Port. They were clear that the redevelopment 
proposals did not reflect the “real needs” of the people of Mumbai—neither the working-class 
populations dependent on the port lands, nor the majority of the city’s existing inhabitants, who 
                                                        
140 The Mumbai Port Land Development Committee (MPLDC) was established by Gadkari in June 2014 and led by 
former MbPT chairman Rani Jadha. 
141 Manthan K Mehta, “Gadkari to seek state help to evict all encroachers from port land,” Times of India, January 7, 
2015 
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were demanding affordable housing. While several members of the campaign voiced concerns 
that the “affordable housing” discourse obscured the right to housing as a political demand and 
replaced it with one based on market delivery, Hamara Shehar nonetheless began working in this 
period with other housing NGOs that used the affordable housing framework. 
A January 2015 meeting brought the campaign together with unions and community 
groups, composed of several slum dweller associations, social workers, and youth, such as the 
Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (Housing Rights Security Committee), and Dharavi Bachao 
Andolan (Save Dharavi Movement). Veteran millworker trade unionists such as Datta Iswalka of 
the Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS) union attended, suggesting that the issues of 
housing and labor, long the “red threads” of class struggle in the city, might formally entwine in 
contemporary ongoing citywide campaigns. But representatives of the port trust union were also 
in attendance at the meeting, even though its workers had just recently presided over the 
emergency evictions that befell port workers, dabawalla union members (food delivery), and 
informal workers associations. The port union issued a statement that the port trust should only 
deliberate over issues related to the port, not housing or informal work. Some of Hamara 
Shehar’s core members were furious at the port union’s cooptation of solidarity between housing 
and labor (Field notes, January 16, 2015). The implications of this statement for a small 
campaign ambitiously trying to organize a mass-based city struggle were especially deflating in a 
city where labor struggles had such an enormous historical claim, yet current workers’ 
organizations did not seem to have a view of the city beyond their workplaces. As one member 







What is the mood of planning? What do people feel or think about it? Why does the city feel this 
way—both electric and alive, and also hardwired into demobilizing relations of control and 
intolerance wrought by the existing power structures and institutions? What does it mean to 
allow these lines to be drawn across the shared city? A Development Plan for the city is a 
collective space of discussion in which a city’s inhabitants may ask, “what is going to happen 
next?” What then does it mean when the process of negotiating the city’s future is simultaneously 
participatory and dismissive of people’s knowledges, desires, and wills?142  
The Hamara Shehar campaign mobilized communities tirelessly to demand that their 
value to the planning process be recognized and their contributions incorporated. Their emphasis 
on an equitable and community-based planning approach certainly draws on a varied tradition of 
radical planning that emphasizes decentralization, popular control, and even decolonization 
(Friedman 1987).143 In their interactions with officials and state agencies, the campaign seemed 
to take a determined but conventional approach. By making demands at every stage of the 
development planning process on the MCGM, the campaign was simply calling for a basic 
principle of planning: begin from what exists.  
 “The campaign has continuously demanded for informal settlements and informal work spaces to be 
included in the revised Development Plan. The MCGM had also promised to map koliwadas, gaothans and 
adivasipadas. We continue to demand that the needs of the common man been taken into cognizance. 
Demands have been put forth at the various stages of preparation - the people’s vision document, people’s 
plans, collated demands of the thematic consultations held in January 2014 have all been submitted to 
concerned officials. (Hamara Shehar Mumbai, February 15, 2015) 
 
                                                        
142 Field notes, October 2014 
143 As Friedmann lays out, the concept of radical planning is “performed largely at the political base of social 
movements in local communities, involving relatively small numbers of participants but with a view beyond their 
local sphere of action to the larger structural changes that must be accomplished on a wider scale.” (2011: 61) 
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Both workers within the informal urban economy and the producers within the urban 
commons—the koliwadas, gaothans and adivasipadas, among others—are often excluded from a 
series of narratives of the global developing city; its spatial transformation at the hands of 
capitalist development, its contested cosmopolitanism, the mutations of its urban modernity. This 
erasure—enacted both on bureaucratic maps and through violent demolitions—is what the 
campaign sought to redress. Through the campaign, these laboring perspectives of commoners 
and informal workers formed a platform for rethinking planning, and challenging and 
supplanting established neoliberal urban policy and governance frameworks. The campaign also 
attempted to shift public discourse away from neoliberal logics and assumptions—which 
promotes the perception of the inevitability of existing and ongoing social inequality and spatial 
differentiation—in order to imagine, narrate, and enact a vision of the shared city and world 
through the recognition of the urban commons and a true valuation of informal work. 
After four years and three official extensions of deadlines, news of the late-breaking 
proposed land use maps (PLU) finally came through the English-language media on February 16, 
2015. The Hamara Shehar campaign spoke with Development Plan officials, who stated that 
municipal commissioner Sitaram Kunte had already presented the PLU to Mayor Snehal 
Ambekar and other Shiv Sena party leaders, and that the plans would be discussed with heads of 
MCGM departments in the coming days. After that, the PLUs would be available in a month’s 
time for public suggestions and objections. The campaign immediately demanded that the 
MCGM “take into consideration the extensive participation process initiated at the city and ward 
level.” If the MR&TP Act granted an extension by two years to the city officials to prepare the 
Development Plan, they argued, then it should also extend the period of suggestion/objection 
from the public.  
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Hamara Shehar called for a meeting a few days later at the YUVA Office at Tilak Nagar 
to synthesize an understanding of recent events in the development plan process and, as the 
invitation described “to prepare ourselves for constructive engagement to defend our right to the 
city.”144 The campaign encouraged these technical documents to be read as widely as possible, to 
“assess the plan, and what it means for us and our city.” Members of Hamara Shehar met with 
the Commissioner Sitaram Kunte on February 25 to once again relay key demands regarding the 
recent developments in the draft Development Plan. The meeting was attended by more than 
forty individual members of the citywide campaign representing gaothans, koliwadas, 
aadivasipadas, women’s groups, hawkers, slum residents, homeless and various citizens groups. 
It was in this meeting that the commissioner agreed to additional community consultations on 
certain themes as well as administrative ward-level consultations on the draft Development Plan.  
The campaign also pressed for consultations on the Aarey land and Coastal Road in 
addition to inclusion of slums, hawkers, urban villages, social amenities, Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management Plan, homeless, Mumbai Port Trust land. These different areas concerning the 
Development Plan had long been discrete terrains of struggle for the campaign. The campaign 
seemed willing to pursue every single one on principle and conviction, despite the state’s dismal 
record of accounting for them. In what could be seen as an invitation to the table, at that meeting, 
municipal commissioner Kunte asked the dozens of Hamara Shehar members present to state the 
kind of interaction they wanted on these issues and requested the campaign provide a list of 
issues to be discussed at the forthcoming thematic consultations.  
 The campaign was successful in getting the thirty-day public comment period extended to 
sixty days: the deadline for objections and suggestions was now April 24, 2015. The additional 
                                                        
144 Campaign communiqué in advance of the meeting on February 19, 2015 stated, “We are right now in the process 
of studying the document and by evening we shall share to everyone the major points in the summary.” 
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time negotiated would allow Hamara Shehar to inform and mobilize the city about the 
significance of the Development Plan and the popular demand to shape it. After this brief 
feedback period, a nine-member official committee would be appointed to address the objectives 
and comment on the basis of their decision with regard to objectives. With the changes proposed, 
a new Development Plan would be presented to the Municipal House, where it would be debated 




On March 10, 2015, the Marathi language newspaper Lokmat reported the MCGM’s intention to 
host workshops to “explain the Development Plan better”—one of the campaign’s core demands 
at the meeting with the municipal commissioner (and replicated at the ward level). The campaign 
met to discuss the way forward. They decided to host a series of “pre-consultation” workshops to 
discuss the implications of the Development Plan. As a campaign announcement stated to its 
members, “there is no mention of the concerns of the working class in the city in the draft DP.”145  
For ten days in March, the campaign organized “preparatory” education workshops in the 
spirit of pedagogy of the oppressed, to read the maps and discuss the issues arising from the 
proposed land use from the city’s diverse popular and working-class perspectives. With 
community representatives and groups deliberating on the city’s planning needs from the range 
of perspectives, each of which was designated a separate workshop, the campaign collectively 
formulated a comprehensive planning vision on the following points: slums and habitat; informal 
livelihoods, adivasipadas, gaothans, koliwadas; the Bombay Port Trust; social and physical 
infrastructure; environment and open spaces; affordable housing; and gender. These workshops 
                                                        
145 Communiqué dated February 25, 2015. 
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brought communities together to compile detailed suggestions and objections and to prepare for 
MCGM Stakeholder consultations, “if and when they happen.” The workshops also provided a 
recap of the process (which at times seemed technical, focused on objections and proposals as 
opposed to visions and demands), and included campaign recommendations made at the thematic 
workshops, an explanation of recommendations of the draft Development Plan relevant to the 
sector and preliminary critique (PLU / DCRs), and explanation of the process of suggestions and 
objections and time-frame. They also featured map reading with communities and discussion and 
summarizing points to be raised. 
Popular education and collective inquiry about the Development Plan continued to take 
place over a series of lengthy public meetings that on occasion started with song. At times, less 
than a dozen would huddle over desks in a cramped office at Tata Institute for Social Science, 
other meetings filled the rooms of borrowed union halls, or in the shared village halls of 
koliwadas, tenements, and other community spaces. During this time, the core campaign 
members seemed limitless in their energies. It was a crucial time for the campaign, and members’ 
energies reflected neither optimism nor pessimism but pure determination. In addition to 
community gatherings and the work it did to speak directly to the masses of the city to shape 
public opinion, Hamara Shehar willingly participated and facilitated gatherings with planners 
and other urban professionals about the Development Plan.  
One such meeting was the “Preparatory Workshop on Adivasipadas / Gaothans / 
Koliwadas,” held on March 15, 2015, in a small office in an NGO called Apnalaya in a 
deteriorating SRA Housing building near Tardeo Police Station. Approximately twenty-five 
people were in attendance, mostly men. More came in later, about three hours into the meeting, 
perhaps totaling over thirty. The campaign has been meeting with these communities in their 
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homes and in the few open spaces available in their villages for years. Since the end of 2013, 
they have also been ensuring the Kolis participate in consultations with various groups that 
would be affected by the proposed Development Plan. The campaign’s major work in identifying 
the needs of commoners in Mumbai has been to facilitate meetings with members of various 
Gaothan, Koliwada, and Adivasipada communities.146 
After collectively reading through provisions for urban villages in the draft Development 
Plan and DCRs, maps were explained. Hamara Shehar campaign members offered a summary 
and explanation of how the Development Plan will affect coastal roads, no development zones, 
etc. The campaign facilitated inquiry with communities, using their own experiences as 
university researchers and teachers to do what NGO staff activists often do not: that is, move 
beyond summary and slogan and, in small ways, change the relations of understanding within 
communities through co-research. In these meetings, there were often bouts of many people 
talking at once, asking questions, making clarifications or raising points. The format was not 
always about listening to presenters and following along on the projected slides. Residents of 
gaothans pulled out a large map and studied it. The attendees seem to have done a certain amount 
of homework before the meeting. One had a letter of objection typed up on letterhead. They 
arrived at a plan of action including ten core objections. A campaign member explained technical 
points from the proposed Development Plan with respect to the reconstruction and 
redevelopment of goathaon areas. It was a humble experiment in pedagogical democracy: lifting 
the issues out from behind their technical veil and laying them before these marginalized 
                                                        
146 E.g. January 18, 2014 at Kamla Raheja Vidyanidhi Institute of Architecture (KRVIA). HSVN organized a series 
of nine Preparatory Workshops between March 12 to 26 2015 to explore a number of pressing themes and issues 
surrounding the draft Development Plan with various communities who will be most affected by its implementation 
as well as key resource persons and groups. 
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communities for discussion and deliberation. A shared commitment to collective action, humble 
and considerate, emerged (Field notes, March 15, 2015). 
Another such meeting that brought together a number of professional planners critical of 
the municipal government’s handling of the Development Plan took place at Studio-X, a cultural 
venue concerned with architecture and urban design issues, on March 19, 2015. As the invitation 
for this “informal gathering of experts” indicated, the meeting was intended to “provide 
coordinated resistance among various groups in the city and a positive review and support for a 
way forward in envisioning an equitable strategy for Mumbai’s urban development.” Participants 
were invited as experts who were actively involved in some resistance to the Development Plan. 
While there was much shared in terms of nuanced analysis, the strategic tenor of the moment 
remained a point of debate. One participant, Sheela Patel said, “We’ve talked about several 
powerful issues. But we haven’t given people any hope that they can do anything about this. We 
need to demonstrate what can be done from below. If we stop this [the development plan], there 
should be something from below that can push things forward. As intermediaries, we have to 
take this up” (Field notes, March 19, 2015). Hamara Shehar core campaign member and veteran 
community organizer Sitaram Shelar then pivoted the conversation and refocused on the 
campaign’s concern for the masses: “many communities are ready to take this up, not just slum 
communities, rickshaw drivers’ union, hawkers’ unions, and so on. But political parties, such as 
Shiv Sena, will be getting interested in the Development Plan for their own purposes too. So we 
may have strange fellows in the campaign. We have to be a bit careful, even as solutions coming 
from above may be good.” This analysis reflects the campaign’s understanding of the 
heterogeneity of official and elite planning interests, as well as its strategy of engaging with the 
state while also attempting to working autonomously from within communities. The campaign, 
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as it continuously articulated, was determined to create a mass-based movement for a popular 
plan for the city “from below.” The need to be “careful” that Shelar refers to speaks to the 
challenges of prioritizing the experiences and desires of the most marginalized communities in 
the city despite the power and authority of experts, professionals, and city officials.    
 By the spring of 2015, controversy ballooned around the draft Development Plan. Various 
populist responses to the plan had been going on for three years, punctuated by mass 
demonstrations and public appeals. After such extensive expert and citizen’s feedback, and after 
such delay, many in these meetings and in the city’s streets and neighborhoods wondered how 
the planning process could be so error-ridden. One explanation came from a participant in the 
March 19 meeting who stated, “The institution, on a day to day level, does not have the capacity. 
So it has no business putting together such a plan. It is insulting to all of those who have been 
working hard to understand these issues.” In campaign meetings and the daily newspaper 
editorial pages, it appeared that sentiments were shifting from frustration toward apathy. What 
would the point be of planning for the next twenty years if the plan itself so grossly misestimated 
present realities—spatially, culturally, and economically?  
 The technocratic nature of the documents, the planning parlance employed, and the rule 
of experts that made only slight gestures toward people’s input created an air of despondency in 
the meeting halls of the campaign. “There are needs that continue to go unfulfilled. You don’t 
need a Development Plan to tell you that things are not changing. The Development Plan is like a 
Trojan horse. We do not know what they want from it. It may be used to occupy us while they 
move ahead with their own plans. Nobody gives a damn about what 2034 looks like. The 
document is a distraction.”147 The notion that the Development Plan was a distraction from the 
                                                        
147 Recorded from field notes, March 19, 2015.  
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city’s “real” intentions that cannot yet be fathomed (except by following the chain of demolitions 
and evictions) speaks to the exclusionary and alienating nature of governance and planning in 
Mumbai. It also suggests how the concept of a shared future can be robbed of its power and 
potential by the juggernaut of development. Exhaustion at the prospect of an alienated future is a 
challenging condition from which to mobilize in a city known for its ceaseless energies. The 
MCGM seemed to have made up its mind and it would not listen to citizen’s concerns. As one 
member said, “Everyone seems to be frustrated with the pace of things, rather than the 
direction.” (Field notes, January 16, 2015). A small but growing consensus held that nothing 
more could be done at that point but start from scratch. Galvanized by these sentiments, the 
UDRI built a website called “Dump the DP”—a far cry from UDRI’s early, enthusiastic efforts to 
engage with the Development Plan process.  
 In this midst of this sense of despair, Sitaram Shelar reminded people how the “people’s 
planning” process had arisen organically from the contributions of a multiplicity of experiences 
in the early days of the unprecedented organizing around the Development Plan. “We need to go 
back to 2010–2011 to understand what is happening now with the Development Plan. There were 
109 organizations working on various issues (child-rights issues, women, youth, disability, 
hawkers, naka workers, formal and formal housing, etc.). We thought, ‘the corporation is 
building its own visions and objectives on the Plan for Mumbai, so why shouldn’t the people 
also?’” (Field notes, April 2015). The MCGM made quite a show of its inclusion of consultation 
workshops, but the corporation never actually answered the communities’ suggestions. “That is 
because a certain mandate is locked in place,” another participant in that March 19 meeting 
stated. “Their mandate must be changed; currently it is the mandate of the market.”  
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In fact, at the same time the Government of Maharashtra was ignoring residents’ 
comments, it was simultaneously holding consultations with the city’s developers and real estate 
speculators—at least six by March 2015—where the profiteers squabbled over what the city’s 
Development Plan would mean for their bottom line. One such meeting was organized by the 
Practicing Engineers, Architects, and Urban Planners Association (PEATA) and entitled “Unlock 
Draft Development Plan DC Regulation.” A packed auditorium of hundreds of builders and 
developers turned up to see what the new DCR meant for their profit margins. The room’s aisled 
periphery was bulging, and at the threshold of the side entrance people thronged, trying to get in 
or just peak in. The agitated knot of people at the door—and this was the case at each of the 
doors in the auditorium—seemed to adapt to the scene as they would a crowded commuter train, 
perfectly happy to stand bunched together and listen to the proceedings inside, certain they 
would arrive at their destination en masse. A builder’s dream of progress is certainly a moving 
train. Though the Development Plan was already so builder friendly, the audience offered a 
chorus of hoots and hisses each time presenters read from the new DCR and interpreted what it 
might mean for their earnings, sometimes collectively raising or lowering their thumbs.148 Soon, 
however, other demonstrations of discontent from the city’s margins would drown out the 







                                                        




Countermunicipal Cartographies:  




On April 18, 2015, tens of thousands of people from across the city marched to Azad Maidan in 
the scorching heat to register their anger at the city’s Development Plan. The mass yatra 
(procession) of slum dwellers, fisherfolk, adivasis, hawkers and other workers gathered for 
morcha (protest) in the open field across from the municipal headquarters, where people listed 
core demands and issues in the draft Development Plan. The mass then proceeded to flood the 
offices of Municipal Corporation headquarters to submit individual suggestion/objection letters. 
Confronted by a never-ending queue of citizens outside the MCGM Head Office that reached 
Cama Hospital, the MCGM was forced to set up additional “dispatch” desks (five of which were 
set up outside the head office on the sidewalk). The campaign estimated that around fifty 
thousand suggestion objection letters to the draft Development Plan from different wards and 
different issues were submitted on this day alone.149 The outpouring of such public objection was 
a municipal record in itself. More than ever, Hamara Shehar was seemed poised to, in its own 
words, “stake a claim to our right to this city.”150  
Mired in the thickest controversy it ever faced during the Suggestions and Objections 
process, the MCGM appointed former bureaucrat Ramanath Jha as an Officer of Special 
Deputation (OSD) to oversee the revision of the city’s new Development Plan (DP) on May 14, 
2015. Jha was brought on specifically to help review the suggestions and objections and oversee 
                                                        
149 Field notes, April 14, 19 2015. 
150 “The campaign has been the collective effort of so many groups and individuals. We are all hoping tomorrows 
event will be one that will stake a claim to our right to this city.” (Field notes, April 17, 2015). 
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the revision process.151 After having sacked the two private consulting firms that played a critical 
role in drafting Mumbai’s error-ridden Development Plan, the MCGM decided to form a panel of 
experts to help revamp the project. Responding to the fact that there were, by official estimates, 
over thirty thousand objections and suggestions submitted to the MCGM, Jha poured vitriol on 
the idea that so many people would interject in the process. “People like Hamara Shehar got a 
bunch of slum dwellers and they have done a Xerox copy of suggestion and objection letters—I 
don’t believe it,” he reportedly commented during a meeting attended by some of Hamara 
Shehar’s core organizers. Members relayed the affront to others in the core group as they 
assessed the opportunity of working with the special officer appointed to “streamline” the 
process. “Jha speaks like a Brahmin, he shows his caste in such comments,” said one member.152  
Nonetheless, Hamara Shehar called for a meeting with Jha at the end of May in which 
organizers attempted to delineate “what the review process should entail” and “a demand for a 
monthly update on the process” during the four-month period for revision.153 Organizers held a 
campaign meeting to discuss how to prepare for what seemed to be a coming showdown over the 
next three months, during which negotiations with the city government were pitched more often 
on the contested grounds of the city’s informal settlements than in the officials’ air-conditioned 
municipal offices.154  
                                                        
151 Ramanath Jha To Oversee Revision Of New Development Plan, Mumbai Mirror, Thursday, May 14 2015.  
“Jha’s inputs will be of great value in revising within the four-month period that is given by the state government. 
Jha can take the help of any experts and urban planners to help in the Development Plan revision too,” the official 
added. Jha has a lot of experience and expertise in town planning and policy making,” said an official. Jha has been 
heading the All India Institute of Local Self Governance. An IAS officer, Jha served as the Metropolitan 
Commissioner in the MMRDA in 1998 and has also worked as the Municipal Commissioner in Pune in 1995. 
152 “Kardi jha ne Brahman wali baat. Dikha di apni jaat.” Fieldnotes, discussion in core group communications, 
May 21, 2015. 
153 Field notes, May 31, 2015. Op cit. field notes, April 22, 2015 
154 The agenda for that meeting on May 6, 2015 included: the need to reach out to more people (some means 
identified were media, meetings, etc.); to look out for new partners and friends, and yet to keep the existing network 
strong; and to focus on new developments like CZMP, Maharashtra housing policy, etc.; to meet the Municipal 
Commissioner and urgently convey demands from the four months of Development Plan revision; to strategize for 




On June 4, 2015, forest officers, forest and local police, MCGM officials, and bulldozers arrived 
at informal settlements in Malvani, in the northern suburb of Malad, and demolished an entire 
settlement of more than 650 households. Most of those displaced had been living in the 
settlement since before 1995, though they lacked the electricity bills or birth certifications that 
would allow for recognized status and right of settlement. After twenty years of residency, 
families were evicted in a single morning. Only a few were given the 24-hour notice mandated 
by the Maharashtra Slum Areas Act (1971). The Forest Department claimed these homes were 
encroaching on mangrove land under state ownership (though only some parts of the entire 
settlement were on mangrove land), and said the demolitions were necessary for the 
environmental protection of the mangroves. Not two days later, the Maharasthra government’s 
proposal to build a coastal road, which would destroy enormous mangrove lands elsewhere in the 
city, was approved by India’s central government.  
Hamara Shehar, and other urban activists seasoned in the housing movement as well as 
experienced in eviction defense, such as Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao (GBGB, Build Homes, 
Defend Homes), knew all too well that municipal and state departments often hid behind 
deceitful arguments, deliberately evaded responsibility, and made false promises. As Hamara 
Shehar member Hussain Indorewala expressed unequivocally, the “protection of the environment 
does not come in the way of large infrastructure projects like the coastal road, but seems to be a 
hurdle whenever housing rights of the poor are involved.”155 The forms of neocolonial violence 
of the Indian state here toward its own populations is a routine part of the juggernaut of savage 
                                                        
 
155 Quoted in Amitra Bhattacharya, “In Housing rights struggle, monsoons are just a blip,” The Stateman, June 11, 
2015. 
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developmentalism. The implementation of authoritarianism, the bureaucratic dimensions and the 
calculated callousness, along with the sudden and cyclical forms of violence, are also basic 
features of this form of development. Yet in the face of it, communities most vulnerable to the 
form of development that the state unfurls often remain entrapped, in their strategies and tactics, 
by a desperate and ultimately liberal notion that all that they can demand of the state is that it 
operates legally when all evidence and experience suggest the state is, in fact, designed to do 
otherwise. 
The juggernaut developmentalism of the state includes using existing regulations such as 
the protection of mangroves against slum dwellers fighting for tenure and regularization. Two 
other illegal evictions by the Forest Department displaced around seven hundred families after 
April 23 in Cheeta Camp and eight hundred in Bheemchhaya, Vikroli, Kannamwar Nagar in the 
first week of May 2016. In a statement by Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao on the demolitions, the 
group refers to the duplicitous use of legal statues meant to protect both the lives of those who 
have settled in forest areas and the ecological protections.156 These same regulations are not used 
to protect mangroves in other instances nor are they the basis of a larger directive to protect 
mangroves, for instance, on Carter Road, by implementing more capacious sanitation measures 
across the city. Moreover, they communicate to slum dwellers, and the city at large, that these 
regulations are not to be used for what they are intended, but rather for the maintenance of a 
powerful legal and extralegal system of land and resource acquisition that stretches across the 
city. Here, the state’s defense of “ecology” is a defense of its land sovereignty and the rule of 
property, whose operations routinely render peoples’ housing and livelihoods criminal. 
                                                        
156 “Ten years after passing the order [a Bombay High Court order regarding protection of mangroves in Mumbai 
and Navi Mumbai in the year 2005], the forest department suddenly started evicting slums near the mangrove areas 
in complete violation of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, which contains a full procedure of settlement of rights of the 
people living in forest areas.” (GBGB statement, April 19, 2016) 
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Elsewhere, in the case of the coastal road, private transportation seems to matter more than the 
ecological integrity of the mangroves. 
 Moreover, the Indian Forest Act has been used to attack those who seek their living in the 
forests of India, whether in major metropoles or in the countryside. While the significance of the 
spatial politics of zoning and planning is evident in categorically determining the uses of space 
(what “is” and what “is not” in order), the governance mechanisms of informality are often 
obscured behind the idea of “rule of law.” This unequal application of the law has profound 
consequences for how people mobilize land and other resources given their own informality (of 
tenure, services, etc) and how the state acts formally and informally (selectively misapplying its 
laws) to acquire land and resources. By appealing to regulations as stipulated, e.g. a full 
procedure of settlement of rights of the people living in forest areas, communities in resistance 
communicate a double articulation of the limitations of their politics; on the one hand, their 
struggle is within the state, defined by moral claims for inclusion and representation. These 
politics accept the state’s legal framework as a functional basis of justice despite all evidence to 
the contrary. On the other hand, their struggle is against the existing state, which recognizes the 
disjuncture between the state’s self-representation and its reality, challenging the state to uphold 
its own stipulated frameworks for governing by obeying the communities’ directives and actions 
that in fact rely on the liberal functions of the state.   
Yet this framework does not account fully for the nature of revenge and deceit in 
Mumbai’s development politics. Not incidentally, the residents of the Malvani settlements 
devastated by demolitions had been participating in an alternative Development Plan process 
facilitated by the Hamara Shehar campaign since December 2013. The campaign and area 
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residents held numerous community meetings to discuss existing amenities and services in the 















Figure 13: Slum demolitions in Malvani. Photo by author.  
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A campaign member and activist explained the model in Malvani, where a people’s 
development process was part of the larger Hamara Shehar campaign: 
For Malvani, we are proposing a ‘no-developer’ model—or a ‘cooperative self-build’ 
model, where residents come together and create a small co-op (at the most about 75 
families) and pool in their own money to raise a loan to finance their development. The 
guidelines for building heights will be low enough for homes to remain affordable, and 
setbacks will ensure adequate open areas and amenities—some of which they run 
themselves (like community halls, reading rooms, etc) or hand over the municipal 
government (to run clinics, preschools, etc). Unlike other developments, if a community 
does not want to develop, they are free to continue living in their present homes, or go for 
minor improvement and upgradation measures. All of the land in Malvani will be 
effectively an affordable housing zone—there is no question of inclusionary zoning, since 
there is no exclusion. (Interview, June 19, 2014) 
 
The result of these discussions was a document entitled the Malvani People’s Plan. The 
municipal government was well aware that people in Malvani were asserting their right to 
housing and proposing development of their areas. Their plans had been twice submitted to the 
MCGM for approval as part of a wider city plan. During ward consultations in September 2014, 
members of Hamara Shehar handed a printed and bound copy of the Malvani People’s Plan 
directly to the corporation’s town planner, Dinesh Naik. In January 2015, the report was again 
submitted to city officials by Hamara Shehar members, this time handed directly to municipal 
commissioner Sitaran Kunte. During the subsequent evictions, some of those same Hamara 
Shehar members were detained by the police, along with five women from the settlements who 
were trying to save their homes from demolition.157 As such, the demolished settlements sent a 
strong retaliatory message to informal communities across the city that they were neither to be 
accounted for as part of the city’s official Development Plan, nor would they be allowed to create 
their own alternative Development Plans.  
                                                        
157 “Five women from the area who attempted to save their homes were arrested by the police and an FIR has been 
lodged against them. This was the second demolition in the Malad suburb since last week” (Field notes, June 4, 
2015). 
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Juggernaut developmentalism is a war machine that traverses the terrain of community 
life, rendering it informal through the state’s dispossessions and its own illegal operations. That 
same week, on the eastern suburb of Mandala, landless families launched what they called Awas 
Haq Satyagraha (People’s Voice Rights Truth Force) and occupied 55 hectares of land (135 
acres) on the edge of the mangroves. Nearly 1,500 slum dwellers who had been evicted ten years 
earlier during the massive citywide demolitions of 2004–2005 (the wave of demolitions 
accompanied the inauguration of Mumbai’s Global City initiative) returned to the dusty and 
barren lands they long ago settled. Some sat in the exact location where their homes once stood 
ten years ago. Others began drawing chalk lines and planned to start building again. More than a 
decade had passed in waiting, after court rulings favored their resettlement, after officials assured 
the right to return of the three thousand families that lost their homes.  
Activists from Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao (GBGB, Build Homes, Defend Homes) 
including the prominent activist Medha Patkar, accompanied them. Their only demand was to be 
recognized and allowed to build their own (kuchcha) home and be provided basic amenities 
pending fuller incorporation into a housing plan. This cycle of informal land struggle suggests 
the role of collective memory and place-making among the poor, who for ten years after the state 
demolished their homes, have remained determined in their state of displacement and have 
mobilized various instances of community self-organization in the face of state indifference. 
Their memories trace many other cycles of land struggles in the city, but their cyclical nature 
also point to the limits of engaging with the state for the right to basic housing and amenities on 
the terrain of informal land tenure.   
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Figure 14: Slum dwellers demonstrate at municipal offices. Photo by author.  
 
The scholarly attention paid to land grabbing in the city in the contemporary period has 
highlighted the economic and political process of dispossession and the accumulation of land and 
other assets, yet has done little to understand the nature and the history of what kinds of relations 
are being dispossessed. Mumbai’s landscape is indeed changing rapidly through special forms of 
enclosure and thereby rapidly reorganizing the basis of resource dependency in the urban 
economy. These have largely worked through legal and extralegal channels, and can be 
described as a form of urban informality enacted through a form of exception. Yet the ways in 
which scholars have understood the neoliberal moment in Mumbai through the lens of 
“accumulation by dispossession” has partially obscured the political orientations and possibilities 
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of various social strata who lie at the threshold of the state’s laws and regulations and whose 
laboring practices do not fit in the “phantasmagoria of city-ness” ascribed to cosmopolitan cities 
like Mumbai (Robinson 2004: 570, quoted in Parthasarathy 2011: 55). For the city’s commoners 
this brings questions of organization and governance, rules of use and access (e.g. during 
hunting, gathering, and foraging), to discourses about urban life that are otherwise limited to 
public and private spatial concepts, while simultaneously opening to these questions larger 
modes of economic production and spatial production.158  
As Baviskar reminds us, “public” is a juridical category; and therefore also a terrain of 
struggle that, while often construed on the subjective terrain of the citizen and the individual, is 
ultimately about shared control of resources by communities. Most often, community land use 
and the commons in Mumbai imply a conversion of physical geographies (forests, mangroves, 
coastal zones, lakes, the sea), from private or government territories, into a manner of laboring 
and living that enables individual and, in certain cases, community access, contribution, and 




The recent municipalist campaign Hamara Shehar and the decade older housing rights group 
Ghar Banao Ghar Bachao, the two leading land-based social movements in the city, share a 
terrain of struggle on the uneven landscapes produced by juggernaut developmentalism. Yet they 
offer different lessons about the significance of building popular urban movements in the context 
of pervasive informality. GBGB’s strategies involved building popular power through direct 
                                                        
158 Awareness of the urban commons also “reflect ways in which middle-class and elite consumption, forms of urban 
governance, modes of capital accumulation, infrastructure growth, regional capital and population flows, and 
political conflicts and mobilisation facilitate or promote specific resource dependencies and their spatial outcomes 
for the city.” (Parthasarathy 2011: 60) 
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action, land-based actions of defense and reclamation while also exposing the informality of the 
“state-developer nexus” by exposing land scams through the use of RTIs. The direct actions that 
accompany the production of knowledge in its campaigns have delivered material gains to the 
displaced and evicted of Mumbai. However, the cycle of redevelopment that is central to 
juggernaut developmentalism has proved extremely difficult to break. As one of its veteran 
organizers Simpreet Singh commented, “after ten years of participating in Ghar Banao Ghar 
Bachao and trying to stop slum evictions, it feels like firefighting. You may put one out, but there 
is always another” (Simpreet Singh, interview June 9, 2013). Hamara Shehar offer the valuable 
lesson that there are myriad interconnections between experiences of informality, and building 
popular power to confront informality requires establishing the connections between housing and 
other aspects of informal life in the city, from infrastructural issues such as water, to 
transportation; and to connect to communities differently affected by a general production of 
informality, such as street vendors, fisherfolk, adivasis, gaothans, etc. Indeed, a municipalist 
framework that can facilitate the mobilization of a shared spatial consciousness of 
developmentalism proves essential to address the systemic nature of developmentalism.  
In Chatterjee’s (2004) formulation of the politics of the governed, slum dwellers mobilize 
with whatever tactics may enable them to secure land rights, amenities, etc. directly from the 
Controller or municipal official. In struggles against informality, according to Chatterjee’s 
analysis of the functioning of “political society,” demands are limited in their object and the 
outcomes specific to the community that is mobilizing. If they are granted entitlements and 
recognition, it will extend to the boundaries of how that community is recognized by the state 
and also the power that the state potentially has over these communities. But importantly, rights 
granted will not be the basis of a generalized realization of rights to housing or provisions. By 
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this logic, struggles against informality by “the governed” only strengthen the state’s 
governmental reach. In fact, in many cases, the expansion of specific communities’ recognition 
and inclusion are only achieved by “governmental” self-identification of title recognition, which 
recast community membership along cut-off dates or official documentation. Struggles within 
and against informality, for housing or whatever right that may be demanded, are thus confined 
within the state’s flexible capacity to govern. And concessions on this front are granted on an 
exceptional case-by-case basis, the reasons having only in some instances to do with a successful 
grassroots victory.159 It has been said time and again that the poor do not want free homes. In 
fact, they hardly ask for anything exceptional in society. Yet the myth of the undeserving and 
entitled poor is deep and damaging. What the evicted, the insecure, the brutalized and bulldozed 
of these recent campaigns in Mumbai actually wanted is for the state to play by the rules it 
claims to uphold. This is not a demand for exception but rather an abolition of exception. Even as 
Hamara Shehar could not mobilize its large city network directly to stop the cycle of evictions 
and demolitions, nor even prevent the state sanctioned dispossessions (for instance at the Port 
Trust lands, in Malvani, in Mandala) from interfering with its own base-building popular 
planning process, it did nonetheless assist the communities directly impacted in reframing the 
entire regulatory framework and demand that its protections and guarantees apply for all.160 The 
campaign’s approach to the Development Plan departs from this first realm of exception 
altogether by seeking, with the communities in Mandala and Malvani, to challenge the state to 
uphold laws and regulations, a demand that would fundamentally challenge the composition of 
the state. On its surface, the Hamara Shehar campaign’s concern with the Development Plan 
                                                        
159 Other reasons may include alignment of other interests by hired thugs (goondas) and big men who deliver based 
on rent- and vote-seeking logics. 
160 Drawn from field notes, June 10, 2015. 
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seemed predicated on a faith in the functional operations of the democratic state, despite 
evidence to the contrary. In this interpretation, the campaign seemingly upholds the functional 
state and its role in democratic development abstracted from the antagonisms of the past and the 
lines of conflict around developmentalism in the present. Yet, as I’ve shown, the operations of 
the municipal state are embedded in Mumbai’s history of juggernaut developmentalism, defined 
by arbitrary rule and selective governance on an uneven landscape that differentiates and 
underdevelops certain social groups. This, the process of redressing informality amongst 
marginalized communities necessitated simultaneously addressing the composition of the state’s 
own informality. 
The campaign also continued its grassroots work in various informal settlements across 
the city through an ongoing engagement of collective inquiry toward self-development, 
involving principles of autonomy and community self-representation and self-determination of 
their own urban futures, for instance, in the slum community of Mankhurd Transit Camp in M-
Ward. The ward has one of the lowest Human Development indices in the country. In January 
2016, there was a community screening in Hindi of Dear Mandela, a documentary about the 
South African shack dwellers movement. The public screening was meant to emphasize the 




Figure 15: Chart on slum population of Mumbai’s M-East Ward. Image source: scroll.in. 
 
State-space and state-time 
 
Much of the sustained community engagement in the Development Plan process eventually did 
win the campaign a place at the municipality’s table: the municipal commissioner asked Hamara 
Shehar to work with the city to design a workshop for appointed ward level planners and “give 
them a framework and concrete suggestions of how to include marginalized sections in the PLU 
they are preparing right now.” (Field notes, September 24, 2015). From March to May 2016, the 
MCGM began releasing parts of the revised DCRs, the legal specifications that guide the 
implementation of the Development Plan over the next two decades. UDRI referred to the 
“piecemeal publication” as an attempt to obscure the uncorrected errors and conceal the facts of 
its wholesale disavowal of the objections and suggestions process.161  
In all, the campaign organized a challenge to the state-space of the Development Plan, its 
zones of inclusion and exclusion, its forms of knowledges and its spatial representations. But it 
                                                        
161 One Hamara Shehar core member (saathi) referred to MCGM as “a special planning authority (SPA),” which 
verifies the extent to which the core group, certainly others in the campaign and more widely in the city, see the 
democratic municipal body dominated by private interests. At the same time, the members made biting reference to 
UDRI as a “special authority on planning,” a critique of the elitist approach they take to planning. (Field notes, April 
19, 2016).  
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was unable to fundamentally interrupt the state-imposed temporality, of both the endless 
deadlines and the schedule of meetings that delayed accountability and constantly deferred to 
community work the required operations of the planning authorities of the city government. The 
process was dominated by the state, which has repeatedly distracted the campaign and other 
citizen groups with errors and false promises of recognition and rectification. Moreover, the 
MCGM sought repeated extensions for its deadlines to publish the twenty-year Development 
Plan, delays which routinely suspended the animated campaign by interrupting growing citywide 
concern with a start-and-stop bureaucratic rhythm of consultations and schedules of information. 
Always fixed in the immediate present, the campaign had no choice but to engage in the state’s 
temporal restrictions. Hamara Shehar’s urgency of course had everything to do with the future in 
question. As it self-consciously framed in its earliest documents, “the kind of accountability that 
people have access to now won’t be available later. So these processes should be taken under the 
scrutiny of the people now.” (Field notes, June 1, 2015) 
The city government released its Revised Draft Development Plan (RDDP) on May 27, 
2016. Entangled in the fate of the document, Hamara Shehar Mumbai once again organized over 
sixty community meetings and seven thematic consultations across the city. These consultations 
at “citizen’s facilitation centers” aimed to both increase popular understandings as well as bring 
together experts to inform the impact of the Development Plan to develop well-informed 
suggestions to be submitted to the Development Plan. Each community meeting had 
explanations of area reservations/designations, and what the resultant DCR implications and 
ward provisions indicated for the city and its implications for slums, housing, open spaces, urban 
villages, informal livelihoods, hawkers, and social amenities. Glaring omissions as well as 
suggestions and objections to the RDDP were noted through this process.  These have 
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importantly brought out numerous cases of exclusion within the Revised Draft Development 
Plan and raised very serious concerns about the type of development that will unfold in Mumbai 
if many of the current Development Plan provisions are sanctioned by the state. 
 With just over twenty days left for the suggestion and objection period, Hamara Shehar 
invited all its members to a city level strategy meeting on July 11, 2016. This meeting 
summarized and generated suggestions and objections to the Development Plan, planned for the 
days ahead, and decided on key issues that would be taken forward in the campaign. The meeting 
also included a sharing of issues in the Revised Draft Development Plan and its implications on 
slums, housing, urban villages, informal livelihoods, hawkers, social amenities etc., by 
representatives from various communities that have been excluded from the planning process. 
The campaign decided to organize a public meeting at Azad Maidan on July 20, 2016—just ten 
days prior to the end of the suggestion and objection period. There was, once again, a mass 
submission of approximately 3,500 suggestions and objection letters by people from across 
Mumbai to the MCGM office prior to the public meeting. Around 750–1000 people gathered at 
the Azad Maidan to protest the exclusionary Development Plan prepared by the MCGM.  
 As many as fifty diverse groups, led by Hamara Shehar Mumbai, aimed at submitting 
close to one hundred thousand (one lakh) objections to the plan over the remaining eight days of 
the comment period. The groups stated unequivocally that the “regressive” Development Plan 
favored developers and submitted eight non-negotiable demands to the MCGM. The “non-
negotiable demands” put forth by the Hamara Shehar Mumbai reiterated the transformative 
urban democratic agenda it fostered from community meetings since the earliest days of its 
campaign: legal recognition and upgradation of slums, adivasipadas, koliwadas, and gaothans; 
livable housing for all; equitable amenity distribution; access to livelihoods and “economic 
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opportunity”; protection of No Development Zones; and participation and local area planning. In 
each of the demands, the campaign used the language of universalism to attempt to break the 
exceptionalism of municipal governance.  
A delegation met with MCGM officials. At the public meeting, Hamara Shehar Mumbai 
released a detailed response to the Revised Draft Development Plan 2016, a populist analysis of 
the city’s development documents in the form of the People’s Response to Revised Draft 
Development Plan (RDDP) 2014–2034. The document chronicles the campaign’s good-faith 
process of engagement with the Development Plan process as well as derides the problems and 
limits it identified with the governmental approach and analysis.162 The campaign noted that 
some of its demands were included in the government’s document, such as the addition of an 
entire chapter devoted to gendered implications of planning, provisions for homeless. But 
overall, the Revised Development Plan carried forward the errors and unpopular proposals, such 
as the Coastal Road and the unmarked koliwada and goathan areas that plagued the development 
plan process from its start. Moreover, some potentially useful and progressive elements found in 
the original draft were excluded, such as calling for smaller planning units and local area plans. 
The campaign also reiterated its own vision for “a close coordination between economy, equity 
and environment which in turn are important for planning of a city.” Predictably, the MCGM 
failed to comment.  
 
  
                                                        
162 They hosted a campaign meeting and workshop on May 30 with the agenda of taking stock of the progress of the 
DP; familiarizing themselves with the DCRs and critically assessing them; studying maps to figure if their demands 
have been incorporated; and discuss the city-wide development projects such as BPT, metro car shed, coastal road 





There was a lull in campaign activities—the first in nearly five years—for a few months before it 
met again formally on November 2, 2016 to decide the next ground and strategies of the 
campaign and to address the widespread disregard the MCGM had shown to the enormous 
outpouring of objections and suggestions throughout the preceding five-year period. The work of 
preparing and submitting the proposed plan should have been done in June 2011 and cost ₹ 5.48 
crore ($800,000 USD), according to the original scheduled timeline. The MCGM sought a thirty-
month extension to prepare the Development Plan guidelines just two months shy of the 
deadline, extending the timeline to December 2013. In December 2014, the state legislative 
assembly approved an amendment to the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 
(MR&TP Act), granting another two-year extension to prepare, submit, and sanction the 
Development Plan. Civic officials said the implementation of the final Development Plan would 
take more time, owing to a number of factors: the national level Lok Sabha, and soon thereafter 
the Maharashtran Legislative Assembly Vidhan Sabha elections in 2014 forced inactivity, but it 
most directly cited the consultation process in order to explain the delays. 
An ordinance was issued by the civic corporation in July 2016 to extend the deadline for 
the implementation of the Development Plan to November 26, 2016, which was postponed again 
over six weeks into the new year.163 This was the second extension sought by a committee 
consisting of three municipal officials and three state-appointed experts. Yet again, after 
postponing the formation of the committee for more than three months, hearings for twelve 
thousand citizen-objections were held between October 16 and December 17, 2016. The delayed 
                                                        
163 The new deadline was January 15, 2017. 
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Development Plan has come at a cost of ₹ 12.83 crore (1.8 million USD).164 The city argued the 
delays and the compounding costs had to do with procedural adjustments brought on by the 
citywide consultation process.165 The campaign, meanwhile, argued the MCGM was holding the 
“city at ransom” in these delays. Sitaram Shelar from Hamara Shehar Mumbai commented 
bitterly, “The MCGM has betrayed citizens. They keep delaying their work, but when citizens 
ask for an extension, they do not give us even one extra day.”  
Despite the deep knowledge and insight into the city’s current spatial status offered by 
Hamara Shehar through extensive popular engagement with the city corporation on errors and 
suggestions, the plan submitted to the Government of Maharashtra was riddled with errors. 
Nonetheless, the 2014–34 Development Plan along with the Development Control Regulations 
(DCR) were passed by the MCGM on the evening of July 31, 2017. It came after a five-year 
delay and marathon-session of debates running for ten hours in the Municipal Corporation 
Building.166 In a city historically captured by competing landed interests, the development 
“future” all came down to land use. A study of three distinct regions and laboring communities 
affected by the Development Plan illustrate this point. 
                                                        
164 “Civic officials said the cost of the Development Plan had escalated and the plan had been delayed because the 
consultants had asked for more time to prepare it in a comprehensive manner and because the Lok Sabha and state 
assembly elections took place last year [2014]. The firm also incorporated a few workshops at the ward and zone 
levels, with the local MP, MLA, corporator and public.” Sujit Mahamulkar. 2015. “In a first, Development Plan 
pitches for green city.” The Times of India. February 13, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/In-
a-first-development-plan-pitches-for-green-city/articleshow/46221723.cms 
165 “While this Development Plan aimed at being an all-inclusive one by having ward-level consultations. . . these 
were not planned in advance. Besides, why the need of a Development Plan as the authorities tweak several 
aspects. . . Development Plan1991 was revised 240 times,” said Milind Mhaske, project director, Praja Foundation. 
Richa Pintol. 2015. “Uncertainty over when new Development Plan will get clearance,” Times of India, February 23, 
2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Uncertainty-over-when-new-development-plan-will-get-
clearance/articleshow/46336630.cms  
166 There are to be three separate Development Plans in addition to the main one, indicating plans for three land 
parcels—39.3 hectares in the Oshiwara District Centre, 47.37 hectares of the A block in the Bandra-Kurla Complex 
(BKC) and 27.37 hectares between LBS Marg and Mithi river in Kurla. A similar process will unfold in which the 
plans will be published, there will be a suggestions and objections process for sixty days, and a planning committee 
will be constituted to hear objections. 
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The Salt Pans 
The Agari community of Maharashtra and Gujarat are largely salt workers who labor on half of 
the city’s 5,500 acres of salt pans mostly on the eastern side of the city, nine times the size of the 
defunct mill lands, and one of the largest surplus land parcels in Mumbai. 167 Although most of 
these lands are privately owned, much of this land has historically been “encroached” upon by 
salt working commoners and slum dwellers. The lands are in reality layered with multiple 
disputes over the land (the Government of India has assumed ownership of the lands, yet the 
state of Maharashtra and the BMC also claim it).168  
The contested 2014–2034 Development Plan effectively ignored the spatial and labor 
practices of salt-working communities in municipal guidelines that state the land should be 
reserved for “socially relevant activities.” Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis has 
approved a master plan for developing the central government-owned saltpan lands in Mumbai, 
which would prime for development some of the last open spaces in the city. Ostensibly the state 
policy would appropriate the land in order to house the poor. This plan would work in concert 
with the commercial development interests reflected at the municipality level in its twenty-year 
Development Plan as well as the Development Plans of the Mumbai Port Trust Land (the largest 
landowner in the city). Once approved, the central government would likely transfer land rights 
to the MCGM or other agencies, eventually also to private developers. Despite much of this land 
                                                        
167 Freny Manecksha. 2010 “Saltpan city,” http://infochangeindia.org/agenda/coastal-communities/saltpan-city.html. 
“The Konkan coast around present-day Mumbai was ideal for the manufacture of salt; indeed, salt works have been 
in existence here for as long as people can remember. Since 1850, however, the saltpans began to be acquired for 
various public purposes, and little by little, they ceased to be used to produce salt.” 
168 “Since 1960 the Central Salt Department in Jaipur has taken the view that salt work lands belong to the central 
government, and that the salt manufacturers only have right of use to the land to produce salt under the terms of the 
license…the state government has been claiming that though owned by the central government, the salt work lands 
were leased  out to the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. 
Subsequently, the BMC sub-leased the land to various people on a 99-year lease, to manufacture salt. Though the 
lease is over in most cases, the lessees have not given up possession of the land. . . [Private owners] claim that most 
of the land is private land not government land as claimed by the state. 
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previously being marked as either No Development Zone or Coastal Regulation Zone169 (CRZ, 
which restricts development within five hundred meters of the coast),170 the state government’s 
draft housing policy has proposed to “relax environment protection regulations governing coastal 
land use,” essentially removing salt pan lands from CRZ. In addition to housing, the 
government’s vision includes a network of roads through the salt lands, gardens, and 
playgrounds—laying the groundwork for whole new townships.171 The government’s “From 
Hutments to Tenements” policy envisions shifting slum dwellers through redevelopment 
schemes away from other parts of the city to make room for development and infrastructure 
projects in valuable areas. “The proposal to use saltpan lands first emerged in 2002 when the 
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) warned that it was running 
out of land and asked the state to release land belonging to various departments” (Manecksha 
2010).172 
Salt lands not communized are leased by the Union Ministry of Commerce to business 
communities involved in either construction or development for the real estate industry. “Owing 
to increased slum inhabition [sic] on these lands, alongside other arguments for best use of the 
land (ease demand for development, opportunity for infrastructure development),” both central 
and state governments have agreed to initiate land transfers and end salt panning in Mumbai 
(Ibid). The salt commons are refracted through emerging divisions within the traditional salt 
working communities. There are those who have established some fortune based on claims to the 
                                                        
169 Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZs) has been used as an important line of defense for the commons, but just as often 
have been used by the municipality to evict commoners from the coastal lands. 
170 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court instituted a series of injunctions protecting the shoreline and access to it for 
fishermen. These injunctions, along with the creation of Coastal Regulatory Zones in the 1990s and growing 
environmental concerns, have significantly decreased the number and scale of land reclamation projects pursued in 
Mumbai. The Supreme Court has added more restriction in 1990s with the Coastal Regulatory Zones. 
171 Current environmental regulations would prevent real estate growth on much of the saltpan lands. 
172  Freny Manecksha. “Saltpan City.” Infochange, News & Features, April 2010, http://infochangeindia.org/agenda-
issues/coastal-communities/8243-saltpan-city  
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land and who are eager for the land transfers to go through so that they may sell for handsome 
profit.  
But for the majority, the saltpans, mud flats, and mangroves are the ecological basis from 
which specific laboring communities form contiguous commons vital to their reproduction, but 
also to the reproduction of a city and region prone to floods, as evidenced by the July 26–27, 
2005 floods and the 2017 monsoon, which devastated many parts of Mumbai, claimed over one 
thousand lives, rendered many homeless, overwhelmed sewage lines and contaminated drinking 
water for the entire city, and caused widespread economic loss of about ₹ 550 crores ($100 
million). (Anjaria 2006b). This environmental disaster precipitated former Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s call for the expeditious transfer of saltpan lands to the state government. 
While state reappropriation of lands proceed, mangroves and saltpans are also routinely usurped 
by private owners, despite legal protections.173 Flouting legal decisions that certain salt lands and 
adjacent mangroves be notified as “protected forests,” in some cases part of the land leased out 
to salt pans in the eastern suburbs have already been converted for real estate development. The 
overwhelming and contradictory claims by state and private entities are one reason why it is 
rarely acknowledged, even by environmentalists or activists fighting land grabbing, how 
communizing the salt lands and mangroves might actually help protect the city and its fragile 
ecosystem in the future.  
Similar to the salt workers are those who labor in the sand and feed the construction 
industry. The riverbed commons have long been the site of extraction by the “sand mafia” in 
                                                        
173 In Oshiwara, the mangrove lands are owned by a single businessman who is granted permission to develop it as 
he wishes (more car parks and roads, most likely). 
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Mumbai that directly feeds the construction industry and the “land mafia.”174 Dredging these 
riverbeds was the historical work of certain “denotified” tribes such as Kaikadis, Katkaris, 
Pardhis (no longer considered “criminal” by virtue of their commoning traditions), who have 
been pushed out and have fallen back on foraging in the forests, manufacturing bamboo and leaf 
products, as well as basket weaving, and whose occupations remain under state and police 
scrutiny as to whether they are “conducive to settled way of life” although they are no longer 
listed under the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871.175 
 
Koliwadas, the Coastal Commons, and the Coastal Road 
 
The MCGM has indicated in its preparations of the Development Plan that the problems of 
mobility and choked traffic flows on the “inadequate road density and. . . several missing road 
links in the overall road network infrastructure. . .particularly so in the Western Suburbs.” The 
people’s campaign has identified the source of this policy wisdom in the municipality’s working 
relationship with the World Bank-initiated Comprehensive Transport Study (CTS), which 
“recommends expanding the existing road networks to accommodate increasing private vehicle 
demand (and hence creating additional demand).” To this end, the BMC intends to spend ₹150 
billion (US $2.3 billion) to construct a new 35-km long Coast Road on the western sea front 
connecting Kandivali to Nariman Point, as opposed to investment in rail transport systems. This 
                                                        
174 Badri Chatterjee. 2017. “Illegal sand miners in India make ₹1,611-cr profit every year: Australian film.” 
Hindustan Times. April 17, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/mumbai-news/illegal-sand-miners-in-india-make-
1-611-cr-profit-every-year-australian-film/story-o0wzzmQhL3ON42JlkeBM9H.html 
175 “The national commission and commissioners appointed by the Supreme Court in the Right to Food case have 
highlighted the intense hunger and malnutrition that large sections of these communities are being subjected to as a 
result of lack of access to small game and non-meat forest food like barks, roots, tubers, seeds, fruits, leaves, sap 
honey etc, as also fish in ponds and streams, as development takes its toll by snatching their traditional means of 
subsistence without compensating them. Many of these people were performers, artisans or craftsmen working the 
streets for a living, but anti-beggary laws have now hindered them from earning from these activities as well.” 
Neelabh Mishra “Little Caravanserai” The denotified tribes commission has restarted the quota debate.” Outlook. 
October 6, 2008, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/a-little-caravanserai/238563. 
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plan is a direct refutation of conventional transport planning as well as public wisdom: new roads 
do not alleviate traffic, but rather create more of it. The Coastal Road first appeared as a 
“proposed road” in the city’s Development Plan preparatory report’s maps. The Municipal 
Commissioner [claimed it] as one of his three major achievements, which he is “pushing for. . .in 
the larger interest of the city.176  
Hamara Shehar was one of the first groups to raise critical attention to the controversial 
road. Meetings were held by the fishermen associations to lodge their protest against the project, 
which would completely wipe out fishing activity and cut off the Koli community’s direct access 
to the sea. The coastal road project, they argued, would change the face of Mumbai, 
homogenizing the western coastline and destroying the diverse natural features such as beaches, 
mangroves, creeks and existing Koli villages. The project will involve large-scale reclamation 
and destruction of fragile ecosystems such as natural beaches, estuaries and mangroves. This 
process will have an impact on natural drainage patterns, flooding and erosion and apart from 
affecting the livelihoods of fishing communities dependent on coastal resources. The 
construction of a massive sea wall with a eight-lane highway across large stretches of the 
waterfront will cut off the city from the sea, destroying the beaches that act as important and rare 
open public spaces, replace sea breezes with car exhaust, and transform Mumbai from a 
waterfront city to a freeway city. Reclamation due to the coastal road will also cut off iconic 
landmarks and heritage buildings such as Bandra fort and Mahalaxmi temple from the sea and 
destroy the aesthetic beauty and diversity of the city’s waterfronts. Moreover, none of the real 
traffic problems and commuter needs of the city would be addressed. The campaign expressed 
                                                        
176 Response to the MCGM’s Preparatory Studies Report for the Development Plan 2014-34; Hamara Shehar, 
Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan, Abhiyan Mumbai. See also S Balakrishnan. 2013. “BMC Chief Aims for 
Corruption-Free Civic Body, World-Class Mumbai.” DNA, August 13. 
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surprise “that the environmental and social impacts of this controversial project which will 
completely transform the geography of the city and is faced with massive opposition from 
coastal communities and environmentalists alike have been completely ignored in the 
[municipality’s] situation analysis report.”177 
There is a long history of Koli communities, perhaps the group most affected by urban 
development in the city, resisting big projects and land encroachments such the coastal road in 
defense of their right to the coast and the livelihoods and housing it provides.178 Of the distinct 
thirty-six Koli settlements that endure in the city today, there are at least eight communities that 
will be affected by the coastal road.179 These communities are already affected by rapid 
urbanization that puts pressure on their land. These changes can be traced in the Worli-Bandra 
Sea Link bridge project in 2000. There was massive resistance to these by the Worli koliwada as 
well as others some fifteen years ago, but to no avail.180 Since that time, poor planning of waste 
infrastructures in the city has affected the mangrove ecosystem and fish catches have been 
steadily declining.  
                                                        
177 Response to the MCGM’s Preparatory Studies Report for the Development Plan 2014-34; Hamara Shehar, 
Hamara Vikas, Hamara Niyojan, Abhiyan Mumbai. The report states that the Coast Road “will require massive 
reclamation of land from the sea, shifting the present edge of the coast offshore by about 100 meters. This project 
will have massive impacts on the environment and existing social ecologies along the coast, and completely 
obliterate natural features such as rocky headlands, bays with sandy beaches, estuaries, coastal wetlands, marshes, 
mudflats, all of which offer a diversity of habitats forming a fragile coastal ecosystem. The Joint Technical 
Committee report for the coastal road explains that some of these diverse geomorphic features of the coast (it calls 
them “sharp kinks”) which will be replaced by smoothened curves courtesy [of] the freeway will do much to 
“improve the erosion protection” of the coast. It is surprising that the environmental and social impacts of this 
controversial project which will completely transform the geography of the city and is faced with massive 
opposition from coastal communities and environmentalists alike have been completely ignored in the situation 
analysis report.”  
178 In fact, the city’s initial Development Plan in 1964 first proposed a coastal road along the city’s edge with the 
Arabian Sea. It did not come to pass for fifty years, in part due to coastal community resistance.   
179 This include, from the southernmost tip of the city, the Cuffe Parade koliwada, Worli koliwada, Chimbai 
koliwada, Khar Danda koliwada and Juhu koliwada, Moragaon koliwada, Versova koliwada and Madh koliwada. 
180 An overview of the major issues in the struggle against the Bandra-Worli Sealink is provided in the judgment on 
a case filed by the Secretary of the National Fishworkers Forum, Rambhau Patil; see Rambhau Patil vs Maharashta 
State Road Development Mumbai. Corporation, WP 348.2000, 9 October 2000. 
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In the short term, when construction begins on the ramps and bridges, their livelihoods 
will be disrupted. Then the appropriation of the coastal commons will occur and these 
communities will lose their access to the sea. They will lose the area they use to dry fish, other 
coastal resources, habitats and fish breeding areas will be affected.181 In the medium term, beach 
erosion will occur as will loss of shore for ancillary activities such as bandars, or shore jetties 
where boats are anchored, and machis, or fish markets that exist near the entrances of the Koli 
communities. At the city level, flooding of low-lying areas will almost certainly also become a 
regular occurrence. The project will also require road widening through urban villages 
(goathans), affecting another community that has centuries-old ties to the land. Speculative 
development will then continue to encroach on the lands by the sea. The longer-term effects in 
terms of climate change and sustainability of the coastal communities are bleak as well. These 
fisher communities are Mumbai’s original commoners who to this day defend their right to the 
land, the neighborhoods they live in, their koliwadas, and the sea, lakes, rivers, ponds, rivulets 
and creeks from which they derive their livelihoods.  
 
A Parking Lot in Sanjay Gandhi National Park 
 
Sanjay Gandhi National Park is the largest urban park in the country and nearly one-sixth of the 
size of the city (forty square miles). It is a dense and diverse habitat of forest, three major lakes, 
and creeks (nallahs), home to an incredible biodiversity and numerous endangered species of 
plants and animals. It is also home to 1,795 Adivasi families in forty-three hamlets (padas) 
mainly along the edge of the Park (SGNP, 2011).182 Indigenous tribes as well as lower-caste 
                                                        
181 Men are typically engaged in occupations such as fishing, making and repairing nets, while women in the 
community handle the domestic labor as well as marketing, curing and processing of fishes.   
182 Edelblutte Émilie, Gunnell Yanni. 2014. “The tribal populations of Sanjay Gandhi National Park, Mumbai 
(India): A brief political ecology.” L’Espace géographique. (Volume 43), p. 1–17.   
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migrants hunt, gather, and forage food and fodder, fuel-wood, leaves, medicinal plants, flowers 
(for instance, for Dadar’s large flower markets (phool galli)), and produce—all important 
sources of food and incomes in the forests in an economy in which these groups often lack 
essential connections and opportunities to participate in the formal economy. Fuel-wood and 
fodder exist beyond subsistence economies, however, and also serve pavement dwellers and 
street vendors in poorer neighborhoods and slums throughout the city. Foraging for grass in the 
forests also supplies the tabelas (cow sheds) that in turn provide milk to many middle-class 
households and dugdhalayas (milk centers), sweet shops, as well as small and large eateries. 
They also supply Aarey Milk Colony, one of the oldest government-established dairies in India, 
which is located inside Sanjay Gandhi National Park and provides for much of the city’s milk 
and dairy consumption. As this semi-wilderness is either state or privately owned, Adivasi 
communities are deemed “illegal” and their laboring activities are accommodated through a 
system of bribes. Communizing private and public lands in this manner therefore entails systems 
of corruption and monetary exchange that feed into larger systems of surplus extraction and 
accumulation and remind us that no commons can exist apart from other value systems, and their 
attendant economies and political forces.  
The Development Plan proposed building a private parking lot near a new Metro station 
in the middle of the Aarey Milk Colony. This proposed enclosure was on top of the previous 
deregulation of the land’s NDZ notification, which meant that 150 of the 200 or so adivasipadas 
for whom Aarey is a site for plantations, agriculture, grazing, and other primary activities have 
been increasingly encircled by new luxury and leisure developments, such as golf courses, 
resorts, and condominiums (which often masquerade aesthetically but not functionally as 
beautified “green” and “open” spaces). These enclosures have been occurring despite the fact 
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that deforestation and shrinking these spaces are in clear violation of forest and environmental 
regulations. None of these adivasipadas were mapped in the existing land use maps prepared by 
the Municipal Corporation. At the same time, the campaign identified the trap of NDZ 
regulations in contexts where commoning communities may desire or require low-intensity 
construction and development for improved amenities, infrastructure, and services. The double 
bind of simultaneously defending and challenging regulations was a clear indication for the 
Hamara Shehar campaign that a different relation of power through community planning was 
needed.  
Transport-oriented Development in Aarey Colony means the forests and those who forage 
for fuel wood and fodder, will disappear in order to build a car-park near the new Metro station. 
Similarly, essential mangroves, previously protected from development by the Forest Act, and in 
fact administered federally by the Forest Department, are up for grabs. In most cases, bourgeois 
environmentalists have found these commons to be “polluting,” “unhygienic,” or “disorderly” 
and thus have wittingly or wittingly sided with development. 
In March 2015, activists, environmentalists, area residents, and Adivasis came together to 
protest the mass destruction of the National Park—referred to as the city’s green belt—through 
the construction of the Metro 3 parking lot at the Aarey milk colony.183 NGOs and resident 
associations formed Apna Mumbai Abhiyan and proposed taking the Mumbai Metropolitan 
                                                        
183 Here is a fragment of a concerned letter that one citizen sent which indicates the cross-class alliance that emerged 
in this moment: “I’m happy and grateful that some Bombay residents have come together to protest the setting up of 
the metro 3 shed at the Aarey milk colony. Perhaps this is the first time people have gathered in this area to protest 
the mass destruction of the green belt. These protests should have happened a decade ago. But those protesting 
today, including me, were in many ways inadvertently complicit in this destruction. Each one of us, who has come to 
live in Bombay, has bought property here or drives a car is adding to the pressure on housing and roads, which in 
turn is leading to the destruction of the empty spaces, marshlands, man groves and green belts. Of course, this 
pressure could have been dealt with in more responsible ways like it has been elsewhere with good city planning and 
drastic changes in modes of travel. In India, thanks to corruption and greed and indifference, we have chosen to 
ignore all standards and extend all boundaries. [ … ]” Nishtha Jain, “Bombay My City,” March 13, 2015  
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Region Development Authority (MMRDA) to court for its decision to build an elevated Metro 
line 2 between Dahisar and Mankhurd.  
According to those mobilized by the Save Aarey campaign, the arguments that Aarey 
needs development are both aesthetic and economic: the city government quite cynically says, 
“If we don’t develop, can you promise that Aarey is not going to become a slum?” The 
campaign’s response is: “then we can pose other questions: can you promise us that everyone 
will have a job, afford housing, etc. in this city? If so, then we can talk about Aarey.” (Fieldnotes 
March 19, 2015) 
 
Other Worlds-Making  
In illustrating the spatial needs and demands of various communities in the city, Hamara Shehar 
did more than simply highlight and lend support to local struggles against the juggernaut of 
developmentalism. In form, it implemented a different process and articulated an alternative 
notion of planning based on “bottom up” democratic participation. In order to image what an 
actual democratic plan would look like, it enrolled a number of marginalized communities in a 
politics of democratic participation. The campaign thus offered a prefigurative politics at the 
scale of one of the largest cities in the world.  
In content, it provided an alternative notion of the plan itself, one in which the complex 
spatial realities of the commons are recognized, included, valued, and therefore planned for. By 
centering the city’s distinct commoning traditions, Hamara Shehar opened up a new vision of 
what the plan could look like for a city in which there are many realities that can and must be 
recognized. They demonstrate, if only partially, a radical proposition that may very well shape 
the culture of planning in Mumbai and other cities as well: if we can get the commons right in 
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the plan, we can perhaps plan for a great many forms of life beyond the market, existing and 
possible. Thus, in the face of numerous challenges and limitations in its own organization, 
Hamara Shehar offers in its form and content a vision of the development of a world in which 
many worlds can fit.  
Certainly, the determinations of land use were part of another type of world-making. The 
capture of land has been a central facet of the juggernaut developmentalism that has shaped the 
city since its the historic colonial imperial origins, as it was part of the capitalist class equation 
that defeated the collective workers’ movement in the eighties, and remains a central part of the 
story of Mumbai’s triumphant rise as a financial center. As this juggernaut points unwaveringly 
to the “Shining India” to come, there are seemingly no contradictions that its territorial drive for 
accumulation cannot roll over. In its wake already is a conflicted history of the city turned from a 
seat of cosmopolitanism to communalism, and from a beacon of (industrial) modernity to layered 
permanent condition of its city’s informal poor. Yet, when the populist campaign that sought to 
transform the development plan process decided the technical rules governing land use were to 
be its site of struggle, it had no choice but to reclaim the city in its totality. Its radical ambitions 
in that sense sprung from the reality offered by the ground’s view. By the very nature of their 
proposition to utterly change a deeply layered historic city of difference and dominance, 
participants across Hamara Shehar realized that to demand a fair share of the city would require a 
demand for everything. As romantic as it may appear, it is based in the cold facts of how land is 
integral to a world of contentious dramas past, present, and future.  
Previous development plans were consistently marked by a disregard for lived reality of 
the city; a parochial vision about what the future of the city should be and who it would benefit; 
bureaucratic delays; lack of participatory processes; corruption; and in some ways most 
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demobilizing and depoliticizing, an overwhelming failure to actually implement the vast 
majority—nearly 90 percent—of the plan itself. What is crucial to the development of Mumbai 
then, is not only what did get implemented and what did not, but how much the course of 
development proceeded along entirely other pathways.  
This realization punctures the politics of participation in these plans. There seems to be 
an enormous futility to development as a politics. If developmentalism is inherently 
depoliticizing, perhaps one of the most direct ways it is so is in the failure to enact plans. One of 
the significant things to consider, then, about Hamara Shehar Mumbai’s campaign to intervene in 
the Development Plan 2014–2034 is how and why it sought to repoliticize the development. The 
campaign not only sought to change the actual document of the Development Plan, but also the 
entire planning process and culture, from the first mappings of the city, to the commitment the 
city would make it to actually implement the plan itself. In this way, the campaign did two 
significant things: first, it articulated and prefigured an alternative planning process when 
otherwise faced with the nature of developmentalism; and secondly, it re-envisioned the urban 
political project of the development Plans as a shared charter, a promise made about the 
collective rights to the city, to be collectively enacted.  
 
Countermunicipal Cartographies: Collective Imagination and Reason 
The urban world in which we live and through which we maneuver is always in some ways 
constituted through imagination. It is at least partially a re-creation, a robustly imagined one, of 
the inner world we inhabit and of the shared worlds we regenerate with others: how we pursue 
life, always in ways “thrown” together, engender an emotional city that we draw upon, and that 
continues to anchor, soothe, agitate, challenge, threaten, arouse, satisfy, and torment ourselves 
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and others. In creating a platform for collective spatial agency, Hamara Shehar fashioned in 
Mumbai a possible institution of imagination. Its terrain is both the virtual and physical 
world. Previously public spaces, public institutions such as municipal governments, and 
the publicly available institutions of collective urban life and wellbeing (schools, ports, railways, 
infrastructure, water and energy grids) are the domains through which the city is administered, 
produced, and realized. In cities such as Mumbai, pervasive urban informality and the devolution 
of public-oriented state and city planning preclude this possibility. Given this scenario, what 
institutions actually make the city a space for its inhabitants? 184 New institutions such as Hamara 
Shehar Mumbai are provisional answers to this question. And yet, Hamara Shehar is by no 
means a singular institution in the traditional sense of the term; rather it self-consciously refers to 
itself as people’s campaign whose objective is to contest and reclaim the urban planning process. 
But its scope, vision, and heterogeneous participants offer a glimpse into how an organized 
collective spatial politics can begin to reclaim the city.       
The grassroots response to the Development Plan presumed that popular and direct 
experiences of the city would translate into shared knowledge that can manifest and technically 
shape the city according to a plural vision of what the city is and what it is to become.185 What is 
                                                        
184 In The New Urban Question, Andy Merrifield asks: “How might the common urban affinities that cement people 
together actually develop today? Where might these general affinities, and this general will, emerge? How can 
particular wills be made aware of themselves as something more general, as a larger collective constituency that’s 
something greater than the individual parts? What are the institutions through which affinity might develop?” (2014: 
81–82). 
185 The process of constituting collective reason, according to Spinoza, begins with common notions: “Common 
notions, as assemblages, are a practical pivot, building blocks that arise on the terrain of the imagination to 
constitute reason. The production of common notions shows that there is a “curious harmony” between the 
imagination and reason. However, there remains a real difference between them. No matter how strong or intense 
the imagination may be, we continue to regard it in a possible or contingent way. The specific property of reason is 
to consider things as necessary. Common notions transform the fluctuation and contingency of imagination into the 
permanence and consistency of reason. Necessity, presence and frequency are the three characteristics of common 
notions. Reason is the imagination that returns, the refrain. It is an intensified imagination that has gained the power 
to sustain its imagining by means of the construction of common notions. Common notions are ontological 
mechanisms that forge being out of becoming, necessity out of chance. From the beginning, common notions and its 
process of assemblage are part of an ethical project (becoming active, becoming adequate, becoming joyful), but 
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essential in the transformation of imagination to constituted reason, is the process of activating 
local knowledges and arriving at the recognition of their activity, their sufficiency, and increased 
capacity to affect change.186 Therefore the first challenge in constructing popular interventions in 
the Development Plan process was the articulation of one’s social worth and mattering as a 
standpoint for participation. The entire process depends on the ethical construction of 
participation, a process of becoming active, becoming adequate, and becoming increasingly 
capable of affecting change. How “participation” is constructed is an ethical project that either 
increases ones ability to act or diminishes it. The contentions around the Development Plan have 
been waged on two axes, one questioning the “what” of development and one questioning the 
“who” and “how.” It has been a question of material outcomes to the built and lived environment 
of the city, but also about the political question of participation, how questions of development 
will be posed and resolved. 
 In the span of five years, the people’s campaign created unprecedented momentum for 
diverse peoples to critically participate in the shaping of the city through its development 
planning. This participation included community consultations, ground “truthing,” marking 
“errors” in the existing and proposed land use maps and “mapping” the lack of representation on 
the plan alongside “professional mapping.” In the wake of a depoliticized and parochial 
municipal government, the result that emerged was a counter-municipal platform of resistance to 
Mumbai’s planning enclosure. It brought diverse experiences of the city together and in the 
process contributed to a countercartography of the city based on share knowledges, values, 
                                                        
how can we recognize this process in properly political terms?” (Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship 
in Philosophy, 1993 (102–103, 107)) 
186 This is what Spinoza refers to as joy. People’s daily experiences, for example in a bazaar, are more than enough. 
They are important bases of understanding complex urban problems and offer vast reservoirs of tactical knowledge 
of how to influence, maneuver, and mediate complex relationships toward acceptable outcomes for all—in short, 
how bodies affect other bodies. 
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desires, and demands. These include the everyday experiences of fisherfolks (kolis), street 
hawkers, day laborers (naka workers), independent trade unionists, slum dwellers, informal petty 
producers, Indigenous tribals (adivasis), women, rag pickers, migrants, students, women, and 
environmentalists. Katz (2001) describes the creation of a critical topographic knowledge as a 
distinct research method that aims to understand the histories and layered spatial relations 
embodied in both the “natural” and social features of a landscape. In her words, “doing a 
topography brings [these relations] into sharp relief to expose their tensions, contradictions, and 
affiliations . . . and provides the ground—literally and figuratively—for developing a critique of 
the social relations sedimented into space and for scrutinizing the material social practices at all 
geographic scales through which place is produced.” (2001: 1228–1229) 
Moreover, the process of building this counter-municipal cartography allowed for 
disparate spatial experiences to “jump scales” (Smith 1992) in order to create a grounded 
translocal municipalist politics. These various knowledges, values, and desires have never been 
recognized as adequate aspects of planning. The city has never been officially “planned” with 
them in mind, yet its “unofficial” development is predicated on them.  
The campaign became the lived experience of over a hundred community groups and 
other grassroots organizations, activists, researchers and experts, who together formed a vision 
for the city made by and with some of its poorest communities, in which all their lives could find 
a common future that is ecological, Indigenous, as well as diverse in its economies and cultures. 
Maringnati (2011) argues for new ways of sharing information and experiences in the city, what 
he calls a commoning of knowledge: “it is precisely through generation of knowledge that new 
communities must be constituted and the communities so constituted must generate information 
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that is oriented towards a new ethic of commons.”187 Hamara Shehar simultaneously retained a 
state-centric strategy to use these encounters to shape a larger collective analysis of development 
issues in the city and to concretely create documents of suggestions and policy proposals to the 
Municipal Government. The campaign’s mobilizations changed state-society relations as they 
sought to accomplish structural changes in how cities are governed and resources allocated. The 
campaign’s contradictory avenues of engagement in “state spaces” in urban society suggest the 
parallels between reform and collective self-representation. 
 
Class, Mediation, and the Popular  
Hamara Shehar’s analysis offered a view of the city differently-composed of laboring groups and 
communities who had been denied several rights to the city. The people’s campaign centers on 
the contradictions of popular engagement in the planning of Mumbai as they were rendered 
clearly in the stakes of the drafting and implementation of the city’s twenty-year Development 
Plan. Hamara Shehar helps us see how planning, even in pervasively underdeveloped megacities 
such as Mumbai, is about the possibilities of shared life and the promises that can be made about 
the future. Its role in facilitating a collective spatial consciousness is one of the most important 
features of its interventions in the Development Plan process. 
 Yet the campaign’s invocation of the popular, and its address to the common people as a 
basis for a shared political and spatial project, has certain drawbacks. While its analysis of the 
developmental histories the city arise from the point of view of the popular classes, the tensions 
between populism and the specific histories of working class struggle in the city raise difficult 
                                                        
187 Maringnati states, “In cities like those of India, an engagement between the right to the city and the right of 
commons – the right to oppose enclosure of shared resources in cities can open up several new possibilities for 
creating better cities” (2011:68). The first step towards overcoming the challenges would be the production of new 
critical knowledges based on principles of collaboration – in short a commoning of knowledge itself 
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questions. The power of populism is its sublimating qualities, yet the combinatory effects of 
composing “the people” also raise the danger of degeneration and corruption as well. Politically-
mobilized desires can lose focus, be reoriented or captured by charismatic leaders, or be 
blackmailed and recuperated by the ideologies and flexible accumulation strategies of the 
political classes that have in large part already appropriated central urban planning and 
development agencies.  
In its rhetoric and in its actions, the campaign sought to mobilize a populist will that often 
seemed to blur the necessary distinctions and antagonisms in the class-nature of the relations of 
governance. In this sense, the campaign’s strategic demand to “participate” and to address both 
“the people” and the formally democratic institutions of urban planning and governance relied on 
an idealized notion of the state as an institution of public interest. Much of Mumbai’s 
development history should suggest that the institutions of urban planning have made important 
decisions based on powerful class-interests. Moreover, this agenda has only been interrupted by 
episodic outbursts of ‘general popular urban anger’ and in extraordinary moments when the 
collective character of the city is articulated through the combined structural power of various 
segments of the working class. These histories tell us that developmentalism was most 
effectively resisted when the division between ‘popular politics and ‘working class struggle’ 
were not significant.  
In the contemporary case, however differentiated the popular classes were understood to 
be, the campaign’s analysis did not adequately assess their nature in terms of a dynamic class 
composition of the city. These are the fields of class relations and antagonisms within which the 
campaign must necessarily base its analysis and its mobilizations. Yet the relations of production 
of space and informality embedded in the class rule of juggernaut developmentalism directly 
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destroys the potential of shared affinities of development. The basis of its unprecedented city-
wide mobilizations was rooted in a diverse and shared popular urban consciousness. Yet the 
class character of movement in its “democratic aspirations” and “inclusion” in planning futures 
limited the generalization of community and popular mobilization. Thus, while the aim to 
intervene in the development plan would require mobilizing a material force capable of swaying 
political influence away from existing urban accumulation strategies, its invocations of the 
“people” were largely symbolic. This in part can be explained by the composition of the core 
group of a campaign of middle-class activists, urban planners, and researchers, whose aspirations 
for democratic institutions were not directly tied to working class experiences of these 
institutions.  As such, the rights to the city they mobilized were the products of extraordinary 
community initiatives with (not simply on behalf of) the urban poor. Yet they mobilized as 
citizens, as “people” and not as collective producers of a social process of spatial production. 
The nature of democratic populism arising from the perspective of citizens in the city is 
materially different than the egalitarian politics that might arise from the social sphere of 
production, whether informal or otherwise, which struggle against capitalist restructuring in 
urban space.  
As a diverse city-wide platform, the Hamara Shehar campaign had enormous potential to 
serve as a transmission belt of the material power, discontent, and real aspirations of various 
workers in their capacity to wage struggles against their restructuring independent of the 
representatives and the political classes (parties, bureaus, NGOs) that would seek to contain 
them. Yet, the core group of the campaign did not express a strong analysis of the state. 
Specifically lacking was its understanding of the state form of mediation, that is, how the state 
manages class conflicts and antagonism in the urban field. As such, it was not always able to see 
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how “popular” and “democratic” participation in the Development Plan might in fact mask the 
recomposition of a sovereign political class and representatives of capital around what are 
otherwise anti-democratic, generally unpopular, and exclusionary urban policies. The emergence 
of a planning populism stemmed generally from a wave of anti-corruption sentiments that 
specifically challenged the informality of the state and the lack of transparency of its legal 
institutions. Nevertheless, in the emphasis on the deficient workings of the state, the people’s 
process of participating in the Development Plan nonetheless reified the state and normalized its 
development politics even as it criticized it. The ensuing loss of antagonism in the very 
understanding of the state and capital in part explains why the campaign did not sponsor a more 
militant approach among its constituencies nor enjoy the confidence of seeing its analysis, 
proposals, and initiatives carried by a wave of urban uprisings.  
 
Conclusion 
Hamara Shehar’s strategic potential lies in its ability to create a general process that can unite 
working class and popular politics, its ability to form a citywide alliance that can continue to 
build a people’s vision of the city, can incubate many different projects and articulate many 
alternative plans. The campaign has suggested that there are many residents who desire a new 
social and political cartography of the city and its planning rules, in other words to change the 
scale and the projection of the map. It is question of organization to mobilize these desires. The 
way it is done in the five-year cycle of Hamara Shehar was a gradual collective building up of a 
shared and imagined cartography that simultaneously built a network of urban relations. The 
campaign has been a process. It was largely limited in its entanglements with the state forms of 
mediation and its spatiotemporal coordination of participation and bureaucratic procedure. At 
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times, this engagement left the campaign little time to continue fostering the shared imaginations 
it encountered in the diverse communities it helped mobilize. In these communities, and across 
the city, there are still many urban worlds lived and imagined. The political potential of these 
everyday forms of imagination are unknowable outside of organization. Can the campaign 
continue to construct a platform to share them?  
 While urban space, and specifically how it is conceived by state planning, has been the 
contested terrain of the citywide mobilizations, the campaign has also been an urban movement 
centered around time. Harvey (1996: 51–52) conceptualizes the city as a “production of specific 
and quite heterogeneous spatiotemporal forms embedded within different kinds of social 
action… [an] urbanisation constitutive of and by social processes.” Hamara Shehar has 
attempted to challenge the state temporality of deadlines, extensions, and delays as well as state 
and market visions of the future of the city. The political compositions of the campaign 
manifested over five years as a series of temporary and nonlinear convergences of people and 
their urban experiences. In each encounter, the citywide alliance constituted itself. What kinds of 
political cultures and vocabularies these mobilizations give expression to, and how we might 
understand their beginnings, effects, and unlikely durations will be part of the city’s historical 
archive. New beginnings, brief conclusions, unexpected openings, and defeating closures are part 
of the collective history of this unprecedented attempt at asserting the popular right to shape the 
urban environment—all essential moments of political imagination and, it is to be hoped, the 





Rethinking Subaltern Urban Theory:  
Spatial Justice and Political Possibility  
 
 
“The task, as it now stands, cannot, I think, be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods 
mobilized in Subaltern Studies and certainly cannot be carried out by the original participants in that project. What is 
needed is not an extension or reformulation of Subaltern Studies; what is needed are new projects. Even if the 
specific project called Subaltern Studies begun thirty years ago has run its course, it has managed to scatter, reinvent 
and insert itself in several subsequent projects. The questions it asked have now taken other forms; to answer them, 
it is necessary to craft new theoretical concepts. Subaltern Studies was a product of its time; another time calls for 
other projects.” —Partha Chatterjee, “After Subaltern Studies,” (2012: 49) 
 
 
Subaltern Urbanism: An unruly formation of ideas 
 
This chapter critically situates the ethnographic context of Mumbai’s recent urban social 
mobilization in the existing literature on the politics of cities of the Global South, with particular 
attention to subaltern urban theory. It explores the encounter between Subaltern Studies and 
urban social theory to better assess how the Subaltern intellectual tradition can help us 
understand the transformative potential of urban mobilizations around land, housing, livelihood 
and planning in Mumbai and other Indian cities. In doing so, the chapter also considers the status 
of post-coloniality and postcolonial urban studies in the contemporary urban world and asks: can 
this body of urban theory, so animated by the assumptions of the Subaltern Studies project, help 
us understand the transformations underway in such cities? Asking whether subaltern urbanism 
can provide a bottom-up theory of urbanism is a likely starting point given that these ideas 
greatly influence current habits of urban thought on South Asian cities.  
By assessing what subaltern urbanism offers to the study of Southern cities and what 
critical work it is able to do to render legible the forces shaping urban society in much of the 
postcolonial world, the chapter shows how the ethnographic materials and analyses of Southern 
urban social movements presented in this dissertation draw upon but also critically point beyond 
subaltern urban theory. I make the argument that recent experiences of municipalist movements 
240 
and urban politics in Mumbai contribute theoretically to understandings of grassroots and 
popular politics in global South cities shaped through histories of colonial and capitalist 
development, as well as interpretations of a planetary world of cities shaped by global populist 
upsurges and polarizations. In assessing subaltern urbanism through the lens of the ethnographic 
research presented in this dissertation, I find that despite its many contributions to urban thought, 
subaltern urbanism lacks a critical approach to understanding antagonisms and conflict of 
postcolonial capitalist development as central to the complex terrain of subaltern social 
experiences.  
 Given the efforts of Subaltern Studies since the early 1980s to highlight the significance 
of popular politics and mobilization from below in postcolonial India, my aim is to assess the 
status of “subaltern urbanism” in enabling a theoretically and politically responsive theory to 
today’s urban question. Subaltern urbanism may be understood as one offshoot amongst many of 
the Subaltern Studies Collective that has “managed to scatter, reinvent and insert itself in several 
subsequent projects”—a loose formation of ideas that attempts to theorize postcolonial cities and 
its subaltern spaces and classes. An emphasis on popular politics, everyday “insurgence,” and 
forms of informal life, as I discuss below, have been its hallmark features.  
Even though subaltern urbanism is not itself a single coherent urban theory, its 
conceptual background and its major theoretical propositions are nevertheless worth 
exploring.188 In order to underline its concern with spatial politics and spatial justice, we must 
first give shape to the loose formation of ideas that animate the subaltern urbanist literature. 
                                                        
188 “The proliferation of scholars using adjectives such as insurgent and occupancy urbanism seek to open up new 
windows onto those ways of inhabiting the city that run counter to or disrupt global urbanism. [But] like global 
urbanism, subaltern urbanism is not a coherent theory” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013:5). As Chibber 
acerbically notes, just as the Subaltern Studies Collective eschews “clearly constructed propositions” and displays a 
“reluctance to strive for coherence” (2013: 3), so too is it difficult to locate in subaltern urbanist literature major 
theoretical propositions in clearly worked out principles or a coherent system. 
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These are examined in three parts by (I) assessing subaltern urbanism as a geohistorical critique 
of urban theory, (II) tracing its proposed methodological approaches, and relatedly (III) 
evaluating its main political formulations. Doing so will reveal the spatial thought undergirding 
subaltern urbanism, and particularly the limitations for understanding the diverse class projects 
and politics embedded in histories of colonial and postcolonial development and the related 
heterogeneity of popular mobilizations around present day planning and governance. Limitations 
emerge in subaltern urbanism’s concern with metaphorical centers and margins, its spatial bias 
toward methodological localism in conjunction with the abstract space of “worlding,” and its 
critique of modernity through planning and other instruments of state-spatiality.  
 
I. Geohistorical Critique 
Following established critiques of coloniality, subaltern urbanism stresses attention to variation 
in historical-epistemic conditions in the constitution of urban worlds and the necessity to 
overcome dependency on Northern models in urban theory. Identifying the disjuncture between 
the conception of Northern and Southern cities as the main locus of its geohistorical critique, 
subaltern urbanism can be understood as a transposition of postcolonial theories brought to bear 
on urban questions. Subsequently, an examination of the theories of urbanism, urbanization, and 
urban development it offers as challenges to western urban theory would reveal the foundations 
of a consistent and significant intervention in the field of urban studies. 
Subaltern urbanism emerges in part as a response to a larger intellectual project of 
Southern or nonwestern urban theory that seeks to invent new ways of imagining the twenty-first 
century metropolis and rethinking the geography of urban thought given the challenges and 
specificities of the contemporary moment. This project emerges as the urbanisation process has 
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become increasingly “consolidated, intensified and accelerated” (Brenner and Keil 2006:5) under 
conditions of globalization and financialization; or in Marcuse’s (2000) terms, when the “new 
urban spatial order” has become the “new world capitalist order.”  
Globalization has had profound implications for the structure and nature of urban society 
in India, from the integration of Indian financial, labor, and capital markets into new global and 
regional scales; the reorganization and disciplining of India’s labor force along new patterns of 
rural-urban migration and within a new international division of labor; the circulation of new 
aesthetic, image, and cultural flows tied to particular commodity logics; the rise of supraglobal 
regulatory regimes imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank through 
structural adjustment; the violent stirrings of ethnic and national chauvinism both articulated and 
disarticulated from the state; the increased pressure of transnational competition amongst cities; 
and the restructuring of state governments along urban land interests of local and transnational 
capital. 
Decolonization and post-Independence was undoubtedly a profound era of change in 
Indian society, sparking the need for something called Southern theory to address problems 
around colonialism itself. These have largely orchestrated around the following themes: the 
continuities between the colonial and postcolonial state; and post-independence forms of 
subordination and marginality on a world scale; the experience of loss and the unmaking of 
institutions and social orders; discontinuous time and the ruptures of the post-colonial social 
order in terms of nationalist ambition and ideals of progress; the significance of land in social 
structure; and the possibilities of an alternative universalism, or multiple universalities. 
The major questions of global urban studies emerged in response to these trends as 
observed in numerous cities around the world. Subaltern urbanism interrogates critically the 
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“location” of these forces as arising from the “west” but its tendency has been to look at the 
heterogeneity of urban practices, identities, and processes as a way to reimagine the city 
differently.189 Thus the project seeks to “go beyond the west” (Edensor and Jayne 2012).  
Nonwestern urban theory argues that the very imaginaries of “east” and “west” are 
profound structuring forces of historical difference. As stated, subaltern urbanism’s primary 
concern is with representation: how certain urban formations are represented as “megacities” and 
how its “subaltern classes” and “subaltern spaces” are represented. One of the founding premises 
of “difference” that this approach takes is in locating the globalizing force of colonialism as 
having significantly shaped nonwestern cities “differently” in the post-colonial period. The 
implication is that “because the historical trajectories of capitalist development and nationalism 
in South Asia departed so fundamentally from those of the West, the theoretical categories 
derived from the Western experience can only mischaracterize them” (Levien 2013: 486). As 
Simone states, “if colonialism is to be retained as a useful concept in understanding African 
urban history, it requires appreciating the different influences that were brought to bear on 
particular urban spaces” (2004: 19). Southern cities have unique encounters with and experiences 
of colonialism, and postcolonial urban theory calls for an appreciation of these differences over 
shared models for understanding how their legacies have in some ways cohered and propagated 
global processes of urban restructuring. 
Critiques of these discursive distinctions, even knowledge formations such as critical 
urban theory, are vitally important, but in themselves do not nearly exhaust our need to 
understand the diversity of patterns of urbanization that both distinguish and coarticulate the 
                                                        
189 If globalization theory has in some ways yielded global urbanism, Subaltern and postcolonial theory has helped 
shaped subaltern urbanism as a way to deal with the inadequacies of the former. But, as I go on to discuss, its spatial 
thinking fails to offer new understanding of capital as a problem of spatiality and scale. 
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west and nonwest. As I show in the case of Mumbai, “difference” importantly emerges through 
site-specific pathways of economic development, the contingencies of planning as responses to 
specific political agendas, as well as the timing, practices, and modes of incorporation into the 
world economy. The development legacy of Mumbai is undeniably marked through its own 
cultural and political specificities as well as specific historical relationships to imperial 
dominance, colonial extraction, postcolonial economic dependency, and social polarization 
imposed by the financial centers of global capitalism on the peripheries. But at the same time, 
theorizing the contemporary urban condition and possible futures urgently requires an 
articulation of the planetary connections between the development futures of Mumbai and other 
cities in the world.190  
Certainly, urban theory can learn immensely from Southern cities, but the one-way theory 
of the Global South (in which “Euro-America is evolving toward Africa,” Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2012) is misleading. In some cases, core cities are increasingly following a pattern of 
development that can be traced to colonial origins in Southern cities, but their articulation in the 
present, in terms of growing unemployment, carceral and security logics, states of exception, 
declining infrastructure, deteriorating environments, collapsing social deals, institutional 
weakness and instability, are altogether contemporary, connected, and commensurate challenges 
for radical urban theory—in both its “western” and “nonwestern” approaches. 
 
Subaltern Urbanism’s Spatial Critique of Modernity  
Subalternists are critical of the presumption that “capitalism, liberalism and the other hallmarks 
of modernity are dominant. . . [and that the] institutions that are dominant in official documents 
                                                        
190 Moreover, singular attachments to colonial pasts as the markers of difference entrenches an insufficient, in some 
cases implicitly conservative, view of the present. 
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and in elite economic, political and social circles [are by extension] prevalent throughout 
society” (van Dijk 2014:20, 21). In this regard, it aims to “fundamentally pluralize the history of 
power in global modernity” (Chakrabarty 2000:14). So too does subaltern urbanism challenge 
the presumption that the postcolonial city can be explained by development and modernity. A 
rejection of ‘eurocentric’ models for urban development is tempered however by the need to 
grapple with the difficulty of not having a vernacular vision of the modern city; that is until the 
global city discourse of the 1990s rendered postcolonial cities globally connected.  
Nevertheless, subaltern urbanism emphasizes the seemingly un-integrated and 
ungoverned relationships and life practices that constantly leave their imprint on the lives of the 
elite and on their institutions of government. Instead of poor and subaltern uses of the city being 
taken as anachronistic to urban futures (defined increasingly by middle class and elite aesthetics 
and ways of inhabiting the city), they are valorized in subaltern urban theory, taken to be 
contemporary and significant elements of urban modernity as lived experience of the 
contemporary city.191 Subaltern urbanism, like its Subaltern Studies predecessors, therefore also 
marks an engagement with the historical archive in which subaltern figures are the primary 
agents, read “against the grain” in an attempt to assemble a subaltern perspective.  
Moreover, in its critiques of the instruments of modernity, subaltern urbanism assumes 
development and planning is “an elite-organized ideology of refashioning society” (Patel 2010: 
286)—often dismissing development and planning as one-dimensional sources of domination 
whose power is articulated precisely through logics of exclusion. At the same time, a prevalent 
                                                        
191 This tendency stands in contradiction with some of subaltern urbanists’ own formulations on marginalized 
populations. Chatterjee asks, for example, “will [the dispossessed urban poor] accept their redundancy without 
protest? Will they react to the new and glaring social disparities? If democracy has indeed taken root in India’s 
cities, will political society provide the instruments for negotiating a controlled transition to a new urban regime or 
will it explode into anarchic resistance?” (2004:188) 
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motif is the allusion to, and celebration of, the continually thwarted planner through the 
subaltern’s fickle and occasionally eloquent gestures of desire, ambition, and inventiveness that 
overrun the ordinary and expected spatial rules of engagement. Ashis Nandy describes the 
‘unintended city’ as  
“the city that was never part of the formal ‘master plan’ but always implicit in it. This 
unintended city consists of the growing number of poor housed in slums and streets who 
provide the cheap labour and services without which the official city could not survive. 
Exploited and disenfranchised, the existence of this other cannot be acknowledged by the 
official city as part of itself. Seen from the lens of modernisation, the huge mass of 
India’s urban poor appears ‘obsolete’ in the march of progress. But this ‘obsolete’ 
population refuses to “bow out of history,” and exhibits an “obstinate ability to return and 
‘illegitimately’ occupy a large space in the public domain” (Nandy 1998:2, 3; quoted in 
Prakash 2002). 
 
This emphasis on insurgence against planning is especially true for the study of megacities, the 
main stage for subalternist thought. Roy states “ontological readings of the megacity and its 
urbanisms have repeatedly invoked the lifeworld of the informal….Here the slum economy is 
interpreted as a grassroots uprising against state bureaucracy, a revolution from below,” but as I 
argue in the case of planning in Mumbai, these must be recognized in a context of how the 
history of uneven capitalist development has produced a pervasive lived informality for the poor 
as well as a far-reaching elite informality predicated on appropriations and misdirection of law 
and state administration (2011b: 227, 232, Cf Bayat 2007).  
Gyan Prakash points to the new symbolic setting of the contemporary city in the national 
imagination as shifting from “the erosion in the authority of the historicist narrative of Indian 
modernity and the emergence of a new politics of urban space” (2002: 5).192 Yet subaltern 
                                                        
192 This transition reveals the “general problem intrinsic to the nation-state’s historicist discourse of modernisation – 
the inability of its linear narrative to accommodate the spatiality of historical processes, the uncomfortable 
coexistence of the modern and the ‘obsolete’, the intrusion of the rural in the urban, the combined emergence of 
official and unintended cities. The city’s historical geography of power, culture, and society resists its representation 
as evolution and development.” (Ibid.) 
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urbanism’s double-sided critique of modernity remains inadequate to the challenge of 
understanding how political modernity itself is changing and how the urban has become a 
profoundly important arena for conflicts and struggles over power. Though it has become a 
terrain for the market subjugation, as I show in through the diverse campaign participants of 
Hamara Shehar, it is rarely the case that those excluded from planning want to live without the 
recognition and rights that city planning practices are meant to guarantee. Indeed, planning has 
become increasingly an important realm of struggle, engagement, as well as refusal for 
transforming the terms in which decisions are made, priorities delineated, and plans 
implemented. As this dissertation has argued, the efforts of Hamara Shehar Mumbai to mobilize 
both dissent and popular alternatives as interventions in the drafting of the twenty-year municipal 
Development Plan have shown that a challenge to historically produced informality and 
developmentalist planning can be challenged. By emphasizing a politics of symbolic refusal and 
exception rather than a politics of urban struggle and reclamation on the terrain of modernity, 
subaltern urbanist critique is immobilized by forms of neoliberal urban governance and market-
oriented entrepreneurialism that have made planning much more problematically “inclusive” 
even as it remains “exclusive.”  
 
II. Methodological Approaches 
Localism 
Subaltern urbanists call for a decentered, multiple, situated theory and practice in place of what 
they take to be universalizing and abstracting epistemologies prevalent in “western theory.”193 
                                                        
193 Subaltern urbanism largely theorizes the object of its enquiry, i.e. the postcolonial city, and the ontology of its 
agents (subalterns and dominant groups), as different from western theories of urbanism. Consequently, subaltern 
urbanism rethinks the politics of urban life from the perspective of how the way dominant and subaltern groups 
operate, relate, and struggle, is different from the usual (western) urban story. “Alternative theorizations will require 
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Rather, subaltern urbanism attends to the neglected alternative histories rendered insignificant by 
theories of contemporary globalization and urbanization, and seeks to foreground “the 
heterogeneity and multiplicity of metropolitan modernities” and existing subaltern 
cosmopolitanisms as a new approach to understanding nonwestern, noneurocentric urbanism 
(Roy 2009b).194 The contention is that there are rich localizations of social, economic, cultural 
formation, as well as political contestation sedimented in these cities that are obscured by an 
overarching concern with what globalization theory typically offers. In doing so, however, their 
spatial thinking is largely blunted by a lack of critical scalar politics with regards to 
understandings of urban processes and the conditions of knowledge production about urban 
society. 
As such subaltern urbanism privileges everyday lived urban life and focuses resolutely on 
tactics, encroachments and subversions, and accommodations, “explicitly or implicitly working 
to disrupt mainstream global urbanism by attending to the tactics of survival and subversion 
resorted to by subaltern or subordinated populations” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti (2013: 
5). Therefore, its spatial imagination remains fixed in place, relying on local scales to challenge 
the authority of larger ones. Yet this methodological “localism” limits the purview and fetishizes 
the nature, relations, and coordinates of power to which subalternity refers. These coordinates of 
power, their operations, effects, and relations challenge urbanists to better understand the critical 
nexus of everyday life, institutions of the state, capital, and the conditions of possibility and 
                                                        
that urban scholars take seriously the distinct situated knowledges that emerge in and through Southern livelihood 
practices. By “Southern,” we mean those, everywhere, whose livelihoods have been made precarious by 
geohistorical processes of colonialism and globalizing capitalism.” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013: 6). The 
major claim here is that spaces of colonial and postcolonial modernity were, and continue to be, heterogeneous. In 
this regard what is understood as the informal— its practices, meanings, and contestations—is, in many significant 
ways, a long and contradictory path of governmental policies with checkered histories of resistance with regard to 
planning and the economy that are indeed constitutive of the “modern” in postcolonial societies. 
194 The geohistorical critique (representation/discourses of subjugation) suggests a methodology found in the 
resurrection of subjugated, or subaltern, knowledges. 
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strategies of organized collective action. But to their own detriment, subaltern urbanists make 
few attempts to contribute to these questions precisely because they avoid these engagements, 
considering them far too “contaminated already by elitism and grand theory.” (Ibid.)  
The limits of subaltern urbanism’s tendency to “romanticize its localized otherness” 
strangely align with the call to provincialize the geography of urban theory through a “worlding” 
of subalternity (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013). The subaltern urban argument is that 
global urban theory disavows the nature of nonwestern cities by allowing capital to take center 
analytic stage as the main factor shaping modern urbanization, falsely assuming that capitalism 
develops in all places in more or less the same way (Chattopadhyay 2012). Moreover, subaltern 
urbanists’ claim is that global urban theory invalidates understanding of other forms of being-in-
the-world, other itineraries of recognition available for understanding nonwestern cities 
(Mayaram 2008, Ong 2011.)195 While the theorization of being-in-the-world is often intensely 
localized in ethnographic accounts, I have illustrated in the previous chapters a different world-
making process that has arisen in Mumbai—and that has inspired various scales of spatial 
production—from diverse participants of grassroots mobilizations in a city-wide platform that 
mobilizes spatial imaginaries across different locations in the city and region. 
 
Difference and Process 
‘Difference’ in the subaltern urbanist lexicon comes to mean a range of things—on one end, 
“historical difference” judged on a world scale (the cause and effect of enduring epistemologies 
                                                        
195 This worlding of subaltern urbanism is different than the critical philosophical/political economy approaches of 
‘world-as-city’ theorization (cf Madden 2012) that consider the urban-world imaginary from the problematic of 
planetary urbanization, which is “uneven and unequal and ranging across radically different social spaces, [and] has 
covered the globe and brought ‘the most remote parts of the world into its orbit and woven diverse areas, peoples, 
and activities into a cosmos’ (Ibid. 773). 
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of coloniality), and on the other, a multitude of social differences understood as indexes of 
inequality and injustice. But is the subalternists’ argument with the West or the “center,” which 
continue to dominate the state of postcolonial urban theory today, adequate for an actual critique 
of global capital and does the archeology of the South it offers in response help us to think about 
the politics of uneven development and its connective conditions? Limitations arise in how 
differences are understood as representations or discursive manifestations of colonial power-
knowledge (in a critical Saidian tradition unhinged, for example, from the political-strategic anti-
imperial traditions of Frantz Fanon, CLR James, Walter Rodney).  
Chibber argues that “to be universalized, capitalism need not revolutionize entire 
cultures; it need only transform those institutions vital to its reproduction” (2013: 233–234). A 
central dispute that subaltern urbanism has is precisely with this formulation of capital or 
capitalism, and its urban forms, as indeed universalized. This leads subalternists to highlight 
difference as evidence against universalization. The mutual misreading between subalternists and 
their critics has to do with the contested assumption that universalization is tantamount to 
homogenization; and the confusion between the relation between critical concepts, such as 
global/globalization, universal/universalization, and generalization/universalization (Roy 2015). 
Important theoretical sophistication has nonetheless emerged within the wake of 
subaltern studies that shows precisely the nonunitary and unstable nature of capital’s energies as 
it strives for, but cannot achieve universality (Gidwani 2008). Universalization, the “being-
becoming” of capital, as Gidwani shows, is an incomplete, and interrupted, process. The process 
necessitates differentiation, the reorganization of certain differences and the consolidation of 
others, the constant attempt to reorder the world according to hierarchies that may stabilize the 
conditions of its own reproduction, even as these hierarchies are also (potentially and actually) 
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the source of its own fundamental instability. These requirements are not guaranteed outcomes, 
but rather its conditions of possibility. As Taylor warns, failing to take capital’s ontological 
uncertainty as a starting point  
“provides capital with the security of its logical categories, rather than emphasising the 
inherent instability of them and the ways in which the circuits of capital constantly 
attempt to secure their moorings in social relations and institutions whose provenance can 
in no way be derived from capital. On the other, it serves to confine our understanding of 
historical struggles by limiting them to the binaries of a world seen through the categories 
of capital [and] consequently serve to rationalise – rather than contextualise and contest – 
capital’s ‘voracious capacity to incorporate difference and marginalised others as a force 
for legitimising the system’” (2010: 14).  
 
This points to a new ontology of capital that takes seriously its effects on the social world but 
does not take its logics as guaranteed, permanent, or universal. It marks an engagement with 
capital’s lifeworld amongst post-subalternists that is desperately missing from subaltern 
urbanists.  
Subaltern urbanists quite often either avoid engaging with critiques of capital altogether, 
or they compartmentalize them. The basis of this tendency in postcolonial theory can be traced to 
the distinction Chakrabarty makes in Provincializing Europe between what he terms ‘History 1’ 
and ‘History 2.’196 Following Chakrabarty, we find in subaltern urbanism a parallel theory that 
can be remapped as ‘Urban 1’ and ‘Urban 2’: the first are those historical conditions posited by 
capital as “part of its [urbanizing] life process” and the second to those historical conditions 
encountered by capital but not posited by it. That is, postcolonial cities are not the history of 
capital alone, nor do they in the present bear the marks of capitalist spatialization only. Its 
universalization is always incomplete, however destructive and dominant. This is a central 
                                                        
196 Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti (2013) discuss the need to bring geography into the postcolonial historical 
critique implied in Chakrabarty’s terms and have instead proposed the spatialized terms ‘Geohistory 1’ and 
‘Geohistory 2’. 
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contradiction of capital, something that needs more careful engagement and understanding from 
perspectives on the ground of Southern and Northern cities alike.   
Yet both subalternists and their most vocal critics tend to adopt a one-sided approach 
with regard to the dichotomy (either we theorize History/Urban 1 or we theorize History/Urban 
2) that obscures the complex-in-motion that is capital’s unstable life world and its urbanizing 
tendencies.197 Subaltern urbanists offer a critical reading of the logic of development as 
dependent on the “homogenous empty time” of bourgeois spatial thought, which mark 
alternative concepts of time and space as categorically anterior to and subordinate to bourgeois 
thought. However, they tend simply to read subalternity as the condition of “plenitude” and 
“creativity” as substitute narratives that otherwise signify “lack” and “inadequacy.” This reflects 
their profound skepticism of the representation of certain features of ‘third-world’ cities as 
metonymically the illegal slum, the disorderly mega-city, or the “premature metropolis” (Bose in 
Chatterjee 2004).198 
 
Spatial and Scalar Unevenness 
The subaltern urban literature has tended to reproduce the postcolonial perspective in the debated 
limits of historicist theories of uneven development. In earlier debates, the laws that govern 
historic stages of development were taken to operate differently in different nation-state contexts. 
This drove assumptions about capital’s universalism as a rule from which to measure historical, 
                                                        
197 Attending to the political economy of capitalist reproduction, Levien states, “so long as workers provide the 
requisite surplus value, they can have all the cultural difference they want; indeed, capitalists often exploit such 
differences to their advantage” (2013: 490). Chakrabarty conceded the same point decades ago in Rethinking 
Working Class History when he wrote “perhaps we have long overestimated capitalism’s need or capacity to 
homogenize the cultural conditions necessary for its own reproduction” (1989: xiii). 
198 The methodological approach here is to focus on ontology while undertheorizing scale. This leaves subaltern 
urbanists with a conception that there are ontologically discrete or autonomous domains of life, as opposed to social 
life as constituted through overlapping scalar productions of difference. 
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political, and cultural variation. As such, “transitions” to capital and “articulations” of 
precapitalist modes of production with productive forces of capital were set against a master 
narrative of capitalist development. Moreover, questions of spatial difference were often 
subsumed within a territorial grid that took the nation-state as the unit of comparison.  
Indeed, moving beyond top-down, capitalist-centric perspectives on uneven development 
is an urgent task and something that can be common cause for new critical subalternist and 
Marxist perspectives. A subaltern approach might for example emphasize the co-constructed 
productions of urban spaces, and thereby engage with and reformulate a theory of unevenness 
within an urban world dominated but not reducible to capital. Current subaltern urbanist 
literature might in this way offer more than the usual postcolonial strategies of emphasizing 
difference in representations of spaces that stop short of critiques of capitalist development’s 
differentiating tendencies.  
Yet in its inheritance of the tools of postcolonial theory, the spatial thinking of subaltern 
urbanism have largely evaded radical scalar critiques and thereby obscured questions of 
unevenness. As Smith (1992) argued, however, scale matters: “the construction of geographic 
scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation ‘takes place’; [moreover] the 
production of geographic scale is the site of potentially intense political struggle.” He states,  
“The continual production and reproduction of scale expresses the social as much as 
geographical contest to establish boundaries between different places, locations, and sites 
of experience. The making of place implies the production of scale insofar as places are 
made different from each other; scale is the criterion of difference not between places so 
much as between different kinds of places” (67).    
 
The Subaltern Studies project increasingly gravitated toward postcolonial critique focused on 
representations, as opposed to an anticolonial project critical of class and social power via 
Gramscian-Marxist inspired Indian historiography, or spatial Marxist tradition of Lefebvre who 
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defined colonization as “state-bound territorial relationships of domination.” As such, subaltern 
urbanism involves the “rethinking” and “reworking” of forms of knowledge linked to colonialism 
and western domination.  
Given its lack of critical attention to issues of scale, we do not find a ready model for 
how to move past descriptive accounts of marginalization as the primary manifestation of spatial 
differentiation. The challenge is to unseat the hierarchies often implied in the politics of scale, to 
understand how they interrelate and influence each other. By focusing on spaces of 
representation while being blind to a politics of scale, subaltern urbanism fails to address both 
the mechanisms that produce the spatial differentiation that in fact critically defines subalternity, 
as well as a politics of struggle that has politically important implications for how Southern cities 
are in fact transformed.  
There is a missed opportunity here to attend to real structures of power in the world 
system, to acknowledge and build upon translocal subaltern circulations of knowledges emerging 
from manifold struggles. This is a different call than from those whose mandate is for more 
empirical studies as a way to clarify variations in the urban world. Rather, as I develop in this 
dissertation, the call is for a hermeneutics of struggle and their spatial-scalar politics as a means 
to understand the urban condition. This new politics of urban space requires us also to think with 
struggles at a planetary scale, an urgent task obscured by the perceived opposition of Southern 
and Northern theory.  
 
III. Political implications 
These considerations on the spatial thinking behind the subaltern urbanist project allow us to 
assess subaltern urbanism as critical urban theory and pose key questions about its political 
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implications. One of the most important tasks of contemporary urban theory is to elucidate 
power relations as they function in cities and make operable and inoperable certain kinds of 
urbanism. Departing from understandings of “subaltern urbanism” as a literary device used to 
focus attention to the nature of nonwestern postcolonial cities and to rethink and rework the 
forms of knowledge available to understand these cities anew (Denis, Mukhopadhyay, and Zerah 
2012: 52), we can interrogate the political implications of subaltern urbanism as an urban theory 
of subalternity itself.  
But just as subaltern urbanism is without a developed spatialized politics, its approach 
has also largely avoided theorizing subalternity as articulated with certain spatioeconomic 
patterns of capitalist development as well historically-specific power structures, relations, and 
operations. As such, there has not been much in the way of analysis of how economic power is 
constituted as social and political domination, or politics and class struggle conceived as 
expressions of the unstable relations between social/political factors and economic development. 
In short, subaltern urbanism largely remains a theory of social and political manifestations of 
power, specifically with regard to marginalization and participation, but less an analysis of the 
relationship between the social structures and political changes that condition subalternity. 
 By reframing the Indian urban question as one of governmental rule, Partha Chatterjee 
(2004) proposes a spatiopolitical logic at work in postcolonial cities.199 Inherently fragmented, 
                                                        
199 Through an inventive reading of Gramsci and Foucault, Chatterjee situates his critique in the geospatial present 
of “most of the world,” as his book’s subtitle states.  In practical terms, the “politics of the governed” typically 
involves claims to habitation and livelihood by ‘groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve 
violation of the law’.” (Roy 2011: 227) Thus, subaltern mobilizations, becomings, and expressions originate, and 
almost invariably remain within the confines of “governmentality” and appeal to state exception. This is a far 
different logic, the logic of the governed, as opposed to the logic of the citizen, for whom ‘civil society’ is the 
domain of rights-bearing, enfranchised (bourgeois) citizens for whom the principles of liberal democracy prevail. 
Yet a host of critical voices show how Chatterjee’s formulation fails to capture the actual on-the-ground dynamics of 
the politics of contemporary subaltern groups in India (see e.g. Baviskar and Sundar, 2008; Shah, 2008; Sundar and 
Sundar, 2012; and also Nilsen and Roy 2015).  
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power in urban society operates in different domains—civil society, political society, and “an 
outside beyond the boundaries of political society” (Chatterjee, 2008: 61)—in which new 
techniques of governing population groups give rise to a mass politics that is differentiated and 
contradictory on the basis of identity and interest groups. Chatterjee employs the analytic 
“political society” to characterize this population:  
“Populations are empirical categories of people with specific social or economic 
attributes that are relevant for the administration of developmental or welfare policies….a 
heterogeneous social, consisting of multiple population groups to be addressed through 
multiple and flexible policies….This was in sharp contrast with the conception of 
citizenship in which the insistence on the homogeneous national was both fundamental 
and relentless….[Moreover] unlike citizenship, which carries the moral connotation of 
sharing in the sovereignty of the state and hence of claiming rights in relation to the state, 
populations do not bear any inherent moral claim” (Chatterjee 2004: 177).200 
 
Subaltern urbanism overwhelmingly names the conditions of governmental rule over 
differentiated population.201 However, for some, subaltern urbanism also describes a “great 
transformation” of Indian cities, in which ‘the attempt to create a market-oriented society from 
above compels a movement from below to moderate its severely dislocating effects’ (Ruparelia, 
Reddy, Harriss, and Corbridge 2011:2). In this mode, the project is attuned to recovering the 
political agency of various subaltern groups, marginalized not only by the state and economy, but 
also by dominant left perspectives.202 The political consequences of the subaltern urbanist project 
                                                        
200 But, as van Djik states, “recent research shows that political society is utilized by the state, private sector, and 
middle-class actors as well as by poorer groups. Political society can function as a publicly disavowed, but 
nonetheless active, auxiliary of state and capital interests as well” (2014: 25, 26).  
201 For some, Challerjee’s political society signals a complete departure from the original approach of the Subaltern 
Studies Collective. Aditya Nigam states, for example, that originally “[Subaltern Studies] was not so much about the 
ways in which the colonial government and nationalist elites ‘managed’ subaltern populations but, on the contrary, 
the ways in which, the subaltern escaped the mechanisms of control…. But then these were studies that came out of 
the Gramscian-Guhaian phase of Subaltern Studies. It was in the second phase (the late subaltern studies) that what 
Sumit Sarkar described as the ‘Disappearance of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies’ actually occurred. … Elite 
knowledge and politics, and the Chatterjee-ian notion of governmentality-as-welfare, become the instruments of 
discipline and control. (Nigam 2011). 
202 Many of these subaltern—“the sexed and sexual subalterns,” “urban subalterns,” “rural subalterns,” “project-
affected subalterns,” the religious subaltern, etc. (comprised of women, transgendered people, Adivasis, informal 
sector workers, Dalits)—have not only been marginalized in relation to the postcolonial state but have also occupied 
a relatively peripheral position in dominant left politics since independence in 1947 (Omvedt 1993). 
257 
therefore lie in more accurately defining the complexity of consolidation of governmental rule 
and market society, its uneven processes and outcomes.  
 
Bottom up urbanism  
The response to the vast field of governmental rule has been formulated with regard to subaltern 
politics through two divergent emphases: on the one hand micropolitics and the spatiocultural 
formations of everyday life, and on the other, macro level analyses of the dialectic of power and 
resistance. The inaugural statement of the Subaltern Studies Collective makes clear that the 
politics of the project would rest on recovering and valorizing “the contributions made by the 
people on their own, that is, independently of the elite” (Guha 1982: 3). In their emphasis on 
“history from below,” the Subaltern Studies established a “reversal of perspective,” assigning 
primacy to a manifold of resistance in order to rethink the unstable and shifting conditions of 
power.203 The essentially antagonistic relations between subaltern masses and elites were 
identified in the Collective’s early work through countless resistances and insurgencies against 
subordination, economic underdevelopment, and cultural domination. The dialectical 
relationship between domination and insurgency was a recurring object of analysis, and though 
they sought to rethink the primacy of class, these dynamics were nevertheless understood as 
articulations of a manifold of social struggle.  
 This “reversal of perspective” of the early Subaltern Studies project, with its emphasis on 
an autonomous domain of politics, can be traced in the subaltern urbanist “from below” 
approach, yet in curious new arrangements. Its most obvious continuities can be seen in the 
                                                        
203 This approach is in fact part of a long arc of “Copernican Revolutions” in political thought made from the 1950s–
1980s by CLR James, Italian autonomists such as Mario Tronti, British social historians such as Christopher Hill 
and E.P. Thompson. 
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subaltern urbanist emphasis on spaces and forms of popular agency that “often remain invisible 
and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory” (Roy 2011b: 224). For scholars such as 
AbdouMalik Simone, this is best addressed by attending to the self-activity of ordinary people as 
expressions and negotiations of vernacular forms of power. Simone (2004), for instance, 
challenges the ready assumption that most African cities are “dysfunctional arenas of the 
political in the modern age” with weak states in conditions of constant emergency, and indeed 
should not work. Yet, he reminds us, these cities do indeed work; and they are moreover the loci 
of many forms of politics that produce a lot of energy but also a lot of wasted potential. He 
emphasizes many such contradictions in this subaltern conception of the city in which 
informality is not an aberration but a platform for emergent politics.204  
Similarly, Pieterse sustains a subaltern focus on “cityness” itself: “on the inventiveness of 
survivalist practices and the worldliness of African cities: the goal is not to romanticize life in the 
periphery, life in the slums, but more to determine what people do in the city, what people do 
with each other, and how these (non) relationships impact on the individual, the institutions of 
the state—where they are present—and the making of the city itself” (2010: 213). This notion of 
subaltern self-activity and invention is central to the notion of urbanism as a manifold of cities 
within cities, “as the designs and struggles of many attempting to recognize each other as one, 
always imposing themselves on the other, as well as finding ways to leave each other alone” 
(Simone 2012: 46). Simone states  
“far from being marginal to contemporary processes of scalar recomposition and the 
reimagination of political communities, African cities can be seen as a frontier for a wide 
range of diffuse experimentation with the reconfiguration of bodies, territories, and social 
arrangements necessary to recalibrate technologies of control” (2004:2).  
                                                        
204 The dilemma that arises here is with parsing out a politics from these activities. Self-reliance may give rise to 
many instances and networks of mutual support, sanitation, shelter etc., but they are also embedded in operations of 




Thus, there is an emphasis on the contributions to urban society “made by the people on their 
own,” an assertion that what subalterns do outside the realm of formal politics constitutes many 
centers rather than the margins of city-making. This decentering and recentering, the arrival at a 
multiplication of politics, is a welcome response to the erasures of top-down analyses of power. 
The primacy and dynamism of everyday people situates their many maneuvers as the analytic 
compass for navigating the mysterious realm of urban politics.  
These transformations also point to the curious limits of subalternity as politics: while 
emphasizing relations of control and escape, it simultaneously eschews a theory of urban 
relations as viewed “from below,” mediated through processes of domination, marginalization, 
exploitation, and subordination. Somehow along the way, the conception of politics as 
antagonism is done away with, the simultaneously urgent encounters with domination and 
resistance quietly uncouple. The expectation that some resistance is part of the story is still 
acknowledged, yet the meaning of resistance changes. In suggesting that power, traditionally 
conceived, is so porous to the point of irrelevance, it also tends to mystify the structural 
conditions that in fact constrain them. Subalternists analyze the conditions of insurgence, 
subversion, and escape, rather than insurrection and direct confrontations with power. 
Absent critical interrogations of power, it is unclear whether this view from below can 
accumulate even “incremental” radical change in the order of things, to move from the margins 
to something more substantive, and what that would do to change relations of power. As long as 
the “subaltern” remains a philosophical perspective, a critique of epistemology and ontology, 
rather than a theory of subjectivity through struggle, within and against powers, the chances are 
slim that we’ll find out. For Spivak, one stops being subaltern as soon as one acts politically to 
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achieve representation within a hegemonic formation: “you name it in the hope that the name 
will disappear” (1990: 158).  
  
Absent antagonism 
Whereas the conceptual operation of decentering class may open space to attend to other logics 
of subordination, the simultaneous absence of antagonism as a component of its analysis limits 
subaltern urbanism as a theory of politics and limits its ability to contribute to questions of 
spatial justice. This is a departure from a Gramscian sense of politics in the following two ways: 
(1) a notion of antagonism without class that amounts to popular politics; and (2) a notion of 
class without antagonism that is theorized as the habitus of the dispossessed. Both represent the 
limited ways in which agency and autonomy are routinely conceived in subaltern urbanist 
thinking.205 We see that the question of political agency posed in this way is central to how 
subaltern urbanism constructs an “urbanism from below.” Earlier, the Subaltern Studies 
Collective grappled with how to theorize the limits to which the subaltern can or cannot be “the 
subject of history” and what political possibilities arise from relations to elite and state politics 
                                                        
205 “In the work of the Subaltern Studies Collective, the agency of change came to be located in this sphere of 
subaltern politics. In this sense, subalternity became more than the ‘general attribute of subordination’; it also 
became a theory of agency, that of the ‘politics of the people’” (Guha, 1988: 40, quoted in Roy 2011: 226). This line 
of questioning about the inherent agency of the subaltern is not unique to the Subaltern Studies Collective. In his 
apocalyptic account of a ‘planet of slums’, Mike Davis (2004: 28) expresses anxiety about the political agency of 
slum dwellers and how they can be conceived of as history agents. According to Davis, “they have little access to 
the culture of collective labour or large-scale class struggle.” Against such accounts, subaltern urbanism recuperates 
the figure of the slum dweller as a subject of history” (Roy 2011:228). As we’ve seen, theorists of subaltern 
urbanism more broadly recover and align the subaltern as the figure that makes the subaltern city. “Subaltern 
urbanism then is an important paradigm, for it seeks to confer recognition on spaces of poverty and forms of popular 
agency that often remain invisible and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory.” (Roy 2011:224) The 
tendency has been to “assign unique political agency to the mass of urban subalterns.” (Roy 2011: 235) But the 
forms of agency that scholars have uncovered are conceptually limited. Subalternity is not an issue of autonomous 
domains of life and politics, but rather a measure of the power of social life. 
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(“it neither originated from elite politics nor did its existence depend on the latter” (Guha 1982: 
4)).206  
 
Popular Politics: A Modified Notion of Antagonism without Class 
The world of the subaltern, and its containment in/as subaltern spaces and subaltern classes is 
defined by a “terrain constituted by the apparatuses of governmentality that attach to the state” 
(Nilsen and Roy 2015: 5 fn4). Thus, for Chatterjee (ibid.: 40), it is not a separate or autonomous 
domain or realm of society, but actually its opposite, the thorough interiorization of subalternity 
into state logics. This interpretation offers a notion of popular politics without antagonism and 
supplants previous notions of the subaltern in the rubric of “from below” and “from above.” 
Subaltern Studies famously shifted their inquiries from subjecthood to citizenship, fundamentally 
redefining subalternity within a “new framework of democratic citizenship – complex, 
differentiated, perhaps fundamentally altered from the normative ideas of citizenship in western 
liberal democracies, but nonetheless citizenship, not subjecthood” (Chatterjee 2012: 46). One 
outcome of the subaltern urbanist inheritance of this legacy is found in their notions of 
citizenship as well as the production of gendered, ethnic, and spatial subjectivities. The definition 
of the urban field through rights, recognition, and mobilizations are changing the meaning of 
subalternity through popular politics. Politics arising from conditions of informal life, referred to 
in terms of habitus, is conceived as the sole domain of agency in subaltern urbanist literature. 
                                                        
206 This concept of the people and their autonomy interpreted rural land relations through a composition of people 
who were in one way or another just outside the actual reach of the state. The notion of autonomy that emerged, 
even if exaggerated, was theorized within a particular historical context. It is not the case that contemporary urban 
society affords autonomy in that same regard. Rather, if we are to continue to speak of autonomy in relation to the 
subaltern, we need to reimagine both terms. This is what a reinvigorated reading of Gramsci may allow us, as Nilsen 
(2015) and Hart (2012) and others are pursuing; new discoveries along this route may reveal Gramsci’s influence on 
autonomist traditions of workerism, post-workerism, and therefore its relevance for what suggesting what reading 
the urban through a different notion of autonomy may also allow us to do. 
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Habitus of the Dispossessed: A Modified Notion of Class without Antagonism 
Attention to “habitus”—the embodiment of one’s micro power of culture, the interplay of 
agency, and structure, the things we just do—has been a hallmark feature of subaltern urbanism 
as a means to understand subaltern urban practices and spaces. The view from the bottom is 
assembled through a macro-sociology based on individualistic actions, the logic of practice in the 
formation of “habitation, livelihood, self-organization, and politics” (Roy 2011b: 224). It claims 
that it is the very existence as informal life that constitutes political agency and identity. 
Subaltern urbanists in this sense deploy the concept of autonomy emerging from the Subaltern 
Studies Collective to describe informal and infra-politics on the “margins of rules and 
organizational arrangements” of the informal economy as a “world underneath” in the shadow of 
the state (Castells and Portes 1989, Centeno and Portes 2006), addressing survival strategies of 
the poor to posit the informal as a realm that is populated by entirely different subjectivities and 
politics.  
 By conceiving of habitus as an attribute of subordinated people who inhabit an 
autonomous realm (bounded and distinct from the elites), subaltern urbanism reproduces many 
of the characteristics of the Subaltern Studies Collective that have been amply criticized as a 
one-sided concern with representation. This representation of subalternity as habitus 
“…is problematic: contemporary subaltern/subordinated populations do assert and speak 
for themselves, developing very complex trajectories connecting with one another, the 
state and capital (Chari, 2012). It also encourages the erroneous reading that attributes 
resistance, subversion, illegality, informality etc. exclusively to subalterns, underplaying 
how pervasively and effectively the rich and powerful also engage in such practices (Roy, 
2009a)” (Sheppard, Leitner, and Maringanti 2013:5, emphasis added).   
 
We see in theories of informal territoriality and insurgence in such writers as Asef Bayat, 
Soloman Benjamin, and AbdouMalik Simone a slippage between “habitus” and “agency” in 
which the “marginalized and deinstitutionalized subaltern” crafts a street politics best understood 
263 
a “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” “flexibility, pragmatism, negotiation, as well as 
constant struggle for survival and self-development” (Roy 2011b: 228). The idea of the “habitus 
of the dispossessed”—of a slum and informal habitus—is a key feature of subaltern urbanism in 
which informal life is itself a political agency and source of identity (Ibid.). This is a subaltern 
mode of spatial production, the production of subaltern space.207 
Moreover, the fascination with improvisation and status quo subversion largely precludes 
subaltern urbanists from understanding movements and contestations in Southern cities in 
relation to radical urban movements in other parts of the world. When read as a theory of urban 
mobilizations, politics, and movements, subaltern urbanism (e.g. Chatterjee 2004, Appadurai 
2001) exists more or less in isolation from alternative traditions of urban social movements and 
social histories that address “grassroots” democracy.208 Rather, typical theorization begins with 
the recognition of something called a subaltern politics conceived of as categorically distinct 
from and marginal to state and civil society procedures of doing politics. This may be the reason 
why there are few who argue against this categorical imperative who do not abandon the 
subaltern studies approach all together.209  
The subaltern urbanist project might address the nature of power in contemporary urban 
society by naming the conditions of subaltern alterity, that is, by naming cultural and political 
                                                        
207 Insofar as occupancy urbanism is taken to be a distinctive form of political agency and urban strategy, 
Benjamin’s (2008) analysis bears close resemblance to the Subaltern Studies Collective’s original conception of 
agency as well as Chatterjee’s (2004) conceptualization of ‘political society’ as a space of politics formed out of the 
governmental administration of populations but escaping such forms of developmentalism.” (Roy 2011: 228)  
208 Social movement literature in the Indian context tends to be placed in rural settings or note specifically urban 
contexts. The literature on anticaste movements which have taken up cities as their terrain have contributed largely 
to our understandings of culture and spatial politics, subjectivity, and the urban condition. Strangely, this literature is 
largely absent from the perspectives of subaltern urbanism. 
209 One enduring criticism that must be extended to the urbanists approach of subalternism is with the concept of the 
“subaltern” itself, “which collapses too many qualitatively specific relations of subordination and exploitation to be 
useful for analytical purposes (a point made in different ways by Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Ludden 2001)” (Quoted in 
Levien 2013: 491). This may account for the relative constraint with which urban scholars influenced by Subaltern 
Studies in fact choose to name their work as “subaltern urbanism.” Only in some ethnographic writings on the 
relationship of the state and subaltern politics is there a sense that the two are in fact co-constituted (Doshi 2011). 
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forms of everyday life while also producing theories of the structures and forces that dominate 
them.210 The circulation of urban revolts, rebellions, and revolutions in recent years, the 
movement and occupation of the squares since Tahrir Square certainly, have largely failed to 
inspire urban subalternists to develop new translocal and international urban theories of 
encounter between the cycle of struggles throughout the world and the so-called subaltern 
politics of the South. 
The everyday “insurgence” emphasized by subaltern urbanists is nevertheless the biggest 
marker of its borrowed or inherited habits of thought. The rebel or insurgent peasant of Guha’ 
work (1999) has more recently been redrawn as the urban “insurgent citizen” (Holston 2008). 
The Subaltern Studies Collective, specifically through the work of Ranajit Guha’s Elementary 
Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, sought to critique the category of the pre-
political, to show a pattern of peasant resistance in the face of growing capitalist power and 
expand the idea of the “politics of the people” (indebted to but also critical of the English 
tradition of history from below tradition, e.g. E. J. Hobsbawm’s Primitive Rebels). The dominant 
view within subaltern urbanism holds that informality in postcolonial cities is defined by the 
practices of the subaltern (Bayat 2000) and deep democracy as forms of mobilization ‘from 
below’ (Appadurai 2001). Here agency, however limited, is found within the fabric of everyday 
                                                        
210 The conditions of subalternity might be explained through various fault lines in society: for instance, the ravaging 
effects of economic liberalization; state restructuring; or the denial of citizenship as the promise/premise of post-
Independence Indian modernity. The nature of this denial, the differences it makes to variously marginalized and 
disenfranchised groups, and the forms of political responses emerging from these groups, offer important insight 
into the changing nature of the city too often obscured by dominant narratives. Nilsen and Roy (2015:12) suggest an 
understanding of subalternity as: “(i) relational – that is, subalternity is above all a positionality of adverse 
incorporation in a certain set of sociohistorical power relations, (ii) intersectional – that is, subalternity is constituted 
along several axes of power, whose specific empirical form must be deciphered in concrete empirical settings, and 
(iii) dynamic –subalternity does not preclude agency, but agency arises and develops within and in relation to 
dominant discourses and political forms.” Subalternity is best understood in this approach as part of a larger critical 
project, most specifically brought to bear by Black Marxism, of understanding the contours and ongoing 
manifestations of “racial capitalism.” This is a necessary refinement to the evolution of the concept at the core of the 
Subaltern Studies project. 
265 
informality. Insurgency is not understood in narrowly economistic or political terms, but includes 
otherwise unpredictable elements of consciousness. Unlike Guha, who took pains to emphasize 
that insurgencies were consciously organized affairs, and not “spontaneous” or “prepolitical,” 
many urban scholars suggest that spontaneity, not arising from consciousness but rather an 
(informal) urban way of life, is inherently political, or even, post-political.  
 Roy challenges this view of informality and the notion of subalternity it implies, arguing 
that informality be understood not as 
“…a grassroots phenomenon, but rather as a feature of structures of power. . . It is 
tempting to interpret the tactics and struggles of the urban poor in the cities of the global 
South as instances of rebellion and mobilization. Are these ‘shadow cities’ not 
revolutionary, examples of a ‘globalization from below’ (Appadurai, 2001; Neuwirth, 
2004)? [Rather] these are examples of urban populism rather than of radical social 
movements. Such forms of insurgence then do not and often cannot call into question the 
urban status quo; they can imagine but cannot implement the just city. This is the 
informal city, and it is also an insurgent city, but it is not necessarily a just city. It is a city 
where access to resources is acquired through various associational forms but where these 
associations also require obedience, tribute, contribution and can thus be a 
‘claustrophobic game’ (Simone, 2004: 219, quoted in Roy 2009b: 84–85).”  
 
Roy has rightfully pointed out that occupancy urbanism exists amongst elites, “development 
mafias,” crime syndicates, real estate speculators and builders, local bureaucracies and police. 
Indeed, “occupation” is a maneuver upon a contested political terrain that traverses repressive 
institutional wills (e.g. police and military occupation), market logics (e.g. real estate 
development), as well as attempts, individual and collective, to claim space as a relational 
strategy to create publics, commons, spaces of struggle (e.g. occupation as social movement 
tactic). Moreover, as Roy argues, “such forms of insurgence cannot be seen as the means to 
justice in an unjust planning regime. Rather, from the very start, insurgent claims to land have 
been nurtured and fostered by systems of deregulation, unmapping, and informality.” (Roy 
2009b: 81) Roy’s challenge to subaltern urbanism is “to transcend territorial location, to 
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demonstrate various foreclosures that complicate political agency and to call into question the 
conditions for knowledge” (Roy 2011a: 232).211  
 
Conclusion 
The question of knowledge production is so central to the intellectual thought of subaltern 
studies. In what ways can we rethink it as a form of organization? Whatever their insights and 
legacies, the Subaltern Studies project, importantly, was a collective endeavor. The fact that 
individuals with different interests and talents came together to ask questions and begin to 
answer them creatively remains important. It is in some ways also how the Hamara Shehar 
campaign emerged: through a collective of individuals with different interests and talents who 
came together to ask a practice but conceptually difficult question about how the city of Mumbai 
could be planned for social justice.  
It is unclear how the questions and urgencies that the current situation in Southern cities 
will be addressed in a manner than may enable greater prospects for collective life if labor 
continues to be separate from the field of urban experience, however. Subalternists are fond of 
asking where theory is produced. It is my hope that this dissertation demonstrates that the 
location of meaningful critical urban theory remains within the geography of urban struggles. As 
I learned from and with Hamara Shehar Mumbai, collective forms of inquiry and mobilization 
are therefore necessary to read the struggles in the experiences of everyday life and to search for 
                                                        
211 Ananya Roy reminds us that the earlier figure of the subaltern that featured in the works of the Subaltern Studies 
Collective was marked by its radical erasure from archival and ethnographic evidence. The subaltern could not be 
granted recognition except as an absent presence, a trace of colonial and postcolonial rule. In its uptake in urban 
studies, this figure is newly inaugurated alongside ground and theory: the figure of the subaltern inhabits a territory, 
the slum or informal settlement above all, and thereby a distinct spatial identity, the slum dweller, which in turn is 
aligned with a political identity. This status of this figure, ground, and theory is left open, unresolved: is the 
subaltern city essentially that of the slum dweller?; and if so, is it the “majority” perspective, a view of the city from 
the ‘demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those . . . described as the “elite” (Guha 
1988: 44)? 
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lessons. Campaigns such as Hamara Shehar represent the beginnings of such collective research 
emerging within and in connection to a range of struggles and movements. This is where we 
might find our best chance to develop better analysis and more hopeful visions to complex and 
deeply historical urban questions. It remains to be seen how subaltern urbanists will learn from 





The New Urban Question in India 
 
 
“A great city but a terrible place.” —Charles Correa (2011) 
  
 
This dissertation contributes a new perspective on the development of Mumbai by critically 
connecting its planning history within and against the development of the city’s working and 
popular classes. I have shown how governmental rule, bourgeois and elite dominance, and 
popular expressions amongst the working classes of Mumbai have long affected one another in 
the development the city through the various class projects that have claimed it. In so doing, I 
offer an historical understanding of the co-constitution of urban development and the 
development of worker-capital relations.  
I show how decisions over planning were, since the origins of the city, always contested 
and the basis of shifting class relations, often involving alliances and ruptures within and across 
class relations. Crucially, this history also demonstrates how the conditions of subalternity has 
been continually produced as a class project—and has been resisted in various ways. As I trace 
this history into the present, I demonstrate how the increasingly pervasive informality in the city 
since the 1980s was the result of a myriad of strategies to break workers’ power and claims over 
the city. 
 I situate this historical project within the evolution of what I refer to as “juggernaut 
developmentalism” as a spatial ideology and highlight its depoliticiszing and fragmenting nature. 
The dissertation identifies this developmentalism as the ruling ideology foundational to both 
Mumbai’s developmental trajectory as well as global forms of accumulation. As this ideology is 
the predominant way a range of postcolonial cities are enlisted into global forms of 
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accumulation, I also situate the stakes of understanding the challenges confronting the project of 
development. Indeed, through an ethnographic study of the recent cycle of populist and 
municipalist interventions in city planning in Mumbai, I show how the prospects of social justice 
in the city lie only in the recognition and direct confrontation of this juggernaut.  
 In addition to contributing a critical history of the development of Mumbai, this 
dissertation develops a politics from below approach to urban subalternity. My central claims, 
arising both from my historical investigation and ethnographic research, is that renewed 
theorizations of subalternity are necessary and must start with the centering of class dynamics of 
conflict, struggle, and antagonism. These relations of class, informed by historically and 
ethnographically specific findings, must also integrate and navigate populism as a dominant yet 
unruly expression of collective urban life. I offer an anthropological perspective on subaltern 
urban politics that are also crucially struggles over the production of space and scale. While most 
accounts of subalternity in urban contexts are spatially tied to a “localism” that categorically 
subordinates subaltern politics to larger forms of spatial rule, my ethnographic research suggests 
the importance of a subaltern politics of scale for situating the urban question in India. Similarly, 
my approach refuses the defeatism of the prevailing subalternist literature that begins with a 
politics of “exception” and governmental rule. It does so by decentering predominantly 
biopolitical frameworks of popular politics in postcolonial cities. Instead, I reinterpret the 
separations and antagonisms at the heart of postcolonial state-society relations by developing an 
approach to subalternity that does not formally separate political from civil society as Chatterjee 
does.  
 My ethnographic and historical findings also challenge both popular and academic 
conclusions that the working-class character of Mumbai has been rendered immobile and that a 
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spirit of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinist urban culture has since divided and ruled the city. I 
specifically show how urban struggles in Mumbai are expansive expressions of class—and must 
be read that way—and moreover, that contemporary struggles continue to rearticulate a legacy of 
past workers’ struggles in the city. This notion of class is demonstrated as a class plurality that 
despite intrinsic and historically-produced differences, can find common cause in the urgency to 
intervene in the planning of the city; and perhaps can thereby also create the grounds for a multi-
class alliance that can adequately confront the juggernaut of developmentalism. 
 It is in this manner that I interpret Mumbai’s historical and contemporary contributions to 
the evolving conversation of the right to the city, with a strong orientation toward the many 
different labors in the city. My orientation throughout the project has also been to read the past 
and present struggles in Bombay/Mumbai with a faithful eye toward their contributions to the 
city’s political cultures and its built environment. Using collectivist research methods and 
drawing from an anthropological orientation toward social movements, I have endeavored to 
conduct an ethnography of the contested city rooted in many specific ethnographic 
understandings in the city. In so doing, it is my hope that I have offered an honest political 
understanding of the critical situation facing the working and popular classes of Mumbai, and 
that can also hopefully serve the collective thinking that is occurring in the city under extremely 
challenging conditions of mobilization.  
As I have shown in the preceding chapters, Mumbai’s political and planning histories 
have since colonial times emerged through a relationship of extreme fragmentation from within 
society, differently affecting populations of the governed and their relationship to the state. 
Social differentiation has become an increasingly important object of concern of planning. 
Planning indeed conceptualizes and orders things in time and space; it also projects and focuses 
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the diverse possibilities that time holds for space against an array of competing determinations. 
As the critical history of planning in Mumbai presented reveals, these are contested enactments 
of power—whether arising from colonial concerns over the contaminating effects of poor native 
hygiene; statist intervention in the urban economy to render certain postcolonial ideals of the city 
legible; to order the population into economies of labor; to enact “revenge” on a class of workers 
that have developed collective power; or quite simply, to grab land and make profit. The 
administration of space and the built environment became a central tool in the administration of 
people who lived, worked, and otherwise inhabited the spaces of the city. During a momentous 
century and a half of fire, famine, plague, strikes, and riots, urban planning came closer to its 
central political task of mediating the urban roots of social and class revolt. This dissertation 
shows how this reality came to be.  
The obligations of the state to the masses of people were never fully articulated in terms 
of social welfare. Urban governance has long been articulated through what Gilmore (2007:28) 
defines as “state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated 
vulnerability to premature death.” The independent workers movements as well as the 
Communist Party in the 1920s onward, both of which pushed the anticolonial movement to 
articulate proletarian interests in Independence, was significant also for pushing demands on the 
colonial and postcolonial state to promote general welfare. The agenda for capitalists and 
relatively autonomous state actors has since been to realign state agencies that are targeted for 
welfare claims by various subaltern groups toward a larger urban political culture of 
abandonment. This relationship, between society and the state shapes “people’s understanding of 
themselves in the world—because norms change along with forms” (Gilmore 2007: 43, 44). At 
the same time, “abandonment is far too complicated for any single ideologue, party, or election 
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cycle to achieve; experience shows abandonment takes a long time and produces new agencies 
and structures that replace, supplement, or even duplicate old institutions” (Ibid.) An aspect of 
juggernaut developmentalism is the institutionalization of abandonment while producing a 
depoliticized space of engagement in the city’s developmental future. 
 While class interests varied amongst different sections of the ruling elite, what has 
cohered in the contemporary form of juggernaut developmentalism is an elite vision of the city 
as first and foremost fulfilling a certain kind of economic and political rationale. An urban 
development regime that would seek profit and accumulation of power and prestige over the 
social development of the city and its people has presided over the city for significant stretches 
of its history, ensuring that calculated efforts for redress and regeneration of the city, its people, 
and its environment would remain stifled and inadequate. As a legacy of the colonial-era-born 
juggernaut developmentalism, the long arc of development in Mumbai has also coincided with 
an abandonment. Within the juggernaut we find the central characteristics of a liberal urbanism 
whose hallmarks, however much they have transformed in the given historical context, are a “let 
live and let die” approach to the city’s subaltern populations. Yet the city has always been 
inhabited by people who would demand a city governed “otherwise” and have produced a 
multiplicity of political expressions.  
Few of these expressions in the recent history have cohered into a bloc capable of 
challenging the planning regimes in place in Mumbai. Popular expressions are increasingly 
associated with narrowly defined communal forms of politics, whereas progressive social justice 
campaigns are canalized by a safe and non-confrontational infrastructure of non-profit 
organizations that depoliticize the discourses and practices of social movements that attempt to 
organize against long-term abandonment of infrastructure and other public goods. Urban 
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struggles such as these would have earlier been regarded as “displaced class struggles,” not 
without merit given the nature of work and housing informality that emerged after the dramatic 
defeat of the mill workers of Bombay in the 1980s. With the previous era’s workers’ struggles 
irreparably broken, and surviving solidarities scrambled across the city, a unifying militancy is 
not likely to emerge from the fragmentary urban struggles in India today.  
Even as urban informality is a mode of production of class fragmentation, many 
contemporary struggles around informality are not, as they were for Castells, about collective 
consumption. Indeed, the conditions of informality break the possibility of class project of 
collective consumption. Focusing instead on governmental engagement with the state, these 
urban politics, as Chatterjee (2004) states, typically retain no strategic or imagined possibility of 
collectivizing demands on the state or for a citywide redress of lacking resources or facilities.  
Yet contemporary struggles around informality in Mumbai and other Indian cities are 
undeniably “placing” themselves on the urban terrain, and in a sense, and for better or worse, 
have “replaced” class struggles of the lost city and its previous inhabitants. The first charter of 
the recently-inaugurated Right to the City Campaign in India reflects this historical analysis in 
their assessment of the nature of contemporary urban movements in India:  
“One has been witness to renewed protests and contestations by the urban poor in the 
form of the struggles of right to housing, access to basic services like water-education, 
struggle of labouring classes and claim over dignified identity. At the same time one has 
also witnessed the weakening and breaking down of traditional mobilizations of the 
working class in form of trade unions. In many cases, these protests and mobilizations 
have been successful in either achieving their goals or at least oppose and resist the 
onslaught of the neo-liberal agenda that is backed by the traditional hierarchical 
structures of our society. To an extent, the poor have been able to make city their home 
though being excluded from its systems in greater or lesser degree. 
 At the same time it is important to realise that these mobilizations have not been 
able to put up a comprehensive understanding around the urban space and the 
interventions have been site specific. At times the groups are often pitted against each 
other, the demands remain short sighted as the struggles are localized and there is an 
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inability in forging a consolidated struggle across sites and issues.” (First Right to the 
City Charter, Delhi, December 2015) 
 
In the course of Mumbai’s history, one can see how development has profoundly determined the 
character of urban life, its social organization and spatial consciousness. But in other instances, it 
has been the other way around: social struggles and political forms break from certain 
development pathways and establish new terrains in which the direction of development is 
contested. These are decisive, if protracted, moments in the history of the city, and this 
dissertation demonstrates the conditions of emergence of new social struggles around planning 
today. 
Hamara Shehar Mumbai reveals an alternative planning paradigm as a response to these 
formations to challenge the regulatory frameworks and established doctrines of India’s post-
liberalization era. This dissertation also makes the case for articulating the right to the city as the 
right to the commons as its many labors. As I discuss in detail in Chapter Six, but extend across 
the whole of the dissertation, this commoning of knowledge is one of the key aspects of the 
sociospatial horizon of justice animating the People’s Development Plan campaign. The 
campaign waged by Hamara Shehar Mumbai allows us to interpret and understand urban 
informality as a terrain of struggle. The campaign situates planning as both technocratic, 
bureaucratic, state practice, as well as a mode of informal spatial production. Hamara Shehar 
demonstrates how peoples’ participation is both prescript and postscript to planning. It is from 
Hamara Shehar’s perspective that we may see how urban social movements precede and surpass 
planning, and also locate the conditions of critique to rethink subaltern urbanism.  
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New Municipalism  
Since liberalization in the early 1990s, Mumbai has been at the center of many corporate-
sponsored reimaginings of the city and its role in new national aspirations for growth. The 
discourse around becoming a “global city” has circulated widely and endowed urban planning 
and governance with an urgent sense that market-led change is necessary and inevitable. State 
and capitalist processes of urbanization have extended bureaucratic control and marketized 
differential access to social services (Harvey 1989), at the same time as they have remained 
fiercely exclusionary in the neoliberal era of Indian cities. As in many other parts of the world, 
this has entailed entrenching, and indeed relying upon, salient social differences such as caste, 
class, religion, race and gender to produce an uneven and unequal landscape of access to land 
and services, while also structurally excluding large parts of society. This process has opened the 
field of urban governance and planning to an unprecedented array of social conflicts seeking to 
address fundamental questions about to whom the city belongs.   
Municipalism is not the exclusive domain of progressive politics. It is rather an abstract 
space of urban ideology to be contested, articulated, and organized. The ruling elites in cities like 
Mumbai certainly have their own traditions of “municipalism” as well as an idea of what 
municipal institutions should do and what the city should look like. Their capture of the 
municipal state and their ability to wield its powers to establish norms and regulations of urban 
development, as well as enervate it and bypass those very regulations, has long established in 
Mumbai a complex situation of urban governance.   
Relatedly, the “popular” and the “community” are also ideological categories of urban 
politics. A progressive and radical municipalist agenda, which challenges market liberalism and 
the uses of state institutions to implement neoliberal spatial reforms, cannot simply mobilize the 
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“popular” and the “community” but must pass through them and reorganize them in the process.  
Hamara Shehar attempts to reconstitute a “public realm of the city that is somehow expressive of 
the people, expressive of the general will—a will, maybe, that incorporates an affinity of 
common notions” (Merrifield 2013: 83). 212 The point is to find existing spaces activated by 
people, and to invent different ones; ultimately to create a city “function” (ibid), a process of 
difference confronting differentiation to produce, perhaps, a recognition function, a reclamation 
function, a redistribution function, a reparation function.  
The Hamara Shehar Mumbai campaign emerged against this backdrop in an attempt to 
address the very conditions of urban differentiation that foster inequality and injustice in the city. 
Its primary task has been to disarticulate from state indifference the potentializing power of 
planning. As such, the campaign’s intersections with planning authorities suggest an 
understanding of power not merely as a functional operation of power as difference, but a set of 
mechanisms that can be used differently. The campaign’s wager is that planning can be used to 
effect intentional outcomes toward what it refers to as an “equitable city.” Gilmore asks: “Where 
are openings that ordinary people can enter to grasp and redirect a portion of the social wage?” 
(2007: 53) The vision of a city differently arranged through popular input in planning for 
equitable outcomes is the starting point of this dissertation’s inquiry into Indian urbanization and 
its urban question. These visions emerged from ordinary people and communities that mobilized 
a different imagination of planning and what it can do to address the uneven and altogether 
                                                        
212 In India, as elsewhere, urban campaigns and movements must first break the legacy of nationalist thought if they 
are to establish such common notions. The national question has rescaled to the level of urban society, as such 
scaled down to the “city” level, its politics and imaginings, as well as jumped to the urban, a scale that 
simultaneously supersedes the nation-state. Indeed, the “city-region is now viewed as the fundamental unit of 
economic development and potential environmental collapse.” (Merrifield 2013: xiv) The promises and perils of 
development that fueled the building of the post-Independent nation have instantiated themselves on the urban scale. 
It is arguably a profound reason why Indian cities, like other postcolonial cities, are not the premiere (actual or 
theoretical) sites of revolt and rebellion, experimentation with democratic insurrection and militancy, when 
compared to other contemporary cities as well as their own national arena during decolonization.  
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lacking distribution of social welfare and social justice in the city. They show us that collective 
imagination can be a meaningful material force in the shaping of city futures.213  
The people’s planning campaign represents a new municipalist orientation whose 
potential for unseating the most entrenched orthodoxies of planning and regimes of 
administration in urban India is far from charted. But what it does represent is an experiment in 
democratic municipalism and institutional imagination that can be understood as percolating in 
various ways in “rebel cities” across the planet in the last decade, from Cairo to Barcelona and 
Madrid, to Athens, to Buenos Aires, where what has been emerging are a number of “radical 
innovation[s] of democratic institutions and a development of capacities to administer together 
the common in which social life is written…[from] a coalition that expresses in subversive, 
antagonistic form the plural ontology of society” (Hardt and Negri 2017: 228).  
 Plan-making, decision-making, and implementation put questions of urban development 
squarely in the domain of state planning and urban governance. 214 But as an anthropology of 
planning suggests, planning is also a process that is shaped by promises embedded in the 
complex sociospatial relationships between residents of a city. As Friedmann states 
‘By serving corporate capital, it is caught up in the vortex of unlimited economic expansion. By serving the 
state, it works for the economy of destruction. Only by serving people directly, when people are organised 
to act collectively on their own behalf, will it contribute toward the project of an alternative development’ 
(Friedmann 1987: 11). 
 
 Can disparate and subterranean stirrings of the imagination such as Hamara Shehar 
Mumbai play a significant role in metropolitan planning? The answer lies in how it may inspire 
urban movements that understand and address the nature of informality as well as the causes and 
                                                        
213 As Gilmore states, “the resilience of [grassroots] planning, its reworking into the landscape of community action 
through both workshops and other kinds of political engagement, enables the creative imagination that self-
determination requires.” (2007: 54).  
214 Unlike in Kolkata, where a Communist-led government for three decades emphasized democratic 
decentralization and bottom-up planning, if only in name, Mumbai has always been ruled from above by bourgeois 
(colonial, industrialist, ethnic) elites. 
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possible remedies of fragmentation in social life and everyday political culture. These 
fragmentations are class and ethnic schisms that sometimes are all the more immovable when 
articulated as “community” or neighborhood place-based identities, or based on party patronage. 
Can collective urban knowledge be the basis of a municipalist organization that can learn how to 
govern without dependency on professionals?  
 At the heart of these stirrings in Mumbai are a number of communities who have faced 
different aspects of the planning regime and also face different fates. Yet, the urge to resist the 
direction of current planning and to propose something new is only possible through a careful 
stitching together of these different perspectives into what they self-consciously refer to as a 
“peoples’ plan.” Thus, the success of the campaign is a wager on two central strategies: 
collective self-determination in development and the articulation and recognition of a plural 
political community. 
Nevertheless, challenging an elite urban world view, and specifically calling it into 
question as an ideology, has been important work of the citywide grassroots campaign that has 
emerged in Mumbai in recent years. As such, Hamara Shehar campaign’s vision and political 
mobilizations have emerged as a countermunicipal cartography (collective productions of spatial 
knowledge and politics) that inform alternative understandings of municipal forms of life. Can 
the development of their power and collective self-determination critically come to define the 
meaning of Mumbai’s urban development? The hope and the uncertainties that remain after the 
city’s recent populist cycle of mobilizations and struggles lie on the threshold of an important 
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